Summa Contra Gentiles

 Book 1

 The Function of the Wise Man

 Of the Author's Purpose

 That the Truths which we confess concerning God fall under two Modes or Categories

 That it is an advantage for the Truths of God, known by Natural Reason, to be proposed to men to be believed on faith

 That it is an advantage for things that cannot he searched out by Reason to be proposed as Tenets of Faith

 That there is no lightmindedness in assenting to Truths of Faith, although they are above Reason

 That the Truth of reason is not contrary to the Truth of Christian Faith

 Of the Relation of Human Reason to the first Truth of Faith*

 The Order and Mode of Procedure in this Work

 Of the Opinion of those who say that the Existence of God cannot he proved, being a Self-evident Truth

 Rejection of the aforesaid Opinion, and Solution of the aforesaid Reasons

 Of the Opinion of those who say that the Existence of God is a Tenet of Faith alone and cannot he demonstrated

 Reasons in Proof of the Existence of God

 That in order to a Knowledge of God we must use the Method of Negative Differentiation*

 That God is Eternal

 That in God there is no Passive Potentiality

 That in God there is no Composition

 That God is Incorporeal

 That God is His own Essence*

 That in God Existence and Essence is the same*

 That in God there is no Accident

 That the Existence of God cannot he characterised by the addition of any Substantial Differentia*

 That God is not in any Genus

 That God is Universal Perfection

 How Likeness to God may be found in Creatures

 What Names can be predicated of God

 That the Plurality of divine Names is not inconsistent with the Simplicity of the Divine Being predicated of God and of other Beings

 That nothing is predicated of God and other beings synonymously*

 That it is not at all true that the application of common Predicates to God and to Creatures involves nothing beyond a mere Identity of Name

 That the things that are said God and Creatures are said analogously

 That the several Names predicated of God are not synonymous

 That the Propositions which our Understanding forms of God are not void of meaning

 That God is His own Goodness*

 That in God there can be no Evil

 That God is the Good of all Good

 That God is One

 That God is Infinite

 That God has Understanding

 That in God the Understanding is His very Essence

 That God understands by nothing else than by His own Essence

 That God perfectly understands Himself

 That God primarily and essentially knows Himself alone

 That God knows other things besides Himself

 That God has a particular Knowledge of all things

 Some Discussion of the Question how there is in the Divine Understanding a Multitude of Objects

 Reasons to show how the Multitude of intelligible Ideal Forms has no Existence except in the Divine Understanding

 How there is in God a Multitude of Objects of Understanding

 That the Divine Essence, being One, is the proper Likeness and Type of all things Intelligible*

 That God understands all things at once and together

 That there is no Habitual Knowledge in God

 That the Knowledge of God is not a Reasoned Knowledge

 That God does not understand by Combination and Separation of Ideas

 That the Truth to be found in Propositions is not excluded from God

 That God is Truth

 That God is pure Truth

 That the Truth of God is the First and Sovereign Truth

 The Arguments of those who wish to withdraw from God the Knowledge of Individual Things*

 A list of things to be said concerning the Divine Knowledge

 That God Knows Individual Things

 That God knows things which are not*

 That God knows Individual Contingent Events*

 That God knows the Motions of the Will

 That God knows infinite things*

 That God knows Base and Mean Things*

 That God knows Evil Things

 That God has a Will

 That the Will of God is His Essence

 That the Object of the Will of God in the First Place is God Himself

 That God in willing Himself wills also other things besides Himself*

 That with one and the same Act of the Will God wills Himself and all other Beings

 That the Multitude of the Objects of God's Will is not inconsistent with the Simplicity of His Substance

 That the Divine Will reaches to the good of Individual Existences

 That God wills things even that as yet are not

 That God of necessity wills His own Being and His own Goodness

 That God does not of necessity love other things than Himself

 Arguments against the aforesaid Doctrine and Solutions of the same

 That God wills anything else than Himself with an Hypothetical Necessity*

 That the Will of God is not of things in themselves Impossible

 That the Divine Will does not take away Contingency from things

 That Reason can be assigned for the Divine Will*

 That nothing can be a Cause to the Divine Will

 That there is a Free Will in God

 That there are no Passions in God

 That there is in God Delight and Joy

 That there is Love in God.*

 In what sense Virtues can be posited in God

 That in God there are the Virtues which regulate Action

 That the Contemplative (Intellectual) Virtues are in God

 That God cannot will Evil

 That God hates nothing

 That God is Living

 That God is His own Life

 That the Life of God is everlasting

 Book 2

 Connexion of what follows with what has gone before.

