Eusebius

 VID. arts. Semi-Arianism and Asterius for a notice of the symbol of the [ homoiousion ], in opposition to the orthodox [ homoousion ] and [ ex ousias ] on the one hand, and to [ anomoion ] on the other. Eusebius is one of the special supporters of this form of heresy. Asterius is another (vid. art. Arian Leaders ); the statements set down here and under the title "Asterius" are mainly taken from what we find in their controversial works.

 In his Letter to his people, supr. vol. i. p. 55, etc., Eusebius scarcely commits himself to any positive sense in which the formula "of the substance" ([ ex ousias ]), is to be interpreted, but only says what it does not mean. His comment on it is "of the Father, but not as a part;" where, what is not negative, instead of being an explanation, is but a recurrence to the original words of Scripture, "of the Father," of which [ ex ousias ] itself is the explanation; a curious inversion. He says, that the Son is not like the radiance of light so far as this, that the radiance is an inseparable accident of substance, whereas the Son is by the Father's will, [ kata gnomen kai proairesin ], Dem. Ev. iv. 3. (vid. art. [ Boulesis ]). And though he insists on our Lord being alone [ ek theou ], yet he means in the sense which Athan. refutes, Decr. § 7, viz. that He alone was created immediately from God. It is true that he plainly condemns with the Nicene Creed the [ ex ouk onton ] of the Arians, "the Son was out of nothing," but an evasion was at hand here also; for he not only adds, according to Arian custom, "not as others," but he has a theory that no being whatever is out of nothing, for non-existence cannot be the cause of existence. God, he says, "proposed His own will and power as a sort of matter and substance of the production and constitution of the universe, so that it is not reasonably said, that anything is out of nothing. For what is from nothing cannot be at all. How indeed can nothing be to anything a cause of being? but all that is, takes its being from One who only is and was, who also said, 'I am that I am.'" Dem. Ev. iv. 1. Again, speaking of our Lord, "He who was from nothing would not truly be Son of God, as neither is any other of things generate ." Eccl. Theol. i. 9 fin.

 He distinctly asserts, Dem. Ev. iv. 2, that our Lord is a creature. "This offspring," he says, "did He first produce Himself from Himself as a foundation of those things which should succeed; the perfect handiwork, [ demiourgema ], of the Perfect, and the wise structure [ architektonema ], of the Wise," etc. It is true in his Lett. § 6, he grants that "He was not a work resembling the things which through Him came to be;" but this again is only the ordinary Arian evasion of "an offspring, not as the offsprings." E.g. "It is not without peril to say recklessly that the Son is generate out of nothing  similarly to the other generates ." Dem. Ev. v. 1; vid. also Eccl. Theol. i. 9, iii. 2. And he considers our Lord the only Son by a divine provision similar to that by which there is only one sun in the firmament, as a centre of light and heat. "Such an Only-begotten Son, the excellent artificer of His will and operator, did the supreme God and Father of that operator Himself first of all beget, through Him and in Him giving subsistence to the operative words (ideas or causes) of things which were to be, and casting in Him the seeds of the constitution and governance of the universe; ... Therefore the Father being one, it behoved the Son to be one also; but should any one object that He did not constitute more, it is fitting for such a one to complain that He constituted not more suns, and moons, and worlds, and ten thousand other things." Dem. Ev. iv. 5 fin.; vid. also iv. 6.

 He does not say that our Lord is from the substance of the Father, but that He has a substance from the Father, "not from other substance, but from the Father." This is the Semi-Arian doctrine, which, whether confessing the Son from the substance of the Father or not, implied that His substance was not the Father's substance, but a second substance. The same doctrine is found in the Semi-Arians of Ancyra, though they seem to have confessed, "of the substance." And this is one object of the [ homoousion ], to hinder the confession "of the substance" from implying a second substance, which was not obviated or was even encouraged by the [ homoiousion ]. The Council of Ancyra, quoting the text "As the Father hath life in Himself, so," etc., says "since the life which is in the Father means substance, and the life of the Only-begotten who is begotten from the Father means substance, the word 'so' implies a likeness of substance to substance." Epiph. Hær. 73, 10 fin. Hence Eusebius does not scruple to speak of "two substances," and other writers of three substances, contr. Marcell. i. 4, p. 25. He calls our Lord "a second substance," Dem. Ev. vi. Præf.; Præp. Ev. vii. 12, p. 320, and the Holy Spirit a third substance, ibid. 15, p. 325. This it was that made the Latins so suspicious of three hypostases, because the Semi-Arians, as well as they, understood [ hypostasis ] to mean substance. Eusebius in like manner calls our Lord "another God," "a second God," Dem. Ev. v. 4, p. 226, v. fin.; "second Lord," ibid. 3 init. 6 fin.; "second cause," Dem. Ev. v. Præf.; "not the True God." Syn. § 17, Concil. vii. art. 6, p. 409. Vid. also [ heteron echousa to kat' ousian hypokeimenon ], Dem. Ev. v. 1, p. 215; [ kath' heauton ousiomenos ], ibid. iv. 3. And so [ heteros para ton patera ], Eccl. Theol. i. 20, p. 90; and [ zoen idian echon ], ibid.; and [ zon kai hyphestos kai tou patros hyparchon ektos ], ibid. Hence Athan. insists so much on our Lord not being external to the Father. Once admit that He is in the Father, and we may call the Father, the only God, for then the Son is included. And so again as to the Ingenerate, the term does not exclude the Son, for He is generate in the Ingenerate. Vid. [ Agenetos ] and Marcellus .

