Letter CLXVII.

(a.d. 415.)

From Augustin to Jerome on James II. 10.

Chap. I.

1. My brother Jerome, esteemed worthy to be honoured in Christ by me, when I wrote to you propounding this question concerning the human soul,—if a new soul be now created for each individual at birth, whence do souls contract the bond of guilt which we assuredly believe to be removed by the sacrament of the grace of Christ, when administered even to new-born children?—as the letter on that subject grew to the size of a considerable volume, I was unwilling to impose the burden of any other question at that time; but there is a subject which has a much stronger claim on my attention, as it presses more seriously on my mind. I therefore ask you, and in God’s name beseech you, to do something which will, I believe, be of great service to many, namely, to explain to me (or to direct me to any work in which you or any other commentator has already expounded) the sense in which we are to understand these words in the Epistle of James, “Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all.”1310    Jas. ii. 10. This subject is of such importance that I very greatly regret that I did not write to you in regard to it long ago.

2. For whereas in the question which I thought it necessary to submit to you concerning the soul, our inquiries were engaged with the investigation of a life wholly past and sunk out of sight in oblivion, in this question we study this present life, and how it must be spent if we would attain to eternal life. As an apt illustration of this remark let me quote an entertaining anecdote. A man had fallen into a well where the quantity of water was sufficient to break his fall and save him from death, but not deep enough to cover his mouth and deprive him of speech. Another man approached, and on seeing him cries out in surprise: “How did you fall in here?” He answers: “I beseech you to plan how you can get me out of this, rather than ask how I fell in.” So, since we admit and hold as an article of the Catholic faith, that the soul of even a little infant requires to be delivered out of the guilt of sin, as out of a pit, by the grace of Christ, it is sufficient for the soul of such a one that we know the way in which it is saved, even though we should never know the way in which it came into that wretched condition. But I thought it our duty to inquire into this subject, lest we should incautiously hold any one of those opinions concerning the manner of the soul’s becoming united with the body which might contradict the doctrine that the souls of little children require to be delivered, by denying that they are subject to the bond of guilt. This, then, being very firmly held by us, that the soul of every infant needs to be freed from the guilt of sin, and can be freed in no other way except by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord, if we can ascertain the cause and origin of the evil itself, we are better prepared and equipped for resisting adversaries whose empty talk I call not reasoning but quibbling; if, however, we cannot ascertain the cause, the fact that the origin of this misery is hid from us is no reason for our being slothful in the work which compassion demands from us. In our conflict, however, with those who appear to themselves to know what they do not know, we have an additional strength and safety in not being ignorant of our ignorance on this subject. For there are some things which it is evil not to know; there are other things which cannot be known, or are not necessary to be known, or have no bearing on the life which we seek to obtain; but the question which I now submit to you from the writings of the Apostle James is intimately connected with the course of conduct in which we live, and in which, with a view to life eternal, we endeavour to please God.

3. How, then, I beseech you, are we to understand the words: “Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all”? Does this affirm that the person who shall have committed theft, nay, who even shall have said to the rich man, “Sit thou here” and to the poor man, “Stand thou there,” is guilty of homicide, and adultery, and sacrilege? And if he is not so, how can it be said that a person who has offended in one point has become guilty of all? Or are the things which the apostle said concerning the rich man and the poor man not to be reckoned among those things in one of which if any man offend he becomes guilty of all? But we must remember whence that sentence is taken, and what goes before it, and in what connection it occurs. “My brethren,” he says, “have not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Lord of Glory, with respect of persons. For if there come into your assembly a man with a gold ring, in goodly apparel, and there come in also a poor man in vile raiment; and ye have respect to him that weareth the gay clothing, and say unto him, Sit thou here in a good place; and say to the poor, Stand thou there, or sit here under my footstool; are ye not then partial in yourselves, and are become judges of evil thoughts? Hearken, my beloved brethren, Hath not God chosen the poor of this world, rich in faith, and heirs of the kingdom which He hath promised to them that love Him? But ye have despised the poor,”1311    Jas. ii. 1–6.—inasmuch as you have said to the poor man, “Stand thou there,” when you would have said to a man with a gold ring, “Sit thou here in a good place.” And then there follows a passage explaining and enlarging upon that same conclusion: “Do not rich men oppress you by their power, and draw you before the judgment-seats? Do not they blaspheme that worthy name by the which ye are called? If ye fulfil the royal law according to the Scripture, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, ye do well: but if ye have respect to persons, ye commit sin, and are convinced of the law as transgressors.”1312    Jas. ii. 6–9. See how the apostle calls those transgressors of the law who say to the rich man, “Sit here,” and to the poor, “Stand there.” See how, lest they should think it a trifling sin to transgress the law in this one thing, he goes on to add: “Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all. For He that said, Do not commit adultery, said also, Do not kill. Now if thou do not kill, yet, if thou commit adultery, thou art become a transgressor of the law,” according to that which he had said: “Ye are convinced of the law as transgressors.” Since these things are so, it seems to follow, unless it can be shown that we are to understand it in some other way, that he who says to the rich man, “Sit here,” and to the poor, “Stand there,” not treating the one with the same respect as the other, is to be judged guilty as an idolater, and a blasphemer, and an adulterer, and a murderer—in short,—not to enumerate all, which would be tedious,—as guilty of all crimes, since, offending in one, he is guilty of all.”

Chap. II.