 That the Philosopher and the Theologian view Creatures from Different Standpoints

 Order of Matters to be Treated

 That it belongs to God to be to other Beings the Principle of Existence

 That there is in God Active Power

 That God's Power is His Substance

 That God's Power is His Action

 In what manner Power is said to be in God

 That something is predicated of God in relation to Creatures

 That the Relations, predicated of God in regard to Creatures, are not really in God*

 How the aforesaid Relations are predicated of God

 That the Predication of many Relations of God is no prejudice to the Simplicity and Singleness of His Being

 That God is to all things the Cause of their being

 That God has brought things into being out of nothing

 That Creation is not a Movement nor a Change

 Solution of Arguments against Creation*

 That Creation is not Successive

 That it belongs to God alone to create

 That God is Almighty

 That God's Action in Creation is not of Physical Necessity, but of Free Choice of Will

 That God acts by His Wisdom*

 In what sense some things are said to be Impossible to the Almighty

 That the Divine Understanding is not limited to certain fixed Effects

 That God has not brought things into being in discharge of any Debt of Justice

 How in the Production of a Creature there may be found a debt of Justice in respect of the necessary Sequence of something posterior upon something pr

 How Absolute Necessity may have place in Creation

 That it is not necessary for Creatures to have existed from Eternity*

 Reasons alleged for the Eternity of the World on the part of God, with Answers to the same

 Reasons alleged for the Eternity of the World on the part Creatures, with answers to the same

 Reasons alleged for the Eternity of the World on the part of the Creative Process itself, with Answers to the same

 Arguments wherewith some try to show that the World is not Eternal, and Solutions of the same

 That the Variety of Creatures does not arise from any Contrariety of Prime Agents*

 That the Variety of Creatures has not arisen from Variety of Merits and Demerits

 The Real Prime Cause of the Variety of Creatures.

 That it was necessary for the Perfection of the Universe that there should be some Intellectual Natures

 That Subsistent Intelligences are Voluntary Agents

 That Subsistent Intelligences have Free Will

 That Subsistent Intelligence is not Corporeal

 That in Created Subsistent Intelligences there is a Difference between Existence and Essence

 That in Created Subsistent Intelligences there is Actuality and Potentiality

 That Subsistent Intelligences are Imperishable

 How a Subsistent Intelligence may be united with a Body, with a Solution of the Arguments alleged to prove that a Subsistent Intelligence cannot be un

 Plato's Theory of the Union of the Intellectual Soul with the Body*

 That Vegetative, Sentient, and Intelligent are not in man Three Souls

 That the Potential Intellect of Man is not a Spirit subsisting apart from Matter*

 That Man is not a Member the Human Species by possession of Passive Intellect, but by possession of Potential Intellect

 That the aforesaid Tenet is contrary to the Mind of Aristotle

 Against the Opinion of Alexander concerning the Potential Intellect*

 That the Soul is not a Harmony*

 That the Soul is not a Body

 Against those who suppose Intellect and Sense to be the same

 Against those who maintain that the Potential Intellect is the Phantasy*

 How a Subsistent Intelligence may be the Form of a Body

 Solution of the Arguments alleged to show that a Subsistent Intelligence cannot be united with a Body as the Form of that Body*

 That the Potential Intellect is not One and the Same in all Men

 Of the Opinion of Avicenna, who supposed Intellectual Forms not to be preserved in the Potential Intellect*

 Confutation of the Arguments which seem to prove the Unity of the Potential Intellect

 That the Active Intellect is not a separately Subsisting Intelligence, But a Faculty of the Soul

 That it is not impossible for the Potential and the Active Intellect to be united in the one Substance of the Soul

 That it was not the opinion of Aristotle that the Active Intellect is a separately Subsistent Intelligence, but rather that it is a part of the Soul*

