A Treatise on the Soul.

 Having discussed with Hermogenes the single point of the origin of the soul, so far as his assumption led me, that the soul consisted rather in an ada

 Chapter II.—The Christian Has Sure and Simple Knowledge Concerning the Subject Before Us.

 Chapter III.—The Soul’s Origin Defined Out of the Simple Words of Scripture.

 Chapter IV.—In Opposition to Plato, the Soul Was Created and Originated at Birth.

 Chapter V.—Probable View of the Stoics, that the Soul Has a Corporeal Nature.

 Chapter VI.—The Arguments of the Platonists for the Soul’s Incorporeality, Opposed, Perhaps Frivolously.

 Chapter VII.—The Soul’s Corporeality Demonstrated Out of the Gospels.

 Chapter VIII.—Other Platonist Arguments Considered.

 Chapter IX.—Particulars of the Alleged Communication to a Montanist Sister.

 Chapter X.—The Simple Nature of the Soul is Asserted with Plato. The Identity of Spirit and Soul.

 Chapter XI.—Spirit—A Term Expressive of an Operation of the Soul, Not of Its Nature.  To Be Carefully Distinguished from the Spirit of God.

 Chapter XII.—Difference Between the Mind and the Soul, and the Relation Between Them.

 Chapter XIII.—The Soul’s Supremacy.

 Chapter XIV.—The Soul Variously Divided by the Philosophers This Division is Not a Material Dissection.

 Chapter XV.—The Soul’s Vitality and Intelligence. Its Character and Seat in Man.

 Chapter XVI.—The Soul’s Parts. Elements of the Rational Soul.

 Chapter XVII.—The Fidelity of the Senses, Impugned by Plato, Vindicated by Christ Himself.

 Chapter XVIII.—Plato Suggested Certain Errors to the Gnostics.  Functions of the Soul.

 Chapter XIX.—The Intellect Coeval with the Soul in the Human Being. An Example from Aristotle Converted into Evidence Favourable to These Views.

 Chapter XX.—The Soul, as to Its Nature Uniform, But Its Faculties Variously Developed. Varieties Only Accidental.

 Chapter XXI.—As Free-Will Actuates an Individual So May His Character Change.

 Chapter XXII.—Recapitulation. Definition of the Soul.

 Chapter XXIII.—The Opinions of Sundry Heretics Which Originate Ultimately with Plato.

 Chapter XXIV.—Plato’s Inconsistency. He Supposes the Soul Self-Existent, Yet Capable of Forgetting What Passed in a Previous State.

 Chapter XXV.—Tertullian Refutes, Physiologically, the Notion that the Soul is Introduced After Birth.

 Chapter XXVI.—Scripture Alone Offers Clear Knowledge on the Questions We Have Been Controverting.

 Chapter XXVII.—Soul and Body Conceived, Formed and Perfected in Element Simultaneously.

 Chapter XXVIII.—The Pythagorean Doctrine of Transmigration Sketched and Censured.

 Chapter XXIX.—The Pythagorean Doctrine Refuted by Its Own First Principle, that Living Men are Formed from the Dead.

 Chapter XXX.—Further Refutation of the Pythagorean Theory.  The State of Contemporary Civilisation.

 Chapter XXXI.—Further Exposure of Transmigration, Its Inextricable Embarrassment.

 Chapter XXXII.—Empedocles Increased the Absurdity of Pythagoras by Developing the Posthumous Change of Men into Various Animals.

 Chapter XXXIII.—The Judicial Retribution of These Migrations Refuted with Raillery.

 Chapter XXXIV.—These Vagaries Stimulated Some Profane Corruptions of Christianity. The Profanity of Simon Magus Condemned.

 Chapter XXXV.—The Opinions of Carpocrates, Another Offset from the Pythagorean Dogmas, Stated and Confuted.

 Chapter XXXVI.—The Main Points of Our Author’s Subject. On the Sexes of the Human Race.

 Chapter XXXVII.—On the Formation and State of the Embryo. Its Relation with the Subject of This Treatise.

 Chapter XXXVIII.—On the Growth of the Soul. Its Maturity Coincident with the Maturity of the Flesh in Man.

 Chapter XXXIX.—The Evil Spirit Has Marred the Purity of the Soul from the Very Birth.

 Chapter XL.—The Body of Man Only Ancillary to the Soul in the Commission of Evil.

 Chapter XLI.—Notwithstanding the Depravity of Man’s Soul by Original Sin, There is Yet Left a Basis Whereon Divine Grace Can Work for Its Recovery by

 Chapter XLII.—Sleep, the Mirror of Death, as Introductory to the Consideration of Death.

 Chapter XLIII.—Sleep a Natural Function as Shown by Other Considerations, and by the Testimony of Scripture.

 Chapter XLIV.—The Story of Hermotimus, and the Sleeplessness of the Emperor Nero. No Separation of the Soul from the Body Until Death.

 Chapter XLV.—Dreams, an Incidental Effect of the Soul’s Activity.  Ecstasy.

 Chapter XLVI.—Diversity of Dreams and Visions. Epicurus Thought Lightly of Them, Though Generally Most Highly Valued. Instances of Dreams.

 Chapter XLVII.—Dreams Variously Classified. Some are God-Sent, as the Dreams of Nebuchadnezzar Others Simply Products of Nature.