4. But has he who has one virtue all virtues? and has he no virtues who lacks one? If this be true, the sentence of the apostle is thereby confirmed. But what I desire is to have the sentence explained, not confirmed, since of itself it stands more sure in our esteem than all the authority of philosophers could make it. And even if what has just been said concerning virtues and vices were true, it would not follow that therefore all sins are equal. For as to the inseparable co-existence of the virtues, this is a doctrine in regard to which, if I remember rightly, what, indeed, I have almost forgotten (though perhaps I am mistaken), all philosophers who affirm that virtues are essential to the right conduct of life are agreed. The doctrine of the equality of sins, however, the Stoics alone dared to maintain in opposition to the unanimous sentiments of mankind: an absurd tenet, which in writing against Jovinianus (a Stoic in this opinion, but an Epicurean in following after and defending pleasure) you have most clearly refuted from the Holy Scriptures.1313    Jerome, Contra Jovinianum, lib. ii. In that most delightful and noble dissertation you have made it abundantly plain that it has not been the doctrine of our authors, or rather of the Truth Himself, who has spoken through them, that all sins are equal. I shall now do my utmost in endeavouring, with the help of God, to show how it can be that, although the doctrine of philosophers concerning virtues is true, we are nevertheless not compelled to admit the Stoics’ doctrine that all sins are equal. If I succeed, I will look for your approbation, and in whatever respect I come short, I beg you to supply my deficiencies.

5. Those who maintain that he who has one virtue has all, and that he who lacks one lacks all, reason correctly from the fact that prudence cannot be cowardly, nor unjust, nor intemperate; for if it were any of these it would no longer be prudence. Moreover, if it be prudence only when it is brave, and just, and temperate, assuredly wherever it exists it must have the other virtues along with it. In like manner, also, courage cannot be imprudent, or intemperate, or unjust; temperance must of necessity be prudent, brave, and just; and justice does not exist unless it be prudent, brave, and temperate. Thus, wherever any one of these virtues truly exists, the others likewise exist; and where some are absent, that which may appear in some measure to resemble virtue is not really present.

6. There are, as you know, some vices opposed to virtues by a palpable contrast, as imprudence is the opposite of prudence. But there are some vices opposed to virtues simply because they are vices which, nevertheless, by a deceitful appearance resemble virtues; as, for example, in the relation, not of imprudence, but of craftiness to the said virtue of prudence. I speak here of that craftiness1314    Astutia. which is wont to be understood and spoken of in connection with the evilly disposed, not in the sense in which the word is usually employed in our Scriptures, where it is often used in a good sense, as, “Be crafty as serpents,”1315    Matt. x. 16. and again, to give craftiness to the simple.”1316    Prov. i. 4. It is true that among heathen writers one of the most accomplished of Latin authors, speaking of Catiline, has said: “Nor was there lacking on his part craftiness to guard against danger,”1317    Sallust, De Bello Catilinario. using “craftiness” (astutia) in a good sense; but the use of the word in this sense is among them very rare, among us very common. So also in regard to the virtues classed under temperance. Extravagance is most manifestly opposite to the virtue of frugality; but that which the common people are wont to call niggardliness is indeed a vice, yet one which, not in its nature, but by a very deceitful similarity of appearance, usurps the name of frugality. In the same manner injustice is by a palpable contrast opposed to justice; but the desire of avenging oneself is wont often to be a counterfeit of justice, but it is a vice. There is an obvious contrariety between courage and cowardice; but hardihood, though differing from courage in nature, deceives us by its resemblance to that virtue. Firmness is a part of virtue; fickleness is a vice far removed from and undoubtedly opposed to it; but obstinacy lays claim to the name of firmness, yet is wholly different, because firmness is a virtue, and obstinacy is a vice.

7. To avoid the necessity of again going over the same ground, let us take one case as an example, from which all others may be understood. Catiline, as those who have written concerning him had means of knowing, was capable of enduring cold, thirst, hunger, and patient in fastings, cold, and watchings beyond what any one could believe, and thus he appeared, both to himself and to his followers, a man endowed with great courage.1318    Ibid. But this courage was not prudent, for he chose the evil instead of the good; was not temperate, for his life was disgraced by the lowest dissipation; was not just, for he conspired against his country; and therefore it was not courage, but hardihood usurping the name of courage to deceive fools; for if it had been courage, it would not have been a vice but a virtue, and if it had been a virtue, it would never have been abandoned by the other virtues, its inseparable companions.

8. On this account, when it is asked also concerning vices, whether where one exists all in like manner exist, or where one does not exist none exist, it would be a difficult matter to show this, because two vices are wont to be opposed to one virtue, one that is evidently opposed, and another that bears an apparent likeness. Hence the hardihood of Catiline is the more easily seen not to have been courage, since it had not along with it other virtues; but it may be difficult to convince men that his hardihood was cowardice, since he was in the habit of enduring and patiently submitting to the severest hardships to a degree almost incredible. But perhaps, on examining the matter more closely, this hardihood itself is seen to be cowardice, because he shrunk from the toil of those liberal studies by which true courage is acquired. Nevertheless, as there are rash men who are not guilty of cowardice, and there are cowardly men who are not guilty of rashness, and since in both there is vice, for the truly brave man neither ventures rashly nor fears without reason, we are forced to admit that vices are more numerous than virtues.

9. Accordingly, it happens sometimes that one vice is supplanted by another, as the love of money by the love of praise. Occasionally, one vice quits the field that more may take its place, as in the case of the drunkard, who, after becoming temperate in the use of drink, may come under the power of niggardliness and ambition. It is possible, therefore, that vices may give place to vices, not to virtues, as their successors, and thus they are more numerous. When one virtue, however, has entered, there will infallibly be (since it brings all the other virtues along with it) a retreat of all vices whatsoever that were in the man; for all vices were not in him, but at one time so many, at another a greater or smaller number might occupy their place.

Chap. III.