 That the Human Soul does not Perish with the Body

 Arguments of those who wish to prove that the Human Soul perishes with the Body, with Replies to the same

 That the Souls of Dumb Animals are not Immortal

 Apparent Arguments to show that the Human Soul does not begin with the Body, but has been from Eternity, with Replies to the same

 That the Soul is not of the substance of God

 That the Human Soul is not transmitted by Generation*

 That the Human Soul is brought into Being by a Creative Act of God

 Arguments against the Truth of the Conclusion last drawn, with their Solution

 That there are Subsistent Intelligences not united with Bodies*

 That Intelligences subsisting apart are not more than one in the same Species*

 That an Intelligence subsisting apart and a Soul are not of one Species

 That Intelligences subsisting apart do not gather their Knowledge from Objects of Sense

 That the Mind of an Intelligence subsisting apart is ever in the act of understanding

 How one separately subsisting Intelligence knows another

 That Intelligences subsisting apart know Material Things, that is to say, the Species of Things Corporeal

 That Intelligences subsisting apart know Individual Things

 Whether to Separately Subsisting Intelligences all Points of their Natural Knowledge are Simultaneously Present

 Book 3

 Preface to the Book that Follows

 That every Agent acts to some End

 That every Agent acts to some Good

 That Evil in things is beside the Intention of the Agent

 Arguments against the Truth of the Conclusion last drawn, with Solutions of the Same

 That Evil is not a Nature or Essence*

 Arguments against the aforsesaid Conclusion, with Answers to the same

 That the Cause of Evil is good

 That Evil is founded in some Good

 That Evil does not entirely swallow up Good

 That Evil is an Accidental Cause

 That there is not any Sovereign Evil, acting as the Principle of All Evils

 That the End in View of everything is some Good

 That all Things are ordained to one End, which is God

 How God is the End of all Things

 That all Things aim at Likeness to God

 How Things copy the Divine Goodness

 That Things aim at Likeness to God in being Causes of other Things

 That all Things seek good, even Things devoid of Consciousness

 That the End of every Subsistent Intelligence is to understand God

 That Happiness does not consist in any Act of the Will*

 That the Happiness of Man does not consist in Bodily Pleasures

 That Happiness does not consist in Honours nor in Human Glory

 That Man's Happiness does not consist in Riches

 That Happiness does not consist in Worldly Power

 That Happiness does not consist in the Goods of the Body

 That the Final Happiness Man does not consist in Acts of the Moral Virtues

 That the Final Happiness of Man consists in the Contemplation of God

 That Human Happiness does not consist in such Knowledge of God as is common to the majority of Mankind

 That Happiness does not consist in the Knowledge of God which is to be had by Demonstration

 That Happiness does not consist in the Knowledge of God by Faith

 [That we cannot find happiness in this life by sharing an angel's natural knowledge of God]*

 That the Soul in this life does not understand itself by itself

 That we cannot in this life see God as He essentially is*

 That the Final Happiness of Man is not in this Life*

 That the Knowledge which Pure Spirits have of God through knowing their own Essence does not carry with it a Vision of the Essence of God

 That the desire of Pure Intelligences does not rest satisfied in the Natural Knowledge which they have of God

 How God is seen as He essentially is

 That no Created Substance can of its natural power arrive to see God as He essentially is

 That a Created Intelligence needs some influx of Divine Light to see God in His Essence

 Arguments against the aforesaid statements, and their Solutions

 That the Created Intelligence does not comprehend the Divine Substance

 That no Created Intelligence in seeing God sees all things that can be seen in Him

 That every Intelligence of every grade can be partaker of the vision of God

 That one may see God more perfectly than another

 How they who see the Divine Substance see all things

 That they who see God see all things in Him at once

 That by the Sight of God one is Partaker of Life Everlasting

 That they who see God will see Him for ever

 How in that Final Happiness every Desire of Man is fulfilled

 That God governs things by His Providence

 That God preserves things in being

 That nothing gives Being except in as much as it acts in the Power of God

 That God is the Cause of Activity in all Active Agents

 That God is everywhere and in all things

 Of the Opinion of those who withdraw from Natural Things their Proper Actions

 How the Same Effect is from God and from a Natural Agent

 That the Divine Providence is not wholly inconsistent with the presence of Evil in Creation

