Chap. IV.—Of God and His Affections, and the Censure of Epicurus.

That which follows is concerning the school of Epicurus; that as there is no anger in God, so indeed there is no kindness. For when Epicurus thought that it was inconsistent with God to injure and to inflict harm, which for the most part arises from the affection of anger, he took away from Him beneficence also, since he saw that it followed that if God has anger, He must also have kindness. Therefore, lest he should concede to Him a vice, he deprived Him also of virtue.10    [Ne illi vitium concederet etiam virtutis fecit expertem.]   From this, he says, He is happy and uncorrupted, because He cares about nothing, and neither takes trouble Himself nor occasions it to another. Therefore He is not God, if He is neither moved, which is peculiar to a living being, nor does anything impossible for man, which is peculiar to God, if He has no will at all, no action, in short, no administration, which is worthy of God. And what greater, what more worthy administration can be attributed to God, than the government of the world, and especially of the human race, to which all earthly things are subject?  

What happiness, then, can there be in God, if He is always inactive, being at rest and unmoveable? if He is deaf to those who pray to Him, and blind to His worshippers? What is so worthy of God, and so befitting to Him, as providence? But if He cares for nothing, and foresees nothing, He has lost all His divinity. What else does he say, who takes from God all power and all substance, except that there is no God at all? In short, Marcus Tullius relates that it was said by Posidonius,11    [Disciple of Panætius the Rhodian, a Stoic, third century B.C.]   that Epicurus understood that there were no gods, but that he said those things which he spoke respecting the gods for the sake of driving away odium; and so that he leaves the gods in words, but takes them away in reality, since he gives them no motion, no office. But if this is so, what can be more deceitful than him? And this ought to be foreign to the character of a wise and weighty man. But if he understood one thing and spoke another, what else is he to be called than a deceiver, double-tongued, wicked, and moreover foolish? But Epicurus was not so crafty as to say those things with the desire of deceiving, when he consigned these things also by his writings to everlasting remembrance; but he erred through ignorance of the truth. For, being led from the beginning by the probability12    Verisimilitudine, i.e., likeness of truth.   of a single opinion, he necessarily fell into those things which followed. For the first opinion was, that anger was not consistent with the character of God. And when this appeared to him to be true and unassailable,13    Inexpugnabile, impregnable.   he was unable to refuse the consequences; because one affection being removed, necessity itself compelled him to remove from God the other affections also. Thus, he who is not subject to anger is plainly uninfluenced by kindness, which is the opposite feeling to anger. Now, if there is neither anger nor kindness in Him, it is manifest that there is neither fear, nor joy, nor grief, nor pity. For all the affections have one system, one motion,14    Commotio.   which cannot be the case with God. But if there is no affection in God, because whatever is subject to affections is weak, it follows that there is in Him neither the care of anything, nor providence.  

The disputation of the wise man15    Epicurus: it seems to be spoken with some irony.   extends thus far: he was silent as to the other things which follow; namely, that because there is in Him neither care nor providence, therefore there is no reflection nor any perception in Him, by which it is effected that He has no existence at all. Thus, when he had gradually descended, he remained on the last step, because he now saw the precipice. But what does it avail to have remained silent, and concealed the danger? Necessity compelled him even against his will to fall. For he said that which he did not mean, because he so arranged his argument that he necessarily came to that point which he wished to avoid. You see, therefore, to what point he comes, when anger is removed and taken away from God. In short, either no one believes that, or a very few, and they the guilty and the wicked, who hope for impunity for their sins. But if this also is found to be false, that there is neither anger nor kindness in God, let us come to that which is put in the third place.  

CAPUT IV. 0085B De Deo, deque ejus affectibus, Epicurique reprehensione.

Quod sequitur, de schola Epicuri est; sicut iram in Deo non esse, ita nec gratiam quidem. Nam cum putaret Epicurus, alienum esse a Deo malefacere atque 0086A nocere, quod ex affectu iracundiae plerumque nascitur, ademit ei etiam beneficentiam, quoniam videbat consequens esse, ut si habeat iram Deus, habeat et gratiam. Itaque ne illi vitium concederet, etiam virtutis fecit expertem. Ex hoc, inquit, beatus et incorruptus est, quia nihil curat, neque habet ipse negotium, neque alteri exhibet. Deus igitur non est, si nec movetur, quod est proprium viventis: nec facit aliquid impossibile homini, quod est proprium Dei, si omnino nullam habet voluntatem, nullum actum, nullam denique administrationem, quae Deo digna sit. Et quae major, quae dignior administratio Deo assignari potest, quam mundi gubernatio, maximeque generis humani, cui omnia terrena subjecta sunt.

0086B Quae igitur in Deo potest esse beatitudo, si semper quietus, et immobilis torpet? si precantibus surdus, si colentibus caecus? Quid tam dignum, tam proprium Deo, quam providentia? Sed si nihil curat, nihil providet, amisit omnem divinitatem. Qui ergo totam vim, totam Deo substantiam tollit, quid aliud dicit, 0087A nisi Deum omnino non esse? Denique Marcus Tullius a Posidonio dictum refert, id Epicurum sensisse, nullos deos esse, sed ea, quae de diis locutus sit, depellendae invidiae causa dixisse: itaque verbis illum deos relinquere, re autem ipsa tollere, quibus nullum motum, nullum tribuit officium. Quod si ita est: quid eo fallacius? quod a sapiente et gravi viro debet esse alienum. Hic vero si aliud sensit, et aliud locutus est, quid aliud appellandus est, quam deceptor, bilinguis, malus, et propterea stultus? Sed non erat tam versutus Epicurus, ut fallendi studio ista loqueretur, cum haec etiam scriptis ad aeternam memoriam consignaret: sed ignorantia veritatis erravit. Inductus enim a principio verisimilitudine unius sententiae, necessario in ea, quae sequebantur, incurrit. 0087B Prima enim sententia fuit, iram in Deum non convenire. Quod cum illi verum et inexpugnabile videretur, non poterat consequentia recusare, quia uno affectu amputato, etiam caeteros affectus adimere Deo necessitas ipsa cogebat. Ita qui non irascitur, utique nec gratia movetur, quod est irae contrarium: jam si nec ira in eo, nec gratia est, utique nec metus, nec laetitia, nec moeror, nec misericordia. Una est enim ratio cunctis affectibus, una commotio, quae in Deum 0088A cadere non potest. Quod si nullus affectus in Deo est, quia quidquid afficitur, imbecillum est; ergo nec cura ullius rei, nec providentia est in eo.

Hucusque pervenit sapientis hominis disputatio; caetera, quae sequuntur; obticuit: scilicet, quia nec cura sit in eo, nec providentia; ergo nec cogitationem aliquam, nec sensum in eo esse ullum: quo efficitur, ut non sit omnino. Ita cum gradatim descendisset, in extremo gradu restitit, quia jam praecipitium videbat. Sed quid prodest reticuisse, ac periculum dissimulasse? Necessitas illum vel invitum cadere coegit. Dixit enim quod noluit, quia argumentum sic ordinavit, ut ad illud, quod evitabat, necessario deveniret. Vides igitur quo perveniat, ira sublata, et Deo adempta. Denique aut nullus id credit, 0088B aut admodum pauci, et quidem scelerati, ac mali, qui sperant peccatis suis impunitatem. Quod si et hoc falsum invenitur, nec iram in Deo esse, nec gratiam, veniamus ad illud, quod tertio loco positum est.