10. We must inquire more carefully whether these things are so; for the statement that “he who has one virtue has all, and that all virtues are awanting to him who lacks one,” is not given by inspiration, but is the view held by many men, ingenious, indeed, and studious, but still men. But I must avow that, in the case—I shall not say of one of those from whose name the word virtue is said to be derived,1319    Virum a quo denominata dictur virtus. but even of a woman who is faithful to her husband, and who is so from a regard to the commandments and promises of God, and, first of all, is faithful to Him, I do not know how I could say of her that she is unchaste, or that chastity is no virtue or a trifling one. I should feel the same in regard to a husband who is faithful to his wife; and yet there are many such, none of whom I could affirm to be without any sins, and doubtless the sin which is in them, whatever it be, proceeds from some vice. Whence it follows that though conjugal fidelity in religious men and women is undoubtedly a virtue, for it is neither a nonentity nor a vice, yet it does not bring along with it all virtues, for if all virtues were there, there would be no vice, and if there were no vice, there would be no sin; but where is the man who is altogether without sin? Where, therefore, is the man who is without any vice, that is, fuel or root, as it were, of sin, when he who reclined on the breast of the Lord says, “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us”?1320    1 John i. 8. It is not necessary for us to urge this at greater length in writing to you, but I make the statement for the sake of others who perhaps shall read this. For you, indeed, in that same splendid work against Jovinianus, have carefully proved this from the Holy Scriptures; in which work also you have quoted the words, “in many things we all offend,”1321    Jas. iii. 2. from this very epistle in which occur the words whose meaning we are now investigating. For though it is an apostle of Christ who is speaking, he does not say, “ye offend,” but, “we offend;” and although in the passage under consideration he says, “Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all,”1322    Jas. ii. 10. in the words just quoted he affirms that we offend not in one thing but in many, and not that some offend but that we all offend.

11. Far be it, however, from any believer to think that so many thousands of the servants of Christ, who, lest they should deceive themselves, and the truth should not be in them, sincerely confess themselves to have sin, are altogether without virtue! For wisdom is a great virtue, and wisdom herself has said to man, “Behold the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom.”1323    Job xxviii. 28, Sept. ver. Far be it from us, then, to say that so many and so great believing and pious men have not the fear of the Lord, which the Greeks call εὐσέβεια, or more literally and fully, θεοσέβεια. And what is the fear of the Lord but His worship? and whence is He truly worshipped except from love? Love, then, out of a pure heart, and a good conscience, and faith unfeigned, is the great and true virtue, because it is “the end of the commandment.”1324    1 Tim. i. 5. Deservedly is love said to be “strong as death,”1325    Song of Sol. viii. 6. because, like death, it is vanquished by none; or because the measure of love in this life is even unto death, as the Lord says, “Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends;”1326    John xv. 13. or, rather, because, as death forcibly separates the soul from the senses of the body, so love separates it from fleshly lusts. Knowledge, when it is of the right kind, is the handmaid to love, for without love “knowledge puffeth up,”1327    1 Cor. viii. 1. but where love, by edifying, has filled the heart, there knowledge will find nothing empty which it can puff up. Moreover, Job has shown, what is that useful knowledge by defining it where, after saying, “The fear of the Lord, that is wisdom” he adds “and to depart from evil, that is understanding.”1328    Job xxviii. 28. Why do we not then say that the man who has this virtue has all virtues, since “love is the fulfilling of the law?”1329    Rom. xiii. 10. Is it not true that, the more love exists in a man the more he is endowed with virtue, and the less love he has the less virtue is in him, for love is itself virtue; and the less virtue there is in a man so much the more vice will there be in him? Therefore, where love is full and perfect, no vice will remain.

12. The Stoics, therefore, appear to me to be mistaken in refusing to admit that a man who is advancing in wisdom has any wisdom at all, and in affirming that he alone has it who has become altogether perfect in wisdom. They do not, indeed, deny that he has made progress, but they say that he is in no degree entitled to be called wise, unless, by emerging, so to speak, from the depths, he suddenly springs forth into the free air of wisdom. For, as it matters not when a man is drowning whether the depth of water above him be many stadia or only the breadth of a hand or finger, so they say in regard to the progress of those who are advancing towards wisdom, that they are like men rising from the bottom of a whirlpool towards the air, but that unless they by their progress, so escape as to emerge wholly from folly as from an overwhelming flood, they have not virtue and are not wise; but that, when they have so escaped, they immediately have wisdom in perfection, and not a vestige of folly whence any sin could be originated remains.

13. This simile, in which folly is compared to water and wisdom to air, so that the mind emerging, as it were, from the stifling influence of folly breathes suddenly the free air of wisdom, does not appear to me to harmonize sufficiently with the authoritative statement of our Scriptures; a better simile, so far, at least, as illustration of spiritual things can be borrowed from material things, is that which compares vice or folly to darkness, and virtue or wisdom to light. The way to wisdom is therefore not like that of a man rising from the water into the air, in which, in the moment of rising above the surface of the water, he suddenly breathes freely, but, like that of a man proceeding from darkness into light, on whom more light gradually shines as he advances. So long, therefore, as this is not fully accomplished, we speak of the man as of one going from the dark recesses of a vast cavern towards its entrance, who is more and more influenced by the proximity of the light as he comes nearer to the entrance of the cavern; so that whatever light he has proceeds from the light to which he is advancing, and whatever darkness still remains in him proceeds from the darkness out of which he is emerging. Therefore it is true that in the sight of God “shall no man living be justified,”1330    Ps. cxliii. 2. and yet that “the just shall live by his faith.”1331    Hab. ii. 4. On the one hand, “the saints are clothed with righteousness,”1332    Job xxix. 14. one more, another less; on the other hand, no one lives here wholly without sin—one sins more, another less, and the best is the man who sins least.

Chap. IV.

14. But why have I, as if forgetting to whom I address myself, assumed the tone of a teacher in stating the question regarding which I wish to be instructed by you? Nevertheless, as I had resolved to submit to your examination my opinion regarding the equality of sins (a subject involving a question closely bearing on the matter on which I was writing), let me now at last bring my statement to a conclusion. Even though it were true that he who has one virtue has all virtues, and that he who lacks one virtue has none, this would not involve the consequence that all sins are equal; for although it is true that where there is no virtue there is nothing right, it by no means follows that among bad actions one cannot be worse than another, or that divergence from that which is right does not admit of degrees. I think, however, that it is more agreeable to truth and consistent with the Holy Scriptures to say, that what is true of the members of the body is true of the different dispositions of the soul (which, though not seen occupying different places, are by their distinctive workings perceived as plainly as the members of the body), namely, that as in the same body one member is more fully shone upon by the light, another is less shone upon, and a third is altogether without light, and remains in the dark under some impervious covering, something similar takes place in regard to the various dispositions of the soul. If this be so, then according to the manner in which every man is shone upon by the light of holy love, he may be said to have one virtue and to lack another virtue, or to have one virtue in larger and another in smaller measure. For in reference to that love which is the fear of God, we may correctly say both that it is greater in one man than in another, and that there is some of it in one man, and none of it in another; we may also correctly say as to an individual that he has greater chastity than patience, and that he has either virtue in a higher degree than he had yesterday, if he is making progress, or that he still lacks self-control, but possesses, at the same time, a large measure of compassion.