 That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with an element of Contingency in Creation*

 That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with Freedom of the Will

 That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with Fortune and Chance*

 That the Providence of God is exercised over Individual and Contingent Things

 That the Providence of God watches immediately over all Individual Things

 That the arrangements of Divine Providence are carried into execution by means of Secondary Causes

 That Intelligent Creatures are the Medium through which other Creatures are governed by God

 Of the Subordination of Men one to another

 That other Subsistent Intelligences cannot be direct Causes of our Elections and Volitions*

 That the Motion of the Will is caused by God, and not merely by the Power of the Will

 That Human Choices and Volitions are subject to Divine Providence

 How Human Things are reduced to Higher Causes*

 In what sense one is said to be Fortunate, and how Man is aided by Higher Causes*

 Of Fate, whether there be such a thing, and if so, what it is

 Of the Certainty of Divine Providence*

 That the Immutability of Divine Providence does not bar the Utility of Prayer

 That God does not hear all Prayers

 How the Arrangements of Providence follow a Plan

 God can work beyond the Order laid down for Creatures, and produce Effects without Proximate Causes

 That the things which God does beyond the Order of Nature are not contrary to Nature*

 Of Miracles

 That God alone works Miracles

 How Separately Subsisting Spirits work certain Wonders, which yet are not true Miracles

 That the Works of Magicians are not due solely to the Influence of the Heavenly Spheres*

 Whence the performances of Magicians derive their Efficacy*

 That the Subsistent Intelligence, which lends Efficacy to Magical Performances, is not Good in both Categories of Being*

 That the Subsistent Intelligence, whose aid is employed in Magic, is not Evil by Nature*

 Arguments seeming to prove that Sin is impossible to Spirits, with Solutions of the same

 That in Spirits there may be Sin, and how

 That Rational Creatures are governed by Providence for their own sakes, and other Creatures in reference to them*

 That the acts of the Rational Creature are guided by God, not merely to the realisation of the Specific Type, but also to the realisation of the Indiv

 That it was necessary for a Law to be given to Man by God

 That the main purpose of the Divine Law is to subordinate Man to God

 That the End of the Divine Law is the Love of God

 That by the Divine Law we are directed to the Love of our Neighbour

 That by Divine Law men are obliged to a Right Faith

 That by certain Sensible Rites our mind is directed to God

 That the Worship of Latria is to be paid to God alone

 That the Divine Law directs man to a Rational Use of Corporeal and Sensible Things

 Of the reason for which Simple Fornication is a Sin by Divine Law, and of the Natural Institution of Marriage

 That Marriage ought to be Indissoluble

 That Marriage ought to be between one Man and one Woman

 That Marriage ought not to take place between Kindred

 That not all Sexual is Sin

 That of no Food is the Use Sinful in itself

 How the Law of God relates a man to his Neighbour

 That the things commanded by the Divine Law are Right, not only because the Law enacts them, but also according to Nature

 That the Divine Government of Men is after the manner of Paternal Government

 Of the Counsels that are given in the Divine Law

 Arguments against Voluntary Poverty, with Replies

 Of various Modes of Living adopted by the Votaries of Voluntary Poverty

 In what the Good of Poverty consists

 Arguments against Perpetual Continence, with Replies

 Against those who find fault with Vows

 That neither all Good Works nor all Sins are Equal*

 That a Man's Acts are punished or rewarded by God

 Of the Difference and Order of Punishments

 That not all Punishments nor all Rewards are Equal

 Of the Punishment due to Mortal and Venial Sins respectively in regard to the Last End

 That the Punishment whereby one is deprived of his Last End is Interminable*

 That Sins are punished also by the experience of something Painful

 That it is Lawful for judges to inflict Punishments

 That Man stands in need of Divine Grace for the Gaining of Happiness

 That the Divine Assistance does not compel a Man to Virtue

 That Man cannot Merit beforehand the said Assistance

 That the aforesaid Assistance is called 'Grace,' and what is the meaning of 'Grace constituting a State of Grace'*

