Chap. VI.—Of the Error of Epicurus, and of the Limbs and Their Use.

I cannot here be prevented from again showing the folly of Epicurus. For all the ravings of Lucretius34    [Yet Lucretuis has originality and genius of an order far nobler than that of moderns who copy his follies.]   belong to him, who, in order that he might show that animals are not produced by any contrivance of the divine mind, but, as he is wont to say, by chance, said that in the beginning of the world innumerable other animals of wonderful form and magnitude were produced; but that they were unable to be permanent, because either the power of taking food, or the method of uniting and generating, had failed them. It is evident that, in order to make a place for his atoms flying about through the boundless and empty space, he wished to exclude the divine providence. But when he saw that a wonderful system of providence is contained in all things which breathe, what vanity was it (O mischievous one!) to say that there had been animals of immense size, in which the system of production ceased!  

Since, therefore, all things which we see are produced with reference to a plan—for nothing but a plan35    Ratio. Nearly equivalent its this place to “providentia.”   can effect this very condition of being born—it is manifest that nothing could have been born without a plan. For it was previously foreseen in the formation of everything, how it should use the service of the limbs for the necessaries of life; and how the offspring, being produced from the union of bodies, might preserve all living creatures by their several species. For if a skilful architect, when he designs to construct some great building, first of all considers what will be the effect36    Summa. [Wisd. xi. 20.]   of the complete building, and previously ascertains by measurement what situation is suitable for a light weight, in what place a massive part of the structure will stand, what will be the intervals between the columns, what or where will be the descents and outlets of the falling waters and the reservoirs,—he first, I say, foresees these things, that he may begin together with the very foundations whatever things are necessary for the work when now completed,—why should any one suppose that, in the contrivance of animals, God did not foresee what things were necessary for living, before giving life itself? For it is manifest that life could not exist, unless those things by which it exists were previously arranged.37    [The amazing proportions imparted to all things created, in correspondence with their relations to man and to the earth, is beautifully hinted by our author.]    

Therefore Epicurus saw in the bodies of animals the skill of a divine plan; but that he might carry into effect that which he had before imprudently assumed, he added another absurdity agreeing with the former. For he said that the eyes were not produced for seeing, nor the ears for hearing, nor the feet for walking, since these members were produced before there was the exercise of seeing, hearing, and walking; but that all the offices of these members arose from them after their production.38    [The snout of the elephant and the neck of the giraffe were developed from their necessities, etc. Modern Science, passim.]   I fear lest the refutation of such extravagant and ridiculous stories should appear to be no less foolish; but it pleases me to be foolish, since we are dealing with a foolish man, lest he should think himself too clever.39    [In our days reproduced as progress.]   What do you say, Epicurus? Were not the eyes produced for seeing? Why, then, do they see? Their use, he says, afterwards showed itself. Therefore they were produced for the sake of seeing, since they can do nothing else but see. Likewise, in the case of the other limbs, use itself shows for what purpose they were produced. For it is plain that this use could have no existence, unless all the limbs had been made with such arrangement and foresight, that they might be able to have their use.  

For what if you should say, that birds were not made to fly, nor wild beasts to rage, nor fishes to swim, nor men to be wise, when it is evident that living creatures are subject to that natural disposition and office to which each was created? But it is evident that he who has lost the main point itself of the truth must always be in error. For if all things are produced not by providence, but by a fortuitous meeting together of atoms, why does it never happen by chance, that those first principles meet together in such a way as to make an animal of such a kind, that it might rather hear with its nostrils, smell with its eyes, and see40    Cerneret, “to see so as to distinguish;” a stronger word than “video.”   with its ears? For if the first principles leave no kind of position untried, monstrous productions of this kind ought daily to have been brought forth, in which the arrangement of the limbs might be distorted,41    Præposterus; having the last first, and the first last.   and the use far different from that which prevails. But since all the races of animals, and all the limbs, observe their own laws and arrangements, and the uses assigned to them, it is plain that nothing is made by chance, since a perpetual arrangement of the divine plan is preserved. But we will refute Epicurus at another time. Now let us discuss the subject of providence, as we have begun.  