15. To sum up generally and briefly the view which, so far as relates to holy living, I entertain concerning virtue,—virtue is the love with which that which ought to be loved is loved. This is in some greater, in others less, and there are men in whom it does not exist at all; but in the absolute fulness which admits of no increase, it exists in no man while living on this earth; so long, however, as it admits of being increased there can be no doubt that, in so far as it is less than it ought to be, the shortcoming proceeds from vice. Because of this vice there is “not a just man upon earth that doeth good and sinneth not;”1333    Eccles. v. 7. because of this vice, “in God’s sight shall no man living be justified.”1334    Ps. cxliii. 2. On account of this vice, “if we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.”1335    1 John i. 8. On account of this also, whatever progress we may have made, we must say, “Forgive us our debts,”1336    Matt. vi. 12. although all debts in word, deed, and thought were washed away in baptism. He, then, who sees aright, sees whence, and when, and where he must hope for that perfection to which nothing can be added. Moreover, if there had been no commandments, there would have been no means whereby a man might certainly examine himself and see from what things he ought to turn aside, whither he should aspire, and in what things he should find occasion for thanksgiving or for prayer. Great, therefore, is the benefit of commandments, if to free will so much liberty be granted that the grace of God may be more abundantly honoured.

Chap. V.

16. If these things be so, how shall a man who shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, be guilty of all? May it not be, that since the fulfilling of the law is that love wherewith we love God and our neighbour, on which commandments of love “hang all the law and the prophets,”1337    Matt. xxii. 40. he is justly held to be guilty of all who violates that on which all hang? Now, no one sins without violating this love; “for this, thou shalt not commit adultery; thou shall do no murder; thou shall not steal; thou shalt not covet; and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, Thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself. Love worketh no ill to his neighbour: therefore love is the fulfilling of the law.”1338    Rom. xiii. 9, 10. No one, however, loves his neighbour who does not out of his love to God do all in his power to bring his neighbour also, whom he loves as himself, to love God, whom if he does not love, he neither loves himself nor his neighbour. Hence it is true that if a man shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he becomes guilty of all, because he does what is contrary to the love on which hangs the whole law. A man, therefore, becomes guilty of all by doing what is contrary to that on which all hang.

17. Why, then, may not all sins be said to be equal? May not the reason be, that the transgression of the law of love is greater in him who commits a more grievous sin, and is less in him who commits a less grievous sin? And in the mere fact of his committing any sin whatever, he becomes guilty of all; but in committing a more grievous sin, or in sinning in more respects than one, he becomes more guilty; committing a less grievous sin, or sinning in fewer respects, he becomes less guilty,—his guilt being thus so much the greater the more he has sinned, the less the less he has sinned. Nevertheless, even though it be only in one point that he offend, he is guilty of all, because he violates that love on which all hang. If these things be true, an explanation is by this means found, clearing up that saying of the man of apostolic grace, “In many things we offend all.”1339    Jas. iii. 2. For we all offend, but one more grievously, another more slightly, according as each may have committed a more grievous or a less grievous sin; every one being great in the practice of sin in proportion as he is deficient in loving God and his neighbour, and, on the other hand, decreasing in the practice of sin in proportion as he increases in the love of God and of his neighbour. The more, therefore, that a man is deficient in love, the more is he full of sin. And perfection in love is reached when nothing of sinful infirmity remains in us.

18. Nor, indeed, in my opinion, are we to esteem it a trifling sin “to have the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ with respect of persons,” if we take the difference between sitting and standing, of which mention is made in the context, to refer to ecclesiastical honours; for who can bear to see a rich man chosen to a place of honour in the Church, while a poor man, of superior qualifications and of greater holiness, is despised? If, however, the apostle speaks there of our daily assemblies, who does not offend in the matter? At the same time, only those really offend here who cherish in their hearts the opinion that a man’s worth is to be estimated according to his wealth; for this seems to be the meaning of the expression, “Are ye not then partial in yourselves, and are become judges of evil thoughts?”

19. The law of liberty, therefore, the law of love, is that of which he says: “If ye fulfil the royal law according to the Scripture, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, ye do well: but if ye have respect to persons, ye commit sin, and are convinced of the law as transgressors.1340    Jas. ii. 8, 9. And then (after the difficult sentence, “Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all,” concerning which I have with sufficient fulness stated my opinion), making mention of the same law of liberty, he says: “So speak ye, and so do, as they that shall be judged by the law of liberty.” And as he knew by experience what he had said a little before, “in many things we offend all,” he suggests a sovereign remedy, to be applied, as it were day by day, to those less serious but real wounds which the soul suffers day by day, for he says: “He shall have judgment without mercy that hath showed no mercy.”1341    Jas. ii. 13. For with the same purpose the Lord says: “Forgive, and ye shall be forgiven: give, and it shall be given unto you.”1342    Luke vi. 37, 38. After which the apostle says: “But mercy rejoiceth over judgment:” it is not said that mercy prevails over judgment, for it is not an adversary of judgment, but it “rejoiceth” over judgment, because a greater number are gathered in by mercy; but they are those who have shown mercy, for, “Blessed are the merciful, for God shall have mercy on them.”1343    Matt. v. 7.