 That the Grace which constitutes the State of Grace causes in us the Love of God

 That Divine Grace causes in us Faith

 That Divine Grace causes in us a Hope of future Blessedness

 Of Graces given gratuitously*

 That Man needs the Assistance of Divine Grace to persevere in Good*

 That he who falls from Grace by Sin may be recovered again by Grace

 That Man cannot be delivered from Sin except by Grace

 How Man is delivered from Sin

 That it is reasonably reckoned a Man's own Fault if he be not converted to God, although he cannot be converted without Grace

 That a Man already in Mortal Sin cannot avoid more Mortal Sin without Grace*

 That some Men God delivers from Sin, and some He leaves in Sin

 That God is Cause of Sin to no Man

 Of Predestination, Reprobation, and Divine Election

 Book 4

 Preface

 Of Generation, Paternity, and Sonship in God

 The Opinion of Photinus touching the Son of God, and its Rejection*

 Rejection of the Opinion of Sabellius concerning the Son of God*

 Of the Opinion of Arius concerning the Son of God*

 Rejection of Arius's Position

 Explanation of the Texts which Arius used to allege for himself

 How the Son of God is called the Wisdom of God

 That the Holy Ghost is true God

 That the Holy Ghost is a Subsistent Person

 Of the Effects which the Scriptures attribute to the Holy Ghost in respect of the whole Creation

 Of the Effects attributed to the Holy Ghost in Scripture in the way of Gifts bestowed on the Rational Creature

 Of the Effects attributed to the Holy Ghost in the attraction of the Rational Creature to God

 Replies to Arguments alleged against the Divinity of the Holy Ghost

 That the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son*

 That there are only Three Persons in the Godhead, Father and Son and Holy Ghost

 Of the Incarnation of the Word according to the Tradition of Holy Scripture

 Of the Error of Photinus concerning the Incarnation

 Of the Error of the Manicheans concerning the Incarnation

 Of the Error of Arius and Apollinaris concerning the Soul of Christ

 Of the Error of Theodore of Mopsuestia concerning the Union of the Word with Man

 Against the Error of Eutyches

 Of the Error of Macarius of Antioch, who posited one Operation only and one Will only in Christ*

 The Doctrine of Catholic Faith concerning the Incarnation

 Objections against the Faith of the Incarnation, with Replies

 Some further Elucidation of the Incarnation

 That the Human Nature, assumed by the Word, was perfect in Soul and Body in the instant of Conception

 That Christ was born of virgin without prejudice to His true and natural Humanity

 That Christ was conceived by the Holy Ghost

 That Original Sin is transmitted from our First Parent to his Posterity

 Arguments against Original Sin, with Replies

 Of the Incarnation as part of the Fitness of Things

 Points of Reply to Difficulties touching the Economy of the Incarnation

 Of the Need of Sacraments

 Of the Difference between the Sacraments of the Old and of the New Law

 Of the Number of the Sacraments of the New Law

 Of Baptism

 Of Confirmation

 Of the Eucharist

 Of the Conversion of Bread into the Body of Christ

 An Answer to Difficulties raised in respect of Place

 The Difficulty of the Accidents remaining

 What happens when the Sacramental Species pass away

 Answer to the Difficulty raised in respect of the Breaking of the Host

 The Explanation of a Text

 Of the kind of Bread and Wine that ought to be used for the Consecration of this Sacrament

 That it is possible for a man to sin after receiving Sacramental Grace*

 That a man who sins after the Grace of the Sacraments may be converted to Grace*

 Of the need of the Sacrament of Penance, and of the Parts thereof

 Of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction

 Of the Sacrament of Order

 Of the Distinction of Orders

 Of the Episcopal Dignity, and that therein one Bishop is Supreme

 That Sacraments can be administered even by Wicked Ministers

 Of the Sacrament of Matrimony

 That through Christ the Resurrection of our Bodies will take place

 Some Points of Reply to Difficulties on the Resurrection

 That Men shall rise again Immortal

 That in the Resurrection there will be no use of Food or of the Sexes

 That Risen Bodies shall be of the same Nature as before

 That the Bodies of the Risen shall be otherwise organised than before

 Of the Qualities of Glorified Bodies

 Of Sex and Age in the Resurrection

 Of the Quality of Risen Bodies in the Lost

 How Incorporeal Subsistent Spirits suffer from Corporeal Fire, and are befittingly punished with Corporeal Punishments