CAPUT VI. De Epicuri errore; et de membris eorumque usu.

Non possum hoc loco teneri, quominus Epicuri 0027B stultitiam rursum coarguam; illius enim sunt omnia quae delirat Lucretius: qui, ut ostenderet animalia non artificio aliquo divinae mentis, sed, ut solet, fortuito esse nata; dixit, in principio mundi alias quasdam innumerabiles animantes miranda specie et magnitudine fuisse natas, sed eas permanere non potuisse, quod illas aut sumendi cibi facultas, aut coeundi generandique ratio defecisset. Videlicet ut et atomis suis locum faceret per infinitum et inane volitantibus, divinam providentiam voluit excludere. Sed cum videret in omnibus quae spirant. mirabilem 0028A Providentiae inesse rationem, quae (malum!) vanitas erat dicere fuisse animalia prodigiosa, in quibus nascendi ratio cessaret?

Quoniam igitur omnia quae videmus cum ratione nata sunt, id enim ipsum nasci, efficere nisi ratio non potest, manifestum est, nihil omnino rationis expers potuisse generari. Ante enim provisum est in singulis quibusque fingendis, quatenus et ministerio membrorum ad necessaria vitae uteretur, et quatenus adjugatis corporibus elata soboles, universas generatim conservaret animantes. Nam si peritus architectus, cum magnum aliquod aedificium facere constituit, primo omnium cogitat, quae summa perfecti aedificii futura sit, et ante emetitur, quem locum leve pondus expectet, ubi magni operis statura sit moles, quae columnarum 0028B intervalla, qui, aut ubi aquarum cadentium decursus et exitus, et receptacula, haec, inquam, prius providet, ut quaecumque sunt perfecto jam operi necessaria, cum ipsis fundamentis pariter ordiatur: cur Deum quisquam putet in machinandis animalibus non ante providisse, quae ad vivendum necessaria essent, quam ipsam vitam daret? Quae utique constare non posset, nisi prius effecta essent quibus constat.

Videbat igitur Epicurus in corporibus animalium divinae rationis solertiam: sed ut efficeret, quod ante imprudenter assumpserat, adjecit aliud deliramentum superiori congruens. Dixit enim, neque oculos ad 0029A videndum esse natos, neque aures ad audiendum, neque pedes ad ambulandum, quoniam membra haec prius nata sunt quam esset usus videndi, et audiendi, et ambulandi: sed horum omnia officia ex natis extitisse. Vereor ne hujusmodi portenta et ridicula refutare non minus ineptum esse videatur. Sed libet ineptire, quoniam cum inepto agimus, ne se ille nimis argutum putet. Quid ais, Epicure? Non sunt ad videndum oculi nati? Cur igitur vident? Postea, inquit, usus eorum apparuit. Videndi ergo causa nati sunt; siquidem nihil possunt aliud quam videre. Item membra caetera, cujus rei causa nata sunt, ipse usus ostendit: qui utique nullo modo posset existere, nisi essent membra omnia tam ordinate, tam providenter effecta, ut usum possent habere.

0029B Quid enim, si dicas aves non ad volandum esse natas, neque feras ad saeviendum, neque pisces ad natandum, neque homines ad sapiendum; cum appareat ei naturae, officioque servire animantes, ad quod est quaeque generata? Sed videlicet qui summam ipsam veritatis amisit, semper erret necesse est. Si enim non providentia, sed fortuitis atomorum concursionibus nascuntur omnia, cur nunquam fortuito accidit, sic coire illa principia, ut efficerent 0030A animal ejusmodi, quod naribus potius audiret, odoraretur oculis, auribus cerneret? Si enim primordia nullum genus positionis inexpertum relinquunt, oportuit ejusmodi quotidie monstra generari, in quibus et membrorum ordo praeposterus, et usus longe diversus existeret. Cum vero universa genera, et universa quoque membra leges suas, et ordines, et usus sibi attributos tueantur, manifestum est nihil fortuito esse factum, quoniam divinae rationis dispositio perpetua servatur. Verum alias refellemus Epicurum; nunc de providentia (ut coepimus) disseramus.