 The Semi-Arians, however, considering the Son as external to the Father, and this as a necessary truth, maintained, in order logically to escape Sabellianism, that the [ homoousion ] implied a separation or divulsion of the Divine Substance into two, following the line of argument of Paul of Samosata, who seems to have stopped the reception of that formula at Antioch in the third century by arguing that it involved either Sabellianism (vid. Hilary) or materialism (vid. Athan. and Basil). E.g. Euseb. Demonstr. iv. 3, p. 148, p. 149, v. 1, p. 213-215; contr. Marcell. i. 4, p. 20; Eccl. Theol. i. 12, p. 73; in laud. Const. p. 525; de Fide i. ap. Sirmond. tom. i. p. 7; de Fide ii. p. 16; and apparently his de Incorporali. And so the Semi-Arians at Ancyra, Epiph. Hær. 73, 11, p. 858. And so Meletius, ibid. p. 878 fin., and Cyril Hier. Catech. vii. 5, xi. 18. [ ou pathei pater genomenos, ouk ek sumplokes, ou kat' agnoian, ouk aporrheusas, ou meiotheis, ouk alloiotheis ]. Vid. also Eusebius's letter to his people as given by Athan. Cyril, however, who had friends among the Semi-Arians and apparently took their part, could not be stronger on this point than the Nicene Fathers.

 The only sense then in which the word [ homoousion ] could be received by such as Eusebius, would seem to be negative, unless it should rather be taken as a mere formula of peace; for he says, "We assented etc. ... without declining even the term 'Consubstantial,' peace being the object which we set before us, and maintenance of the orthodox view ... 'Consubstantial with the Father' suggests that the Son of God bears no resemblance to the creatures which have been made, but that He is in every way after the pattern of His Father alone who begat Him." Euseb. Lett. § 7. These last words can hardly be called an interpretation of [ homoousion ], for it is but saying that [ homoousio n] means [ homoiousion ], whereas the two words notoriously were antagonistic to each other.

 It must be observed too that, though the Semi-Arian [ homoiousion ] may be taken, as it is sometimes by Athan., as satisfying the claims of theological truth, especially when it is understood in the sense of [ aparallaktos eikon ], "the exact image" of the Father, (vid. Decr. § 20, Theod. Hist. i. 4,) yet it could easily be explained away. It need mean no more than a likeness of Son to Father, such as a picture to its original, while differing from it in substance. "Two men are not of like nature, but of the same nature; tin is like silver, but not of the same nature." Syn. § 47-50. Also Athan. notices that "like" applies to qualities rather than to substance. Also Basil. Ep. 8, n. 3; "While in itself," says the same Father, "it is frequently used of faint similitudes, and falling very far short of the original." Ep. 9, n. 3. But the word [ homoousion ] implies " the same in likeness," [ tauton tei omoiosei ], that the likeness may not be considered analogical. vid. Cyril. in Joan. iii. 5, p. 302. Eusebius makes no concealment that it is in this sense that he uses the word [ homoiousion ], for he says, "Though our Saviour Himself teaches that the Father is the only True, still let me not be backward to confess Him also the true God, as in an Image, and as possessed; so that the addition of 'only' may belong to the Father alone as Archetype of the Image ... As supposing one king held sway, and his image was carried about into every quarter, no one in his right mind would say that those who held sway were two, but one, who was honoured through his image." de Eccl. Theol. ii. 23; vid. ibid. 7, pp. 109, 111.

 Accordingly, instead of [ ex ousias ], which was the Nicene formula, he held [ metousiai ], that is, "like to the Father by participation of qualities," as a creature may be; [ ex autes tes patrikes ] [not [ ousias ], but] [ metousias, hosper apo peges, ep' auton procheomenes pleroumenon ]. Eccl. Theol. i. 2. Whereas Athan. says, [ oude kata metousian autou, all' holon idion autou gennema ]. Orat. iii. § 4. Disc. n. 228.) "If ye speak of the Son as being merely such by participation, [ metousiai ], then call Him [ homoiousion ]," Syn. 53; but no, it is for creatures to possess God [ metousiai ], but when God is said to beget, this is all one with enunciating the [ ex ousias ], and a whole participation. Vid. Orat. i. § 16.