 That Souls enter upon Punishment or Reward immediately after their Separation from their Bodies

 That the Souls of the Saints after Death have their Will immutably fixed on Good

 That the Souls of the Wicked after Death have their Will immutably fixed on Evil

 Of the General Cause of Immutability in all Souls after their Separation from the Body

 Of the Last judgement

 Of the State of the World after the judgement

Of various Modes of Living adopted by the Votaries of Voluntary Poverty

FIRST MODE. The first mode is for the possessions of all to be sold, and all to live in common on [the capital fund accumulated by] the price, as was done under the Apostles at Jerusalem: As many as had possessions in lands or houses sold them, and laid the price at the feet of the Apostles, and division was made to each according to the need of each (Acts iv, 34, 35).

Criticism. It is not easy to induce many men with great possessions to take up this mode of life; and if the amount realised out of the possessions of a few rich is divided among many recipients, it will not last long.

Reply. This mode will do, but not for a long time. And therefore we do not read of the Apostles instituting this inode of living when they passed to the nations among whom the Church was to take root and endure.

Second Mode. To have possessions in common, sufficient to provide for all members of the community out of what the property brings in, as is done in most monasteries.

Criticism. Earthly possessions breed solicitude, as well for the gathering in of the returns as also for the defence of them against acts of fraud and violence; and this solicitude is all the greater as greater possessions are required for the support of many. In this way then the end of voluntary poverty is defeated, at least in the case of many, who have the procuratorship of these possessions. Besides, common possession is wont to be a source of discord.

Reply. The administration of these common possessions may be left to the care of one or a few persons, and the rest remain without solicitude for temporals, free to attend to spiritual things. Nor do they who undertake this solicitude for others lose any of the perfection of their life: for what they seem to lose by defect of quiet they recover in the service of charity, in which perfection consists. Nor is there any loss of concord by occasion of this mode of common possessions. For they who adopt voluntary poverty ought to be persons who despise temporal things; and such persons are not the men to quarrel over temporals.

Third mode. To live by the labour of one's hands, as St Paul did and advised others to do. We have not eaten bread of any one for nothing, but in labour and fatigue, night and day working, not to be a burden to any of you: not that we had not authority to act otherwise, but to present ourselves to you as a model for you to imitate: for when we were with you, we laid down to you the rule, if any man not work, neither let him eat (2 Thess. iii, 8-10).

Criticism. It seems folly for one to abandon what is necessary, and afterwards try to get it back again by labour. Moreover, whereas the end of the counsel of voluntary poverty is the readier following of Christ in freedom from worldly solicitudes, earning one's livelihood by one's own labour is a matter of more anxiety than living on the possessions which one had before, especially if they were a modest competency. And the Lord seems to forbid manual labour to His disciples in the text: Behold the fowls of the air, for they sow not, neither do they reap: consider the lilies of the field how they grow, they labour not, neither do they spin (Matt. vi, 26, 28). Moreover this mode of living is inadequate. Many desire a perfect life, who have not the capacity for earning their livelihood by labour, not having been brought up thereto: also there is the possibility of sickness. And no little time must be spent in labour to suffice for earning a livelihood: many spend their whole time in labour, and yet can scarcely live. Thus the votaries of voluntary poverty will be hindered from study and spiritual exercises; and their poverty will be more of a hindrance than a help to the perfection of their life.

Reply. In the case of rich men, their possessions involve solicitude in getting them or keeping them; and the heart of the owner is drawn to them; inconveniences which do not happen to one whose sole object is to gain his daily bread by the labour of his hands. Little time is sufficient, and little solicitude is necessary, for gaining by the labour of one's hands enough to support nature: but for gathering riches and superfluities, as craftsmen in the world propose, much time has to be spent and much solicitude shown. Our Lord in the Gospel has not forbidden labour of the hands, but anxiety of mind about the necessaries of life. He did not say, Do not labour, but, Be not solicitous. And this precept He enforces by an argument from less to greater. For if divine providence sustains birds and lilies, which are of inferior condition, and cannot labour at those works whereby men get their livelihood, much more will it provide for men, who are of worthier condition, and to whom it has given ability to win their livelihood by their own labours. It is the exception for a man not to be able to win enough to live upon by the labour of his hands; and an institution is not to be rejected for exceptional cases. The remedy is, for him whose labour is not enough to keep him, to be helped out either by others of the same society, who can make more by their labour than is necessary for them, or by others who are well off. Nor need those who are content with little spend much time in seeking a livelihood by the labour of their hands: so they are not much hindered from spiritual works, especially as in working with their hands they can think of God and praise Him.

