A Treatise on the Incorruptibility of the World.

 I. (1) In every uncertain and important business it is proper to invoke God, because he is the good Creator of the world, and because nothing is uncer

 II. (4) The world, therefore, is spoken of in its primary sense as a single system, consisting of the heaven and the stars in the circumference of the

 III. (7) And there are three different opinions on the subject which we are at present discussing. Since some persons affirm that the world is eternal

 IV. (13) But some say that the world has been proved by Plato in the Timaeus to be both uncreated and indestructible, in the account of that divine as

 V. (17) But some persons think that the father of the Platonic theory was the poet Hesiod, as they conceive that the world is spoken of by him as crea

 VI. (25) And there are testimonies also in the Timaeus to the fact of the world being exempt from disease and not liable to destruction, such as these

 VII. (32) But since the world has no participation in that irregularity which exists in the things which I have just been mentioning, let us stop awhi

 VIII. (39) However, this argument also is a most demonstrative one, on which I know that vast numbers of philosophers pride themselves as one most acc

 IX. (45) And, indeed, this I imagine is evident to every one, that if the earth were to be destroyed, then all land animals of every kind must also pe

 X. (52) However, time also affords a very great argument in favour of the eternity of the world, for if time is uncreated, then it follows of necessit

 XI. (55) But Critolaus, a man who devoted himself very much to literature, and a lover of the Peripatetic philosophy, agreeing with the doctrine of th

 XII. (63) In reference to which fact it appears to me that the poets were very felicitous in the appellation which they gave to the earth when they ca

 XIII. (69) We have now then discussed at sufficient length the nonsense in opposition to truth which is uttered by those who build up falsehood and fa

 XIV. (70) But Critolaus, in arguing in support of his opinion, brought forward an argument of this kind, --That which is the cause to man of his bein

 XV. (74) And in addition to this he says, that there are three causes of death to living animals, besides the external causes which may affect them, n

 XVI. (78) But Boethus adduces the most convincing arguments, which we shall proceed to mention immediately for if, says he, the world was created and

 XVII. (85) Is it not however worth while to examine this question, in what manner there can be a regeneration of all those things which have been dest

 XVIII. (89) On which account some of the Stoics also, being gifted with a more acute discernment, and perceiving that they would infallibly be convict

 XIX. (94) Nevertheless, as Chryssipus says, some suppose that fire resolves all the arrangement of the universe when the elements are separated into i

 XX. (104) However, besides what has been here said, any one may use this argument also in corroboration of his opinion, which will certainly convince

 XXI. (107) But a person may very likely wonder at those who talk about conflagrations and regenerations, not only on account of the arguments which I

 XXII. (113) But some of those persons who have fancied that the world is everlasting, inventing a variety of new arguments, employ also such a system

 XXIII. (117) Theophrastus, moreover, says that those men who attribute a beginning and destructibility to the world are deceived by four particulars o

 XXIV. (124) And for the purpose of establishing the third alternative of this question they use the following argument: beyond all question that thing

 XXV. (132) But it is necessary to encounter such quibbling arguments as these, lest some persons of too little experience should yield to and be led a

 XXVI. These things, then, may be said by us with respect to the argument that the inequalities of the surface of the earth are no proof of the world h

 XVII. (143) And as for the third argument, it is convicted by itself, as being derived only from an unsound system of questioning proceeding from the

XX. (104) However, besides what has been here said, any one may use this argument also in corroboration of his opinion, which will certainly convince all those who are not determined to be obstinate beyond all bounds; of those things which in pairs are exactly contrary to one another it is impossible that one thing should be, and that the other should not be; for since there is white it follows as a matter of absolute necessity that there must also be black, and since there is a great there must likewise be a little; since there is an odd there must inevitably be an even; since there is a sweet there must be a bitter; since there is day there must be night; and so on in an infinite number of similar cases; but if a conflagration should take place, then something would ensue which is impossible; for then, of things in a pair, the one will happen and the other will not. (105) Come, now, let us consider the matter thus: if everything is resolved into fire, there is then something light, and rare, and warm; for all these are the especial properties of fire; but there can be nothing heavy, or cold, or thick, which are the opposites of the qualities which I have just enumerated. How then can any one more completely overturn the idea of the universal disorder which would be involved in such a conflagration than by showing that those things which by a law of nature must exist together, are by this process separated from their natural conjunction? And the separation has extended to such a degree, that those who maintain this doctrine attribute eternal durability to the one and deny any existence at all to the other. (106) Again, there is this assertion made by some of those who diligently employ themselves in investigating truth which appears to me to be a sufficiently felicitous one; if the world is destroyed it will either be destroyed by some other efficient cause, or by God; now there is certainly nothing else whatever from which it can receive its destruction, for there is nothing whatever which it does not surround and contain; but that which is surrounded and confined within something else is manifestly inferior in power to that which surrounds and confines it, by which it is therefore mastered; on the other hand, to say that it is destroyed by God is the most impious of all possible assertions; for God is the cause not of disorder, and irregularity, and destruction, but of order, and beautiful regularity, and life, and of every good thing, as is confessed by all those whose opinions are based on truth.