20. It is, therefore, by all means just that they be forgiven, because they have forgiven others, and that what they need be given to them, because they have given to others. For God uses mercy when He judgeth, and uses judgment when He showeth mercy. Hence the Psalmist says: “I will sing of mercy and of judgment unto Thee, O Lord.”1344    Ps. ci. 1. For if any man, thinking himself too righteous to require mercy, presumes, as if he had no reason for anxiety, to wait for judgment without mercy, he provokes that most righteous indignation through fear of which the Psalmist said: “Enter not into judgment with Thy servant.”1345    Ps. cxliii. 2. For this reason the Lord says to a disobedient people: “Wherefore will ye contend with me in judgment?1346    Jer. ii. 28, LXX. For when the righteous King shall sit upon His throne, who shall boast that he has a pure heart, or who shall boast that he is clean from sin? What hope is there then unless mercy shall “rejoice over” judgment? But this it will do only in the case of those who have showed mercy, saying with sincerity, “Forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors,” and who have given without murmuring, for “the Lord loveth a cheerful giver.”1347    2 Cor. ix. 7. To conclude, St. James is led to speak thus concerning works of mercy in this passage, in order that he may console those whom the statements immediately foregoing might have greatly alarmed, his purpose being to admonish us how those daily sins from which our life is never free here below may also be expiated by daily remedies; lest any man, becoming guilty of all when he offends in even one point, be brought, by offending in many points (since “in many things we all offend”), to appear before the bar of the Supreme Judge under the enormous amount of guilt which has accumulated by degrees, and find at that tribunal no mercy, because he showed no mercy to others, instead of rather meriting the forgiveness of his own sins, and the enjoyment of the gifts promised in Scripture, by his extending forgiveness and bounty to others.

21. I have written at great length, which may perhaps have been tedious to you, as you, although approving of the statements now made, do not expect to be addressed as if you were but learning truths which you have been accustomed to teach to others. If, however, there be anything in these statements—not in the style of language in which they are expounded, for I am not much concerned as to mere phrases, but in the substance of the statements—which your erudite judgment condemns, I beseech you to point this out to me in your reply, and do not hesitate to correct my error. For I pity the man who, in view of the unwearied labour and sacred character of your studies, does not on account of them both render to you the honour which you deserve, and give thanks unto our Lord God by whose grace you are what you are. Wherefore, since I ought to be more willing to learn from any teacher the things of which to my disadvantage I am ignorant, than prompt to teach any others what I know, with how much greater reason do I claim the payment of this debt of love from you, by whose learning ecclesiastical literature in the Latin tongue has been, in the Lord’s name, and by His help, advanced to an extent which had been previously unattainable. Especially, however, I ask attention to the sentence: “Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and offend in one point, is guilty of all.” If you know any better way, my beloved brother, in which it can be explained, I beseech you by the Lord to favour us by communicating to us your exposition.

DE SENTENTIA JACOBI LIBER, SEU EPISTOLA CLXVII .

Augustinus Hieronymo, de loco qui est Jacobi II, 10, «Qui offenderit in uno, factus est omnium reus:» multa admiscens de Stoicis, qui docebant omnia peccata esse paria; et quisquis haberet unam virtutem, habere omnes; qui careret una, nullam habere.

CAPUT PRIMUM.

1. Quod ad te scripsi, honorande mihi in Christo frater Hieronyme, quaerens de anima humana, si nascentibus singulis novae singulae nunc usque fiunt, ubi peccati vinculum contrabant, quod per Sacramentum gratiae Christi etiam in infantibus recenter natis solvendum esse non dubitamus, cum in non parvum volumen procederet, nolui ulla alia onerare quaestione: sed quod urget acrius, multo minus est negligendum. Proinde quaeso, et per Deum obsecro ut exponas mihi, quod multis existimo profuturum, aut si jam vel abs te vel ab alio aliquo expositum habes, dirigas nobis, quomodo accipiendum sit quod in Epistola Jacobi apostoli scriptum est, Quicumque enim totam legem servaverit, offendat autem in uno, factus est omnium reus. Quae res talis ac tanta est, ut quod hinc tibi non jam olim scripsi, multum me poeniteat.

2. De agenda namque praesenti vita, quomodo ad vitam perveniamus aeternam, non de praeterita perscrutanda, quam penitus demersit oblivio, sicut est illud quod de anima quaerendum putavi, haec vertitur quaestio. Eleganter autem dictum esse narratur quod huic rei satis apte convenit. Cum quidam ruisset in puteum, ubi aqua tanta erat, ut eum magis exciperet ne moreretur, quam suffocaret ne loqueretur; accessit alius, et eo viso admirans ait : Quomodo huc cecidisti? At ille: Obsecro, inquit, cogita quomodo hinc me liberes; non quomodo huc ceciderim, quaeras. Ita quoniam fatemur, et fide catholica tenemus, de reatu peccati tanquam de puteo, etiam parvuli infantis animam Christi gratia liberandam; satis est ei quod modum quomodo salva fiat novimus, etiamsi nunquam quomodo in malum illud devenerit, noverimus. Sed ideo putavi esse quaerendum, ne forte ex illis opinionibus incarnationis animae aliquam teneamus incautius, quae liberandam prorsus animam parvuli contradicat, negans eam esse in isto malo. Hoc igitur firmissime retento, quod anima parvuli de reatu peccati liberanda est, nec alio modo liberanda, nisi gratia Dei per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum: 0734 si possumus etiam ipsius mali causam et originem nosse, vaniloquis, non disputatoribus, sed litigatoribus paratius instructiusque resistimus; si autem non possumus, non quia latet miseriae principium, ideo pigrescere misericordiae debet officium. Adversus eos autem qui sibi videntur scire quod nesciunt, hoc tutiores sumus, quod hanc ignorantiam nostram non ignoramus. Aliud est enim quod nescire malum est; aliud quod sciri vel non potest, vel non opus est, vel ad vitam quam quaerimus indifferens est: hoc vero quod de Litteris apostoli Jacobi nunc requiro, in hac ipsa qua vivimus, et ut semper vivamus Deo placere studemus, actione versatur.