Fourth mode. To live on the alms contributed by others, who retain their wealth. This seems to have been the method observed by our Lord: for it is said that sundry women followed Christ, and ministered to him out of their means (Luke viii, 2, 3).

Criticism. It seems irrational for one to abandon his own and live on an other's property, -- or for one to receive of another and pay him back nothing in return. There is no impropriety in ministers of the altar and preachers, to whom the people are indebted for doctrine and other divine gifts, receiving support at their hands: for the labourer is worthy of his hire, as the Lord says (Matt. x, 10); and the Apostle, the Lord hath ordained that they who preach the gospel should live by the gospel (1 Cor. ix, 14). But it is an apparent absurdity for these persons who minister to the people in no office to receive the necessaries of life from the people. Others moreover, who through sickness and poverty cannot help themselves, must lose their alms through these professors of voluntary poverty, since men neither can nor will succour a great multitude of poor. Moreover independence of spirit is particularly requisite for perfect virtue: otherwise men easily become partakers in other people's sins, either by expressly consenting to them, or by palliating or dissembling them. But this method of life is a great drawback to such independence, for a man cannot but shrink from offending one by whose patronage he lives. Moreover the necessity of exposing one's necessities to others, and begging relief, renders mendicants objects of contempt and dislike, whereas persons who take up a perfect life ought to be reverenced and loved. But if any one will praise the practice of begging as conducive to humility, he seems to talk altogether unreasonably. For the praise of humility consists in despising earthly exaltation, such as comes of riches, honours, fame, but not in despising loftiness of virtue, for in that respect we ought to be magnanimous. That then would be a blameworthy humility, for the sake of which any one should do anything derogatory to loftiness of virtue. But the practice of begging is so derogatory, as well because it is more virtuous to give than to receive, as also because there is a look of filthy lucre about it.

Reply. There is no impropriety in him being supported by the alms of others, who has abandoned his own possessions for the sake of something that turns to the profit of others. Were this not so, human society could not go on. If every one busied himself only about his own affairs, there would be no one to minister to the general advantage. The best thing then for human society (hominum societati) is that they who neglect the care of their own interests to serve the general advantage, should be supported by those whose advantage they serve. Therefore do soldiers live on pay provided by others, and civil rulers are provided for out of the common fund. But they who embrace voluntary poverty to follow Christ, certainly abandon what they have to serve the common advantage, enlightening the people by wisdom, learning and example, or sustaining them by their prayer and intercession. Hence there is nothing base in their living on what they get from others, seeing that they make a greater return, receiving temporals and helping others in spirituals. Hence the Apostle says: Let your abundance in temporals supply their want, that their abundance in spirituals also may supply your want (2 Cor. viii, 14: cf. Rom. xv, 27). For he who abets another becomes a partner in his work, whether for good or evil. By their example other men become less attached to riches, seeing them abandon riches altogether for the sake of perfection. And the less one loves riches, the more ready will he be to make distribution of his riches in other's need: hence they who embrace voluntary poverty are useful to other poor people, provoking the rich to works of mercy by word and example. Nor do they lose their liberty of spirit for the little they receive from others for their sustenance. A man does not lose his independence except for things that become predominant in his affections: for things that a man despises, if they are given to him, he does not lose his liberty. Nor is there any unseemliness in their exposing their necessities, and asking what they need either for themselves or others. The Apostles are read to have done so (2 Cor. viii, ix). Such begging does not render men contemptible, if it is done moderately, for necessaries, not for superfluities, without importunity, and with due regard to the conditions of the persons asked, and place and time. There is no shadow of disgrace about such begging, though there would be, if it were done with importunity or without discretion.

