Chap. XVI.—Of the Mind and Its Seat.

That the nature of the mind is also incomprehensible, who can be ignorant, but he who is altogether destitute of mind, since it is not known in what place the mind is situated, or of what nature it is? Therefore various things have been discussed by philosophers concerning its nature and place. But I will not conceal what my own sentiments are: not that I should affirm that it is so—for in a doubtful matter it is the part of a foolish person to do this; but that when I have set forth the difficulty of the matter, you may understand how great is the magnitude off the divine works. Some would have it, that the seat of the mind is in the breast. But if this is so, how wonderful is it, that a faculty which is situated in an obscure and dark habitation should be employed in so great a light of reason and intelligence; then that the senses from every part of the body come together to it, so that it appears to be present in any quarter of the limbs! Others have said that its seat is in the brain and, indeed, they have used probable arguments, saying that it was doubtless befitting that that which had the government of the whole body should especially have its abode in the highest place, as though in the citadel of the body; and that nothing should be in a more elevated position than that which governs the whole by reason, just as the Lord Himself, and Ruler of the universe, is in the highest place. Then they say, that the organs which are the ministers of each sense, that is, of hearing, and seeing, and smelling, are situated in the head, and that the channels of all these lead not to the breast, but to the brain: otherwise we must be more slow in the exercise of our senses, until the power of sensation by a long course should descend through the neck even to the breast. These, in truth, do not greatly err, or perchance not at all. For the mind, which exercises control over the body, appears to be placed in the highest part, the head, as God is in heaven; but when it is engaged in any reflection, it appears to pass to the breast, and, as it were, to withdraw to some secret recess, that it may elicit and draw forth counsel, as it were, from a hidden treasury. And therefore, when we are intent upon reflection, and when the mind, being occupied, has withdrawn itself to the inner depth,113    In altum se abdiderit. [An interesting “evolution from self-consciousness,” not altogether to be despised. In connection with the tripartite nature of man (of which see vol. iii. p. 474), we may well inquire as to the seat of the ψυχὴ and the πνευ̑μα, severally, on this hint.]   we are accustomed neither to hear the things which sound about us, nor to see the things which stand in our way. But whether this is the case, it is assuredly a matter of admiration how this takes place, since there is no passage from the brain to the breast. But if it is not so, nevertheless it is no less a matter of admiration that, by some divine plan or other, it is caused that it appears to be so. Can any fail to admire that that living and heavenly faculty which is called the mind or the soul, is of such volubility114    Mobilitatis.   that it does not rest even then when it is asleep; of such rapidity, that it surveys the whole heaven at one moment of time; and, if it wills, flies over seas, traverses lands and cities,—in short, places in its own sight all things which it pleases, however far and widely they are removed?  

And does any one wonder if the divine mind of God, being extended115    Intenta discurrit. [2 Chron. xvi. 9; Zech. iv. 10.]   through all parts of the universe, runs to and fro, and rules all things, governs all things, being everywhere present, everywhere diffused; when the strength and power of the human mind, though enclosed within a mortal body, is so great, that it can in no way be restrained even by the barriers of this heavy and slothful body, to which it is bound, from bestowing upon itself, in its impatience of rest, the power of wandering without restraint? Whether, therefore, the mind has its dwelling in the head or in the breast, can any one comprehend what power of reason effects, that that incomprehensible faculty either remains fixed in the marrow of the brain, or in that blood divided into two parts116    Bipartito.   which is enclosed in the heart; and not infer from this very circumstance how great is the power of God, because the soul does not see itself, or of what nature or where it is; and if it did see, yet it would not be able to perceive in what manner an incorporeal substance is united with one which is corporeal? Or if the mind has no fixed locality, but runs here and there scattered through the whole body,—which is possible, and was asserted by Xenocrates, the disciple of Plato,—then, inasmuch as intelligence is present in every part of the body, it cannot be understood what that mind is, or what its qualities are, since its nature is so subtle and refined, that, though infused into solid organs by a living and, as it were, ardent perception, it is mingled with all the members.  

But take care that you never think it probable, as Aristoxenus said, that the mind has no existence, but that the power of perception exists from the constitution of the body and the construction of the organs, as harmony does in the case of the lyre. For musicians call the stretching and sounding of the strings to entire strains, without any striking of notes in agreement with them, harmony. They will have it, therefore, that the soul in man exists in a manner like that by which harmonious modulation exists on the lyre; namely, that the firm uniting of the separate parts of the body and the vigour of all the limbs agreeing together, makes that perceptible motion, and adjusts117    Concinnet.   the mind, as well-stretched things produce harmonious sound. And as, in the lyre, when anything has been interrupted or relaxed, the whole method of the strain is disturbed and destroyed; so in the body, when any part of the limbs receives an injury, the whole are weakened, and all being corrupted and thrown into confusion, the power of perception is destroyed: and this is called death. But he, if he had possessed any mind, would never have transferred harmony from the lyre to man. For the lyre cannot of its own accord send forth a sound, so that there can be in this any comparison and resemblance to a living person; but the soul both reflects and is moved of its own accord. But if there were in us anything resembling harmony, it would be moved by a blow from without, as the strings of the lyre are by the hands; whereas without the handling of the artificer, and the stroke of the fingers, they lie mute and motionless. But doubtless he118    Aristoxenus, whose opinion has been mentioned above.   ought to have beaten by the hand, that he might at length observe; for his mind, badly compacted from his members, was in a state of torpor.  

0064A CAPUT XVI. De mente, et ejus sede.