 Hence St. Austin says, as quoted supr. Arian tenets, "As the Father has life in Himself, so hath He given also to the Son to have life in Himself, not by participating, but in Himself. For we have not life in ourselves, but in our God. But that Father, who has life in Himself, begat a Son such, as to have life in Himself, not to become partaker of life, but to be Himself life ; and of that life to make us partakers ." Serm. 127, de Verb. Evang. 9.

 In Eusebius's Letter to Euphration, as quoted in the seventh Ecum. Council, he introduced the usual Arian argument against the Son's Eternity. "If they co-exist, how shall the Father be Father and the Son Son? or how the One first, and the Other second? and the One ingenerate and the Other generate?" Vid. supr. Arian tenets .

 And further he explained away what Catholics held of the eternity of the gennesis by insisting that God was a Father in posse from eternity, not in fact. "Our religious Emperor did at the time," at Nicæa, "prove in a speech, that our Lord was in being even according to His Divine generation, which is before all ages, since even before He was generated in fact He was in virtue with the Father ingenerately, the Father being always Father, as King always and Saviour always, being all things in virtue, and having all things in the same respects and in the same way." Eus. Lett. § 10.

 Theognis too, another of the Nicene Arians, says the same, according to Philostorgius; viz. "that God even before He begat the Son was a Father, as having the power, [ dunamis ], of being so," Hist. ii. 15, 16; and Asterius. They are answered by Catholics, on the ground that Father and Son are words of nature, but Creator, King, Saviour, are external, or what may be called accidental to Him. Thus Athanasius observes, that Father actually implies Son, but Creator only the power to create, as expressing a [ dunamis ]; "a maker is before his works, but he who says Father, forthwith in Father implies the existence of the Son." Orat. iii. 6. ( Disc . n. 231, supr. vol. i. p. 364.) Vid. Cyril too, Dial. ii. p. 459; Pseudo-Basil. contr. Eun. iv. 1 fin. On the other hand Origen argues the reverse way, that since God is eternally a Father, therefore eternally Creator also. "As one cannot be father without a son, nor lord without possession, so neither can God be called All-powerful, without subjects of His power," Periarch. i. 2, n. 10; hence he argued for the eternity of creation, which Suarez, after St. Thomas, allows to be abstractedly possible. Vid. Theol. Tracts ii. § 11 circ. fin.

 Athan. distinguishes as follows: that, as it is of the essence of a son to be of the nature of the father, so is it of the essence of a creature to be of nothing, [ ex ouk onton ]; therefore, while it was not impossible, from the nature of the case, for Almighty God to be always Father, it was impossible for the same reason that He should be always a Creator, impossible from incapacity, not in the Infinite, but in the finite. Orat. i. 29. Vid. ibid. § 58, where he takes "They shall perish," in the Psalm, not as a fact, but as the definition of the nature of a creature. Also ii. § 1, where he says, "It is proper to creatures and works to have said of them, [ ex ouk onton ] and [ ouk hen prin gennethei ]." Vid. Cyril. Thesaur. 9, p. 67. Dial. ii. p. 460.

 It has been above shown that Eusebius held with Arians generally that our Lord was created by the God of all in order that He might create all else. And this was because the creation could not bear the Divine Hand, as the Arians also said. Vid. a clear and eloquent passage in his Eccl. Theol. i. 8, also 13, to show that our Lord was brought into being before all creation, [ epi soteriai ton holon ]. Vid. also Demonstr. iv. 4; Præp. vii. 15; but especially his remark, "not because the Father was not able to create, did He beget the Son, but because those things which were made were not able to sustain the power of the Ingenerate, therefore speaks He through a Mediator," contra Sabell. i. p. 9.

 There is another peculiarity of Eusebius's view of the creative office of the Divine Word, in contrast with the Catholic doctrine. It is that the Word does not create from His own designs, as being Himself really the [ tupos ], [ eikon ], and [ hypogramma ] of those things which He is creating, but that He copies the Father's patterns as an external minister. "The Father designed ([ dietupou ]) and prepared with consideration, how, and of what shape, measure, and parts ... And He watching ([ enatenizon ]) the Father's thoughts, and alone beholding the depths in Him, went about the work, subserving the Father's orders ([ neumasi ]) ... As a skilful painter, taking the archetypal ideas from the Father's thoughts, He transferred them to the substances of the works." Eccl. Theol. iii. 3, pp. 164, 5.

 In this Eusebius follows the Platonists; so he does, when he attributes our Lord's Priesthood to His Divine Nature, as the Word, in which case His human sufferings have no part in it.

 Moreover, it is doubtful whether he held that our Lord, in becoming incarnate, took on Him a human soul as well as body. In his work against Marcellus, p. 54, he seems to grant his opponent's doctrine, when he says, [ ei men psuches diken (dicha) oikon en autoi toi somati ]; and at p. 55 he seems to say that, if the Word retired from the [ zoopoios sarx ], the [ sarx ] would be left [ alogos ]; vid. also ibid. p. 91.