A Treatise on the Incorruptibility of the World.

 I. (1) In every uncertain and important business it is proper to invoke God, because he is the good Creator of the world, and because nothing is uncer

 II. (4) The world, therefore, is spoken of in its primary sense as a single system, consisting of the heaven and the stars in the circumference of the

 III. (7) And there are three different opinions on the subject which we are at present discussing. Since some persons affirm that the world is eternal

 IV. (13) But some say that the world has been proved by Plato in the Timaeus to be both uncreated and indestructible, in the account of that divine as

 V. (17) But some persons think that the father of the Platonic theory was the poet Hesiod, as they conceive that the world is spoken of by him as crea

 VI. (25) And there are testimonies also in the Timaeus to the fact of the world being exempt from disease and not liable to destruction, such as these

 VII. (32) But since the world has no participation in that irregularity which exists in the things which I have just been mentioning, let us stop awhi

 VIII. (39) However, this argument also is a most demonstrative one, on which I know that vast numbers of philosophers pride themselves as one most acc

 IX. (45) And, indeed, this I imagine is evident to every one, that if the earth were to be destroyed, then all land animals of every kind must also pe

 X. (52) However, time also affords a very great argument in favour of the eternity of the world, for if time is uncreated, then it follows of necessit

 XI. (55) But Critolaus, a man who devoted himself very much to literature, and a lover of the Peripatetic philosophy, agreeing with the doctrine of th

 XII. (63) In reference to which fact it appears to me that the poets were very felicitous in the appellation which they gave to the earth when they ca

 XIII. (69) We have now then discussed at sufficient length the nonsense in opposition to truth which is uttered by those who build up falsehood and fa

 XIV. (70) But Critolaus, in arguing in support of his opinion, brought forward an argument of this kind, --That which is the cause to man of his bein

 XV. (74) And in addition to this he says, that there are three causes of death to living animals, besides the external causes which may affect them, n

 XVI. (78) But Boethus adduces the most convincing arguments, which we shall proceed to mention immediately for if, says he, the world was created and

 XVII. (85) Is it not however worth while to examine this question, in what manner there can be a regeneration of all those things which have been dest

 XVIII. (89) On which account some of the Stoics also, being gifted with a more acute discernment, and perceiving that they would infallibly be convict

 XIX. (94) Nevertheless, as Chryssipus says, some suppose that fire resolves all the arrangement of the universe when the elements are separated into i

 XX. (104) However, besides what has been here said, any one may use this argument also in corroboration of his opinion, which will certainly convince

 XXI. (107) But a person may very likely wonder at those who talk about conflagrations and regenerations, not only on account of the arguments which I

 XXII. (113) But some of those persons who have fancied that the world is everlasting, inventing a variety of new arguments, employ also such a system

 XXIII. (117) Theophrastus, moreover, says that those men who attribute a beginning and destructibility to the world are deceived by four particulars o

 XXIV. (124) And for the purpose of establishing the third alternative of this question they use the following argument: beyond all question that thing

 XXV. (132) But it is necessary to encounter such quibbling arguments as these, lest some persons of too little experience should yield to and be led a

 XXVI. These things, then, may be said by us with respect to the argument that the inequalities of the surface of the earth are no proof of the world h

 XVII. (143) And as for the third argument, it is convicted by itself, as being derived only from an unsound system of questioning proceeding from the

XVIII. (89) On which account some of the Stoics also, being gifted with a more acute discernment, and perceiving that they would infallibly be convicted, thought it well to be beforehand in preparing assistance as it were for a defunct proposition. But what they prepared was of no use; for, since fire is the cause of all motion, and since motion is the beginning of generation, for it is impossible that anything whatever should be generated without motion, they said that before the new world began to be formed, when it was beginning to be fashioned, the whole fire would not be extinguished in that conflagration; that they affirmed that some would still remain, but yet only a small portion. For they were exceedingly cautious, lest if it should be wholly extinguished, the consequence would be that everything would remain motionless and devoid of ornament, inasmuch as the cause of motion would no longer be in any existence. (90) But all these ideas are the invention of quibblers, who employ all their artifices in opposition to the truth. Why so? Because it is impossible, as has been proved already, that the world, after it has been destroyed by conflagration, should become similar to coal, inasmuch as there is a vast quantity of earthy substance left in which the fire must of necessity lie in ambush. And perhaps too the conflagration could not prevail in every quarter, if the heaviest and most invincible of the elements, namely the earth, still remains, without being dissolved; but it must of necessity change, either into flame or into light: into flame, as Cleanthes thought; into light, as Chryssipus conceived. (91) But if it becomes flame, then, when it approaches extinction, it will be extinguished all at once, and not partially or gradually. For the nutriment exists along with it; on which account, while there is a great deal of it, it increases and is diffused; but when it is stunted it becomes less. And any one might conjecture the truth of what takes place from what he sees happen among us. A lamp, when any one pours oil upon it, gives forth a most brilliant flame; but when any one ceases to supply it with that nutriment, and leaves only a small portion in the lamp, then the lamp is at once extinguished, and does not give out the smallest portion of flame. (92) If again this is not the case, but if the world becomes light, then again it changes altogether. Why so? Because it has no substance or character of its own, but is generated from flame, and when this is wholly and completely extinguished in all its parts, it follows of necessity that the light also must be extinguished, and that not partially, but altogether. For what flame is to nourishment, that also is light to flame. (93) As therefore the flame is extinguished concurrently with the want of nourishment, so also is the light simultaneously with the flame, so that it is actually impossible for the world to be capable of regeneration, if there is no seminal principle lurking and kindled within it, but if all things are expended and destroyed, some by fire, and some by want. From all which arguments it is plain that the world is for ever uncreated and imperishable.