3. Quomodo igitur intelligendum est, obsecro te, Quicumque totam Legem servaverit, offendat autem in uno, factus est omnium reus? Itane qui furtum fecerit, imo vero qui dixerit diviti, Sede hic, pauperi autem, Tu sta illic, et homicidii, et adulterii, et sacrilegii reus est? Quod si non est, quomodo qui in uno offendat factus est omnium reus? an illud quod dixit de divite et paupere ad ista non pertinet, quorum si quis in uno offenderit, fiet omnium reus? Sed recolendum est unde venerit illa sententia, et quae illam superiora pepererint, quibusque connexa dependeat. Fratres mei, nolite, inquit, in personarum acceptione habere fidem Domini nostri Jesu Christi gloriae. Etenim si introierit in conventum vestrum vir annulum aureum habens in veste candida, introierit autem et pauper in sordido habitu, et intendatis in eum qui indutus est veste praeclara, et dicatis ei, Tu sede hic bene; pauperi autem dicatis, Tu sta illic, aut, Sede sub scabello pedum meorum: nonne judicatis apud vosmetipsos, et facti estis judices cogitationum iniquarum? Audite, fratres mei dilectissimi; nonne Deus elegit pauperes in hoc mundo, divites in fide, et haeredes regni quod repromisit Deus diligentibus se? Vos autem exhonorastis pauperem: propter illum scilicet cui dictum est, Sta illic; cum habenti annulum aureum dictum esset, Tu sede hic bene. Ac deinde sequitur, eamdem ipsam sententiam latius versans et explicans: Nonne, inquit, divites per potentiam opprimunt vos, et trahunt ad judicia? nonne ipsi blasphemant bonum nomen, quod invocatum est super vos? Si quidem legem perficitis regalem, secundum Scripturam, Diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum, bene facitis: si autem personas accipitis, peccatum operamini, redarguti a lege quasi transgressores. Vide quemadmodum transgressores legis appellat, qui dicunt diviti, Sede hic, et pauperi, Sta illic. Vide, ne putarent contemptibile esse peccatum in hac una re legem transgredi, secutus adjunxit, Quicumque autem totam legem servaverit, offendat autem in uno, factus est omnium reus. Qui enim dixit, Non moechaberis, dixit et, Non occides. Quod si non occides, moecharis autem, factus es transgressor legis: propter id quod dixerat, redarguti a lege, quasi transgressores. Quae cum ita sint, consequens videtur (nisi alio modo intelligendum ostendatur) ut qui dixerit diviti, Sede hic, et pauperi, Sta illic, huic non honorem, quem illi deferens, et idololatra, et blasphemus, et adulter, 0735 et homicida, et ne, quod longum est, cuncta commemorem, reus omnium criminum judicandus sit: offendens quippe in uno, factus est omnium reus.

CAPUT II.

4. At enim qui unam virtutem habet, omnes habet; et qui unam non habet, nullam habet? Hoc si verum est, confirmatur ista sententia. Sed ego eam exponi volo, non confirmari; quae per seipsam apud nos omnibus philosophorum auctoritatibus firmior est. Et illud quidem de virtutibus et vitiis, si veraciter dicitur, non est consequens ut propter hoc omnia peccata sint paria. Nam illud de inseparabilitate virtutum, etsi forsitan fallor, tamen si verum memini, quod vix memini, omnibus philosophis placuit, qui easdem virtutes agendae vitae necessarias esse dixerunt. Hoc autem de parilitate peccatorum, soli Stoici ausi sunt disputare, contra omnem sensum generis humani: quam eorum vanitatem in Joviniano illo qui in hac sententia Stoicus erat, in aucupandis autem et defensandis voluptatibus Epicureus, de Scripturis sanctis dilucidissime convicisti (Hieron. lib. 2 cont. Jovin.). In qua tua suavissima et praeclarissima disputatione satis evidenter apparuit, non placuisse auctoribus nostris, vel ipsi potius, quae per eos locuta est, veritati, omnia paria esse peccata. Quomodo autem fieri possit ut etiamsi hoc de virtutibus verum est, non tamen ideo cogamur fateri aequalitatem omnium peccatorum, quantum possum, adjuvante Domino aperire conabor: quod si effecero, approbabis; ubi vero causae defuero, tu supplebis.

5. Certe hinc persuadent, qui unam virtutem habuerit habere omnes, et omnes deesse cui una defuerit, quod prudentia, nec ignava, nec injusta, nec intemperans potest esse: nam si aliquid horum fuerit, prudentia non erit. Porro si prudentia tunc erit, si et fortis, et justa, et temperans sit, profecto ubi fuerit, secum habet caeteras. Sic et fortitudo imprudens esse non potest, vel intemperans, vel injusta: sic temperantia necesse est ut prudens, fortis, et justa sit: sic justitia non est, nisi sit prudens, fortis, et temperans. Ita ubi vera est aliqua earum, et aliae similiter sunt; ubi autem aliae desunt, vera illa non est, etiamsi aliquo modo similis esse videatur.

6. Sunt enim, ut scis, quaedam vitia virtutibus aperta discretione contraria, ut imprudentia prudentiae. Sunt autem quaedam tantum quia vitia sunt, ideo contraria, quadam tamen specie fallaci similia, ut eidem prudentiae, non imprudentia, sed astutia. Nunc enim eam dico astutiam, quae usitatius in malitiosis intelligi et vocari solet; non sicut nostra loqui Scriptura consuevit, quae saepe astutiam in bono ponit: unde, Estote astuti ut serpentes (Matth. X, 16); et illud, Ut et innocentibus det astutiam (Prov. I, 4). Quanquam et apud illos Romanae linguae disertissimus dixerit, Neque illi tamen ad cavendum dolus, aut astutia deerant (Sallust., de Bello Catilin.), astutiam ponens in bono: sed apud illos rarissimum, apud nostros frequentissimum est. Itemque in partibus temperantiae, apertissime contraria est effusio parcimoniae: ea vero 0736 quae tenacitas dici vulgo solet, vitium quidem est, tamen parcimoniae simile, non natura, sed fallacissima specie. Item dissimilitudine manifesta contraria est injustitia justitiae: solet autem quasi imitari justitiam vindicandi se libido, sed vitium est. Ignavia fortitudini perspicue contraria est: duritia vero distat natura, fallit similitudine. Constantia, pars quaedam virtutis est; ab hac, inconstantia longe abhorret, et indubie contrasistit: pertinacia vero constantia dici affectat, et non est; quia illa est virtus, hoc vitium.