Mentis quoque rationem incomprehensibilem esse quis nesciat, nisi qui omnino illam non habet, cum ipsa mens quo loco sit, aut cujusmodi, nesciatur? Varia ergo a philosophis de natura ejus ac loco disputata sunt. At ego non dissimulabo, quid ipse sentiam; non quia sic esse affirmem (quod est insipientis in re dubia facere), sed ut exposita rei difficultate, intelligas, quanta sit divinorum operum magnitudo. Quidam sedem mentis in pectore esse voluerunt. Quod si ita est, quanto tandem miraculo dignum est, rem in obscuro ac tenebroso habitaculo sitam, in tanta rationis atque intelligentiae luce versari? 0064B tum quod ad eam sensus ex omni corporis parte conveniunt, ut in qualibet regione membrorum praesens esse videatur. Alii sedem ejus in cerebro esse 0065A dixerunt. Et sane argumentis probabilibus usi sunt: oportuisse scilicet, quod totius corporis regimen haberet potius in summo, tamquam in arce habitare; nec quidquam esse sublimius, quam id, quod universum ratione moderetur, sicut ipse mundi dominus et rector in summo est. Deinde quod sensus omnis, id est audiendi, et videndi, et odorandi ministra membra in capite sint locata, quorum omnium viae non ad pectus, sed ad cerebrum ferant: alioqui necesse nos esset tardius sentire, donec sentiendi facultas longo itinere per collum ad pectus usque descenderet. Ii vero aut non multum, aut fortasse non errant.

Videtur enim mens, quae dominatum corporis tenet, in summo capite constituta, tamquam in coelo Deus: sed cum in aliqua sit cogitatione, commeare ad pectus, 0065B et quasi ad secretum aliquod penetrale secedere, ut consilium, tamquam ex thesauro recondito, eliciat ac proferat; ideoque cum intenti ad cogitandum sumus, et cum mens occupata in altum se abdiderit, neque audire quae circumsonant, neque videre, quae obstant, solemus. Id vero sive ita est, admirandum profecto est, quomodo id fiat, cum ad pectus ex cerebro nullum iter pateat. Sin autem non est ita, tamen nihilominus admirandum est, quod divina nescio qua ratione fiat, ut ita esse videatur. An potest aliquis non admirari, quod sensus ille vivus atque coelestis, qui mens, vel animus nuncupatur, tantae mobilitatis est, ut ne tum quidem, cum sopitus est, conquiescat; 0065C tantae celeritatis, ut uno temporis puncto coelum 0066A omne collustret, et si velit, maria pervolet, terras, ac urbes peragret, omnia denique, quae libuerit, quamvis longe lateque summota sint, in conspectu sibi ipse constituat.

Et miratur aliquis, si divina mens Dei per universas mundi partes intenta discurrit, et omnia regit, omnia moderatur, ubique praesens, ubique diffusa; cum tanta sit vis ac potestas mentis humanae intra mortale corpus inclusae ut ne septis quidem gravis hujus ac pigri corporis, cui alligata est, coerceri ullo pacto possit, quominus sibi liberam vagandi facultatem, quietis impatiens, largiatur? Sive igitur in capite mens habitat, sive in pectore, potestne aliquis comprehendere, quae vis rationis efficiat, ut sensus ille incomprehensibilis aut in medulla cerebri haereat, 0066B aut in illo sanguine bipartito, qui est inclusus in corde? ac non ex eo ipso colligat, quanta sit Dei potestas, quod animus se ipsum non videt, aut qualis, aut ubi sit; nec si videat, tamen perspicere possit, quo pacto rei corporali res incorporalis adjuncta sit? Sive etiam mentis locus nullus est, sed per totum corpus sparsa discurrit, quod et fieri potest, et a Xenocrate Platonis discipulo disputatum est, siquidem sensus in qualibet parte corporis praesto est, nec quid sit mens ista, nec qualis, intelligi potest, cum sit natura ejus tam subtilis ac tenuis, ut solidis visceribus infusa, vivo, et quasi ardenti sensu, membris omnibus misceatur.

0066C Illud autem cave, ne unquam simile veri putaveris, 0067A quod Aristoxenus dixit: Mentem omnino nullam esse, sed quasi harmoniam in fidibus, ex constructione corporis, et compagibus viscerum vim sentiendi existere. Musici enim intentionem concentumque nervorum in integros modos, sine ulla offensione consonantium, harmoniam vocant. Volunt igitur animum simili ratione constare in homine, qua et concors modulatio constat in fidibus; scilicet, ut singularum corporis partium firma conjunctio, membrorumque omnium consentiens in unum vigor, motum illum sensibilem faciat, animumque concinnet, sicut sunt nervi bene intenti ad conspirantem sonum. Et sicut in fidibus, cum aliquid aut interruptum, aut relaxatum est, omnis canendi ratio turbatur, et solvitur: ita in corpore, cum pars aliqua membrorum duxerit vitium, destrui universa, corruptisque omnibus atque turbatis, 0067B occidere sensum, eamque mortem vocari. Verum ille, si quidquam mentis habuisset, non harmoniam de fidibus ad hominem transtulisset. Non enim canere sua sponte fides possunt, ut sit ulla in his comparatio ac similitudo viventis. Animus autem sua sponte et cogitat, et movetur. Quod si quid in nobis harmoniae simile esset, ictu moveretur externo, sicut nervi manibus, qui sine tactu artificis pulsuque digitorum, muti atque inertes jacent. Sed nimirum pulsandus ille manu fuit, ut aliquando sentiret; quia mens ejus ex membris male compacta torpebat.