There is, no doubt, a certain humiliation in begging, as having a thing done to you is less honourable than doing it, and receiving than giving, and obeying royal power than governing and reigning. The spontaneous embracing of humiliations is a practice of humility, not in any and every case, but when it is done for a needful purpose: for humility, being a virtue, does nothing indiscreetly. It is then not humility but folly to embrace any and every humiliation: but where virtue calls for a thing to be done, it belongs to humility not to shrink from doing it for the humiliation that goes with it, for instance, not to refuse some mean service where charity calls upon you so to help your neighbour. Thus then where begging is requisite for the perfection of a life of poverty, it is a point of humility to bear this humiliation. Sometimes too, even where our own duty does not require us to embrace humiliations, it is an act of virtue to take them up in order to encourage others by our example more easily to bear what is incumbent on them: for a general sometimes will do the office of a common soldier to encourage the rest. Sometimes again we may make a virtuous use of humiliations as a medicine. Thus if any one's mind is prone to undue self-exaltation, he may with advantage make a moderate use of humiliations, either self-imposed or imposed by others, so to check the elation of his spirit by putting himself on a level with the lowest class of the community in the doing of mean offices.

Fifth mode. There have also been some who said that the votaries of a perfect life should take no thought either for begging or labouring or laying up anything for themselves, but should exped their sustenance from God alone, according to the texts, Be not solicitous, and, Take no thought for the morrow (Matt. vi, 25, 34).

Criticism. This seems quite an irrational proceeding. For it is foolish to wish an end and omit the means ordained to that end. Now to the end of eating there is ordained some human care of providing oneself with food. They then who cannot live without eating ought to have some solicitude about seeking their food. There follows also a strange absurdity: for by parity of reasoning one might say that he will not walk, or open his mouth to eat, or avoid a stone falling, or a sword striking him, but expect God to do all, which is tantamount to tempting God.*

Reply. It is quite an irrational error to suppose that all solicitude about making a livelihood is forbidden by the Lord. Every action requires care: if then a man ought to have no solicitude about temporal things, it follows that he should do nothing temporal, which is neither a possible nor a reasonable course. For God has prescribed to every being actions according to the peculiarity of its nature. Man, being made up of a nature at once spiritual and corporeal, must by divine ordinance exercise bodily actions; and at the same time have spiritual aims; and he is the more perfect, the more spiritual his aims are. But it is not a mode of perfection proper to man to omit bodily action: bodily actions serve necessary purposes in the preservation of life; and whoever omits them neglects his life, which he is bound to preserve. To look for aid from God in matters in which one can help oneself by one's own action, and so to leave that action out, is a piece of folly and a tempting of God: for it is proper to the divine goodness to provide for things, not immediately by doing everything itself, but by moving other things to their own proper action (Chap. LXXVII). We must not then omit the means of helping ourselves, and expect God to help us in defect of all action of our own: that is inconsistent with the divine ordinance and with His goodness.

But because, though it rests with us to act, still that our actions shall attain their due end does not rest with us, owing to obstacles that may arise, the success that each one shall have in his action comes under divine arrangement. The Lord then lays it down that we ought not to be solicitous for what does not belong to us, that is, for the success of our actions: but He has not forbidden us to be solicitous about what does belong to us, that is, for the work which we ourselves do. It is not then to act against the precept of the Lord, to feel solicitude for the things which have to be done; but he goes against the precept, who is solicitous for what may turn out even when (etiam si) he does all that is in his power to do, and takes due precautions beforehand (praemittat) to meet the contingency of such untoward events.

When that is done, we ought to hope in God's providence, by whom even the birds and herbs are sustained.* To feel solicitude on such points seems to appertain to the error of the Gentiles who deny divine providence. Therefore the Lord concludes that we should take no thought for the morrow (Matt. vi, 34), by which He has not forbidden us to lay up betimes things needful for the morrow; but He forbids that solicitude about future events which goes with a sort of despair of the divine assistance, as also the allowing of the solicitude that will have to be entertained to-morrow to come in before its time perversely to-day:* for every day brings its own solicitude; hence it is added, Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof.