A Treatise on the Incorruptibility of the World.

 I. (1) In every uncertain and important business it is proper to invoke God, because he is the good Creator of the world, and because nothing is uncer

 II. (4) The world, therefore, is spoken of in its primary sense as a single system, consisting of the heaven and the stars in the circumference of the

 III. (7) And there are three different opinions on the subject which we are at present discussing. Since some persons affirm that the world is eternal

 IV. (13) But some say that the world has been proved by Plato in the Timaeus to be both uncreated and indestructible, in the account of that divine as

 V. (17) But some persons think that the father of the Platonic theory was the poet Hesiod, as they conceive that the world is spoken of by him as crea

 VI. (25) And there are testimonies also in the Timaeus to the fact of the world being exempt from disease and not liable to destruction, such as these

 VII. (32) But since the world has no participation in that irregularity which exists in the things which I have just been mentioning, let us stop awhi

 VIII. (39) However, this argument also is a most demonstrative one, on which I know that vast numbers of philosophers pride themselves as one most acc

 IX. (45) And, indeed, this I imagine is evident to every one, that if the earth were to be destroyed, then all land animals of every kind must also pe

 X. (52) However, time also affords a very great argument in favour of the eternity of the world, for if time is uncreated, then it follows of necessit

 XI. (55) But Critolaus, a man who devoted himself very much to literature, and a lover of the Peripatetic philosophy, agreeing with the doctrine of th

 XII. (63) In reference to which fact it appears to me that the poets were very felicitous in the appellation which they gave to the earth when they ca

 XIII. (69) We have now then discussed at sufficient length the nonsense in opposition to truth which is uttered by those who build up falsehood and fa

 XIV. (70) But Critolaus, in arguing in support of his opinion, brought forward an argument of this kind, --That which is the cause to man of his bein

 XV. (74) And in addition to this he says, that there are three causes of death to living animals, besides the external causes which may affect them, n

 XVI. (78) But Boethus adduces the most convincing arguments, which we shall proceed to mention immediately for if, says he, the world was created and

 XVII. (85) Is it not however worth while to examine this question, in what manner there can be a regeneration of all those things which have been dest

 XVIII. (89) On which account some of the Stoics also, being gifted with a more acute discernment, and perceiving that they would infallibly be convict

 XIX. (94) Nevertheless, as Chryssipus says, some suppose that fire resolves all the arrangement of the universe when the elements are separated into i

 XX. (104) However, besides what has been here said, any one may use this argument also in corroboration of his opinion, which will certainly convince

 XXI. (107) But a person may very likely wonder at those who talk about conflagrations and regenerations, not only on account of the arguments which I

 XXII. (113) But some of those persons who have fancied that the world is everlasting, inventing a variety of new arguments, employ also such a system

 XXIII. (117) Theophrastus, moreover, says that those men who attribute a beginning and destructibility to the world are deceived by four particulars o

 XXIV. (124) And for the purpose of establishing the third alternative of this question they use the following argument: beyond all question that thing

 XXV. (132) But it is necessary to encounter such quibbling arguments as these, lest some persons of too little experience should yield to and be led a

 XXVI. These things, then, may be said by us with respect to the argument that the inequalities of the surface of the earth are no proof of the world h

 XVII. (143) And as for the third argument, it is convicted by itself, as being derived only from an unsound system of questioning proceeding from the

II. (4) The world, therefore, is spoken of in its primary sense as a single system, consisting of the heaven and the stars in the circumference of the earth, and all the animals and plants which are upon it; and in another sense it is spoken of merely as the heaven. And Anaxagoras, having a regard to this fact, once made answer to a certain person who asked of him what the reason was why he generally endeavoured to pass the night in the open air, that he did so for the sake of beholding the world, by which expression he meant the motions and revolutions of the stars. And in its third meaning, as the Stoics affirm, it is a certain admirably-arranged essence, extending to the period of conflagration, either beautifully adorned or unadorned, the periods of the motion of which are called time. But at present the subject of our consideration is the world, taken in the first sense of the word, which being one only, consists of the heaven, and of the earth, and of all that is therein. (5) And the term corruption is used to signify a change for the worse; it is also used to signify the utter destruction of that which exists, a destruction so complete as to have no existence at all; for as nothing is generated out of nothing, so neither can anything which exists be destroyed so as to become non-Existence.[this is similar to Lucretius's doctrine--Nil igitur fieri de nihilo posse putandum est.] For it is impossible that anything should be generated of that which has no existence anywhere, as equally so that what does exist should be so utterly destroyed as never to be mentioned or heard of again. And indeed in this spirit the tragedian says:--

"Nought that e'er has been

Completely dies, but things combined

Before another union find;

Quitting their former company,

And so again in other forms are Seen."[from the Chrysippus of Euripides.]

(6) Nor is it so very silly a thing to doubt whether the world is destroyed so as to pass into a state of non-existence, but rather whether it is subjected to a change from a new arrangement, being dissolved as to all the manifold forms of its elements and combinations so as to assume one and the same appearance, or whether, like a thing broken and dashed to pieces, it is subjected to a complete confusion of its different fragments.