Chapter XIV.—Argument:  With Something of the Pride of Self-Satisfaction, Cæcilius Urges Octavius to Reply to His Arguments; And Minucius with Modesty Answers Him, that He Must Not Exult at His Own by No Means Ordinary Eloquence, and at the Harmonious Variety of His Address.

Thus far Cæcilius; and smiling cheerfully (for the vehemence of his prolonged discourse had relaxed the ardour of his indignation), he added:  “And what does Octavius venture to reply to this, a man of the race of Plautus,39    “Plautinæ prosapiæ.”  The expression is intended as a reproach against the humble occupations of many of the Christian professors.  Plautus is said, when in need, to have laboured at a baker’s hand-mill.  Cæcilius tells Octavius that he may be the first among the millers, but he is the last among the philosophers.  Stieber proposes “Christianorum” instead of “pistorum”—“Christians” instead of “millers.” who, while he was chief among the millers, was still the lowest of philosophers?”  “Restrain,” said I, “your self-approval against him; for it is not worthy of you to exult at the harmony of your discourse, before the subject shall have been more fully argued on both sides; especially since your reasoning is striving after truth, not praise.  And in however great a degree your discourse has delighted me by its subtile variety, yet I am very deeply moved, not concerning the present discussion, but concerning the entire kind of disputation—that for the most part the condition of truth should be changed according to the powers of discussion, and even the faculty of perspicuous eloquence.  This is very well known to occur by reason of the facility of the hearers, who, being distracted by the allurement of words from attention to things, assent without distinction to everything that is said, and do not separate falsehood from truth; unaware that even in that which is incredible there is often truth, and in verisimilitude falsehood.  Therefore the oftener they believe bold assertions, the more frequently they are convinced by those who are more clever, and thus are continually deceived by their temerity.  They transfer the blame of the judge to the complaint of uncertainty; so that, everything being condemned, they would rather that all things should be left in suspense, than that they should decide about matters of doubt.  Therefore we must take care that we do not in such sort suffer from the hatred at once of all discourses, even as very many of the more simple kind are led to execration and hatred of men in general.  For those who are carelessly credulous are deceived by those whom they thought worthy; and by and by, by a kindred error, they begin to suspect every one as wicked, and dread even those whom they might have regarded as excellent.  Now therefore we are anxious—because in everything there may be argument on both sides; and on the one hand, the truth is for the most part obscure; and on the other side there is a marvellous subtlety, which sometimes by its abundance of words imitates the confidence of acknowledged proof—as carefully as possible to weigh each particular, that we may, while ready to applaud acuteness, yet elect, approve, and adopt those things which are right.”

CAPUT XIV.

ARGUMENTUM.---Non sine animi elati fastidio provocat Octavium Caecilius, ut argumentis suis respondeat. Cui Minucius modeste respondet, de sua haud mediocri 0275B eloquentia, deque concinna orationis varietate non esse ipsi exultandum.

0276A Sic Caecilius, et renidens (nam indignationis ejus tumorem effusae orationis impetus relaxaverat): Ecquid ad haec, ait, audet Octavius, homo Plautinae prosapiae, ut pistorum praecipuus, ita prostremus philosophorum? Parce, inquam, in eum plaudere; neque enim prius exultare te dignum est concinnitate sermonis, quam utrimque plenius fuerit peroratum; maxime quum non laudis, et veritati disceptatio vestra nitatur. Et quamquam magnum in modum me, subtili varietate, tua delectaverit oratio, tamen altius moveor, non de praesenti actione, sed de toto genere disputandi: quod plerumque pro disserentium viribus, et eloquentiae potestate, etiam perspicuae veritatis conditio mutetur. Id accidere pernotum est auditorum facilitate, qui, dum verborum lenocinio a rerum intentionibus avocantur, sine delectu adsentiuntur dictis omnibus: nec a rectis falsa secernunt, nescientes 0276B inesse et incredibili verum, et in verisimili 0277A mendacium. Itaque quo saepius asseverationibus credunt, eo frequentius a peritioribus arguuntur: sic assidue temeritate decepti. Culpam judicis transferunt ad incerti querelam, ut damnatis omnibus malint universa suspendere, quam de fallacibus judicare. Igitur nobis providendum est, ne odio identidem sermonum omnium laboremus, ita, ut in execrationem et odium hominum plerique simpliciores efferantur. Nam incaute creduli circumveniuntur ab his, quos bonos putaverunt: mox, errore---consimili jam suspectis omnibus, ut improbos metuunt etiam, quos optimos sentire potuerunt. Nos proinde solliciti, quod utrimque in omni negotio disseratur, et ex altera parte plerumque obscura sit veritas, ex altero latere 0277B mira subtilitas, quae nonnumquam ubertate dicendi, 0278A fidem confessae probationis imitetur: diligenter quantum potest, singula ponderemus, ut argutias quidem laudare, ea vero quae recta sunt, eligere, probare, suscipere possimus.