7. Ut ergo non iterum eadem commemorare necesse sit, exempli gratia ponamus aliquid unde possint caetera intelligi. Catilina, ut de illo scripserunt qui nosse potuerunt, frigus, sitim, famem ferre poterat, eratque patiens inediae, algoris, vigiliae, supra quam cuiquam credibile est, ac per hoc et sibi et suis magna praeditus fortitudine videbatur (Sallust., de Bello Catilin.). Sed haec fortitudo prudens non erat; mala enim pro bonis eligebat: temperans non erat; corruptelis enim turpissimis foedabatur: justa non erat; nam contra patriam conjuraverat. Et ideo nec fortitudo erat; sed duritia sibi, ut stultos falleret, nomen fortitudinis imponebat: nam si fortitudo esset, non vitium, sed virtus esset; si autem virtus esset, a caeteris virtutibus tanquam inseparabilibus comitibus nunquam relinqueretur.

8. Quapropter dum quaeritur etiam de vitiis utrum ipsa similiter omnia sint, ubi unum erit; aut nulla sint, ubi unum non erit; laboriosum est id ostendere, propterea quia uni virtuti duo vitia opponi solent, et quod aperte contrarium est, et quod specie similitudinis adumbratur. Unde illa Catilinae , quia fortitudo non erat, quae esset, cum secum virtutes alias non habebat, facilius videbatur: quod vero ignavia fuerit, ubi exercitatio quaslibet gravissimas molestias perpetiendi atque tolerandi, supra quam cuiquam credibile est, fuit, aegre persuaderi potest. Sed forte acutius intuentibus, ignavia apparet ipsa duritia; quia laborem bonorum studiorum quibus vera acquiritur fortitudo, neglexerat. Verumtamen quia sunt audaces qui timidi non sunt, et rursus timidi quibus abest audacia, cum sit utrumque vitium; quoniam qui vera virtute fortis est, nec temere audet, nec inconsulte timet; cogimur fateri vitia plura esse virtutibus.

9. Unde aliquando vitium vitio tollitur; ut amore laudis, amor pecuniae: aliquando unum cedit, ut plura succedant; velut qui ebriosus fuerit, si modicum biberit, et tenacitatem et ambitionem didicerit. Possunt itaque vitia etiam cedere vitiis succedentibus, non virtutibus; et ideo plura sunt. Virtus vero quo una ingressa fuerit, quoniam secum caeteras ducit, profecto vitia cedent omnia quaecumque inerant: non enim omnia inerant, sed aliquando totidem, aliquando plura paucioribus, vel pauciora pluribus succedebant.

CAPUT III.

10. Haec utrum ita se habeant, diligentius inquirendum est. Non enim et ista divina sententia est, qua dicitur, Qui unam virtutem habuerit, 0737 omnes habet; eique nulla inest, cui una defuerit: sed hominibus hoc visum est, multum quidem ingeniosis, studiosis, sed tamen hominibus. Ego vero nescio quemadmodum dicam, non dico virum, a quo denominata dicitur virtus, sed etiam mulierem quae viro suo servat tori fidem, si hoc faciat propter praeceptum et promissum Dei, eique primitus sit fidelis, non habere pudicitiam, aut pudicitiam nullam vel parvam esse virtutem; sic et maritum qui hoc idem servat uxori: et tamen sunt plurimi tales, quorum sine aliquo peccato esse neminem dixerim, et utique illud qualecumque peccatum ex aliquo vitio venit. Unde pudicitia conjugalis in viris feminisque religiosis cum procul dubio virtus sit, non enim aut nihil, aut vitium est, non tamen secum habet omnes virtutes. Nam si omnes ibi essent, nullum esset vitium; si nullum vitium, nullum omnino peccatum: quis autem sine aliquo peccato? quis ergo sine aliquo vitio, id est fomite quodam, vel quasi radice peccati, cum clamet qui supra pectus Domini recumbebat, Si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos decipimus, et veritas in nobis non est (I Joan. 1, 8)? Neque hoc apud te diutius agendum est; sed propter alios qui forte hoc legerint, dico. Nam tu quidem in eodem ipso opere splendido contra Jovinianum (Lib. II) etiam hoc de Scripturis sanctis diligenter probasti: ubi etiam ex hac ipsa Epistola, cujus verba sunt quorum nunc intellectum requirimus, posuisti quod scriptum est, In multis enim offendimus omnes (Jacobi III, 2). Non enim ait, Offenditis, sed offendimus, cum Christi loqueretur apostolus: et cum hoc loco dicat, Quicumque autem totam legem servaverit, offendat autem in uno, factus est omnium reus; ibi non in uno, sed in multis; nec quosdam, sed omnes dicit offendere.

11. Absit autem ut quisquam fidelis existimet tot millia servorum Christi, qui veraciter dicunt se habere peccatum, ne seipsos decipiant, et veritas in eis non sit, nullam habere virtutem, cum virtus magna sit sapientia: dixit autem, ipsa sapientia, homini, Ecce pietas est sapientia (Job XXVIII, 28, sec. LXX). Absit ergo ut dicamus tot ac tantos fideles et pios homines Dei non habere pietatem, quam Graeci vel εὐσέβειαν, vel expressius et plenius θεοσέβειαν vocant: quid autem est pietas, nisi Dei cultus? et unde ille colitur, nisi charitate? Charitas igitur de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta, magna et vera virtus est, quia ipsa est et finis praecepti (I Tim. 1, 5). Merito dicta est fortis sicut mors (Cant. VIII, 6): sive quia nemo eam vincit, sicut mortem; sive quia in hac vita usque ad mortem est mensura charitatis, sicut Dominus ait; Majorem hac charitatem nemo habet, quam ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis (Joan. XV, 13); sive potius, quia sicut mors animam avellit a sensibus carnis, sie charitas a concupiscentiis carnalibus. Huic subservit scientia, cum est utilis; nam sine illa inflat (I Cor. VIII, 1): quod vero 0738 illa aedificando impleverit, nihil ibi ista inane quod inflet, inveniet. Utilem porro scientiam definiendo monstravit, ubi cum dixisset, Ecce pietas est sapientia; continuo subjunxit, Abstinere vero a malis, scientia est. Cur ergo non dicimus, qui hanc virtutem habet, habere omnes; cum plenitudo legis sit charitas (Rom. XIII, 10)? An quanto magis est in homine, tanto magis est virtute praeditus: quanto autem minus, tanto minus inest ei virtus; quia ipsa est virtus: et quanto minus inest virtus, tanto magis est vitium? Ubi ergo illa plena et perfecta erit, nihil ex vitio remanebit.