 Chapter XLVIII.—Causes and Circumstances of Dreams. What Best Contributes to Efficient Dreaming.

 Chapter XLIX.—No Soul Naturally Exempt from Dreams.

 Chapter L.—The Absurd Opinion of Epicurus and the Profane Conceits of the Heretic Menander on Death, Even Enoch and Elijah Reserved for Death.

 Chapter LI.—Death Entirely Separates the Soul from the Body.

 Chapter LII.—All Kinds of Death a Violence to Nature, Arising from Sin.—Sin an Intrusion Upon Nature as God Created It.

 Chapter LIII.—The Entire Soul Being Indivisible Remains to the Last Act of Vitality Never Partially or Fractionally Withdrawn from the Body.

 Chapter LIV.—Whither Does the Soul Retire When It Quits the Body?  Opinions of Philosophers All More or Less Absurd. The Hades of Plato.

 Chapter LV.—The Christian Idea of the Position of Hades The Blessedness of Paradise Immediately After Death. The Privilege of the Martyrs.

 Chapter LVI.—Refutation of the Homeric View of the Soul’s Detention from Hades Owing to the Body’s Being Unburied. That Souls Prematurely Separated fr

 Chapter LVII.—Magic and Sorcery Only Apparent in Their Effects.  God Alone Can Raise the Dead.

 Chapter LVIII.—Conclusion. Points Postponed. All Souls are Kept in Hades Until the Resurrection, Anticipating Their Ultimate Misery or Bliss.

Chapter VII.—The Soul’s Corporeality Demonstrated Out of the Gospels.

So far as the philosophers are concerned, we have said enough. As for our own teachers, indeed, our reference to them is ex abundanti—a surplusage of authority: in the Gospel itself they will be found to have the clearest evidence for the corporeal nature of the soul. In hell the soul of a certain man is in torment, punished in flames, suffering excruciating thirst, and imploring from the finger of a happier soul, for his tongue, the solace of a drop of water.46    Luke xvi. 23, 24. Do you suppose that this end of the blessed poor man and the miserable rich man is only imaginary? Then why the name of Lazarus in this narrative, if the circumstance is not in (the category of) a real occurrence? But even if it is to be regarded as imaginary, it will still be a testimony to truth and reality. For unless the soul possessed corporeality, the image of a soul could not possibly contain a finger of a bodily substance; nor would the Scripture feign a statement about the limbs of a body, if these had no existence. But what is that which is removed to Hades47    Ad inferna. [See p. 59, supra.] after the separation of the body; which is there detained; which is reserved until the day of judgment; to which Christ also, on dying, descended? I imagine it is the souls of the patriarchs. But wherefore (all this), if the soul is nothing in its subterranean abode?  For nothing it certainly is, if it is not a bodily substance. For whatever is incorporeal is incapable of being kept and guarded in any way; it is also exempt from either punishment or refreshment. That must be a body, by which punishment and refreshment can be experienced. Of this I shall treat more fully in a more fitting place. Therefore, whatever amount of punishment or refreshment the soul tastes in Hades, in its prison or lodging,48    Diversorio. in the fire or in Abraham’s bosom, it gives proof thereby of its own corporeality. For an incorporeal thing suffers nothing, not having that which makes it capable of suffering; else, if it has such capacity, it must be a bodily substance. For in as far as every corporeal thing is capable of suffering, in so far is that which is capable of suffering also corporeal.49    Compare De Resur. Carnis, xvii. There is, however, some variation in Tertullian’s language on this subject.  In his Apol. xlviii. he speaks as if the soul could not suffer when separated from the body. See also his De Testimonio Animæ, ch. iv., p. 177, supra; and see Bp. Kaye, p. 183.

CAPUT VII.

Quantum ad philosophos, satis haec; quia quantum ad nostros, ex abundanti, quibus corporalitas animae in ipso Evangelio relucebit. Dolet apud inferos anima cujusdam, punitur in flamma, et cruciatur in lingua, et de digito animae felicioris implorat solatium roris. Imaginem existimas exitum illum pauperis laetantis 0657A et divitis moerentis? Et quid illic Lazari illic Lazari nomen, si non in veritate res est? Sed etsi imago credenda est, testimonium erit veritatis. Si enim non haberet anima corpus, non caperet imago animae imaginem corporis: nec mentiretur de corporalibus membris Scriptura, si non erant. Quid est autem illud quod ad inferna transfertur post divortium corporis? quod detinetur? quod in diem judicii reservatur? ad quod et Christus moriendo descendit? puto ad animas Patriarcharum. Sed quamobrem, si nihil anima sub terris? Nihil enim, si non corpus: incorporalitas enim ab omni genere custodiae libera est, immunis a poena et a fovela. Per quod enim punitur aut fovetur, hoc erit corpus; reddam de isto plenius et opportunius. Igitur si quid tormenti sive solatii anima praecerpit 0657B ia carcere seu diversorio inferum, in igni, vel in sinu Abrahae, probata erit corporalitas animae. Incorporalitas enim nihil patitur, non habens per quod pati possit: aut si habet, hoc erit corpus. In quantum enim omne corporale, passibile est; in tantum, quod passibile est, corporale est.