A Treatise on the Incorruptibility of the World.

 I. (1) In every uncertain and important business it is proper to invoke God, because he is the good Creator of the world, and because nothing is uncer

 II. (4) The world, therefore, is spoken of in its primary sense as a single system, consisting of the heaven and the stars in the circumference of the

 III. (7) And there are three different opinions on the subject which we are at present discussing. Since some persons affirm that the world is eternal

 IV. (13) But some say that the world has been proved by Plato in the Timaeus to be both uncreated and indestructible, in the account of that divine as

 V. (17) But some persons think that the father of the Platonic theory was the poet Hesiod, as they conceive that the world is spoken of by him as crea

 VI. (25) And there are testimonies also in the Timaeus to the fact of the world being exempt from disease and not liable to destruction, such as these

 VII. (32) But since the world has no participation in that irregularity which exists in the things which I have just been mentioning, let us stop awhi

 VIII. (39) However, this argument also is a most demonstrative one, on which I know that vast numbers of philosophers pride themselves as one most acc

 IX. (45) And, indeed, this I imagine is evident to every one, that if the earth were to be destroyed, then all land animals of every kind must also pe

 X. (52) However, time also affords a very great argument in favour of the eternity of the world, for if time is uncreated, then it follows of necessit

 XI. (55) But Critolaus, a man who devoted himself very much to literature, and a lover of the Peripatetic philosophy, agreeing with the doctrine of th

 XII. (63) In reference to which fact it appears to me that the poets were very felicitous in the appellation which they gave to the earth when they ca

 XIII. (69) We have now then discussed at sufficient length the nonsense in opposition to truth which is uttered by those who build up falsehood and fa

 XIV. (70) But Critolaus, in arguing in support of his opinion, brought forward an argument of this kind, --That which is the cause to man of his bein

 XV. (74) And in addition to this he says, that there are three causes of death to living animals, besides the external causes which may affect them, n

 XVI. (78) But Boethus adduces the most convincing arguments, which we shall proceed to mention immediately for if, says he, the world was created and

 XVII. (85) Is it not however worth while to examine this question, in what manner there can be a regeneration of all those things which have been dest

 XVIII. (89) On which account some of the Stoics also, being gifted with a more acute discernment, and perceiving that they would infallibly be convict

 XIX. (94) Nevertheless, as Chryssipus says, some suppose that fire resolves all the arrangement of the universe when the elements are separated into i

 XX. (104) However, besides what has been here said, any one may use this argument also in corroboration of his opinion, which will certainly convince

 XXI. (107) But a person may very likely wonder at those who talk about conflagrations and regenerations, not only on account of the arguments which I

 XXII. (113) But some of those persons who have fancied that the world is everlasting, inventing a variety of new arguments, employ also such a system

 XXIII. (117) Theophrastus, moreover, says that those men who attribute a beginning and destructibility to the world are deceived by four particulars o

 XXIV. (124) And for the purpose of establishing the third alternative of this question they use the following argument: beyond all question that thing

 XXV. (132) But it is necessary to encounter such quibbling arguments as these, lest some persons of too little experience should yield to and be led a

 XXVI. These things, then, may be said by us with respect to the argument that the inequalities of the surface of the earth are no proof of the world h

 XVII. (143) And as for the third argument, it is convicted by itself, as being derived only from an unsound system of questioning proceeding from the

X. (52) However, time also affords a very great argument in favour of the eternity of the world, for if time is uncreated, then it follows of necessity that the world also must be uncreated. Why so? Because, as the great Plato says, it is days, and nights, and months, and the periods of years which have shown time, and it is surely impossible that time can exist without the motion of the sun, and the rotary progress of the whole heaven. So that it has been defined very felicitously by those who are in the habit of giving definitions of things, that time is the interval of the motion of the world, and since this is a sound definition, then the world must be co-eval with time and also the cause of its existence. (53) And it is the most absurd of all ideas to fancy that there ever was a time when the world did not exist, for its nature is without any beginning and without any end, since these very expressions, "there was," "when," "formerly," all indicate time; and keeping to this view, then, according to the theory of the conflagration [...][there is supposed to be a very large hiatus here.] he at a late period of his life entertained doubts and withheld any positive opinion; for it does not belong to youth, but to old age, to see clearly things of solemn importance which it is desirable to understand, and especially as to matters which it is not the outer sense, which is irrational and deceitful, that determines, but the pure and unalloyed intellect. For that which has no existence is not put in motion, but it has been shown already that time is an interval of the motion of the world. It follows, therefore, of necessity, that each of these things must have subsisted from all eternity, without receiving any beginning of generation, and being in consequence not liable to any corruption. (54) Perhaps some quibbling Stoic will say that time is admitted to be an interval of the motion of the world, but not of that world only which is arranged and adorned by itself, but also of that one which is conceived of in connection with the conflagration which has been spoken of; to whom we must reply, --"My good man, you, misapplying words, call what is disorderliness and a want of arrangement order (kosmos), for if this thing which we see is correctly and appropriately called the world (kosmos), [philo is playing here on the two meanings of the word kosmos, which signified both "order" and "the world."] being arranged and adorned (kekosme�menos) as we see it by man, by the perfection of his skill, then any one would be surely correct in calling the change which is wrought in it by fire a want of order."