12. Proinde mihi videntur Stoici falli, quia proficientem hominem in sapientia nolunt omnino habere sapientiam; sed tunc habere cum in ea omnino perfectus fuerit: non quia illum provectum negant; sed nisi ex profundo quodam emergendo, repente emicet in auras sapientiae liberas, nulla ex parte esse sapientem. Sicut enim nihil interest ad hominem praefocandum, utrum aquam stadiis multis super se habeat altam, aut uno palmo, aut digito: sic illos qui tendunt ad sapientiam, proficere quidem dicunt, tanquam ab imo gurgitis surgentes in aerem; sed nisi totam stultitiam velut opprimentem aquam, proficiendo velut emergendo evaserint, non habere virtutem, nec esse sapientes: ubi autem evaserint, mox habere totam, nec quidquam stultitiae remanere, unde omnino ullum peccatum possit existere.

13. Haec similitudo, ubi stultitia velut aqua, et sapientia velut aer ponitur, ut animus a praefocatione stultitiae tanquam emergens, in sapientiam repente respiret, non mihi videtur satis accommodata nostrarum Scripturarum auctoritati: sed illa potius, ut vitium vel stultitia tenebris, luci autem virtus vel sapientia comparetur, quantum ista similia de corporalibus ad intelligibilia duci possunt. Non itaque sicut de aquis in aerem surgens, ubi earum summum transierit, repente quantum sufficit inspiratur; sed sicut de tenebris in lucem procedens, paulatim progrediendo illuminatur. Quod donec plenissime fiat, jam eum tamen dicimus tanquam de abditissima spelunca egredientem, vicinia lucis afflatum, tanto magis, quanto magis propinquat egressui: ut illud quod in eo lucet, sit utique ex lumine quo progreditur; illud autem quod adhuc obscurum est, sit ex tenebris unde egreditur. Itaque et non justificabitur in conspectu Dei omnis vivens (Psal. CXLII, 2); et tamen justus ex fide vivit (Habac. II, 4). Et induti sunt sancti justitia (Job. XXIX, 14), alius magis, alius minus: et nemo hic vivit sine peccato, et hoc alius magis, alius minus; optimus autem est, qui minimum.

CAPUT IV.

14. Sed quid ego, tanquam oblitus cui loquor, doctori similis factus sum, cum proposuerim quid abs te discere velim? Sed quia de peccatorum parilitate, unde in id quod agebam incidit quaestio, examinandam tibi sententiam meam promere statueram, jam eam tandem aliquando concludam. Quia etsi verum est, eum qui habet unam, omnes habere virtutes; eum qui unam non habet, nullam habere: 0739 nec sic peccata sunt paria. Quia ubi virtus nulla est, nihil quidem rectum est; nec tamen ideo non pravo pravius est, distortoque distortius. Si autem, quod puto esse verius, sacrisque Litteris congruentius, ita sunt animae intentiones, ut corporis membra, non quod videantur locis, sed quod sentiantur affectibus; et aliud illuminatur amplius, aliud minus, aliud omnino caret lumine et tenebroso inumbratur obstaculo: profecto, ita ut quisque illustratione piae charitatis affectus est, in alio actu magis, in alio minus, in aliquo nihil; sic potest dici habere aliam, et aliam non habere, aliam magis, aliam minus habere virtutem. Nam et, Major est in isto charitas, quam in illo, recte possumus dicere; et, Aliqua in isto, nulla in illo, quantum pertinet ad charitatem quae pietas est: et in ipso uno homine quod majorem habeat pudicitiam quam patientiam, et majorem hodie quam heri, si proficit; et adhuc non habeat continentiam, et habeat non parvam misericordiam.

15. Et ut generaliter breviterque complectar quam de virtute habeam notionem, quod ad recte vivendum attinet, virtus est charitas, qua id quod diligendum est diligitur. Haec in aliis major, in aliis minor, in aliis nulla est, plenissima vero quae jam non possit augeri, quamdiu hic homo vivit, est in nemine; quamdiu autem augeri potest, profecto illud quod minus est quam debet, ex vitio est. Ex quo vitio non est justus in terra, qui faciat bonum, et non peccet (III Reg. VIII, 46): ex quo vitio non justificabitur in conspectu Dei omnis vivens. Propter quod vitium, si dixerimus quod peccatum non habemus, nosmetipsos seducimus, et veritas in nobis non est (I Joan. I, 8): propter quod etiam quantumlibet profecerimus, necessarium est nobis dicere, Dimitte nobis debita nostra (Matth. VI, 12); cum jam omnia in Baptismo dicta, facta, cogitata, dimissa sint. Videt itaque, qui recte videt, unde, et quando, et ubi speranda sit illa perfectio cui non sit quod adjici possit. Si autem praecepta non essent, non utique esset ubi se homo certius inspiceret, et videret unde averteretur, quo conaretur, quare gratularetur, quid precaretur. Magna est ergo utilitas praeceptorum, si libero arbitrio tantum detur, ut gratia Dei amplius honoretur.

CAPUT V.

16. Quae si ita se habent, unde fiet omnium reus, si in uno offendat, qui totam legem servaverit? An forte, quia plenitudo legis charitas est qua Deus proximusque diligitur, in quibus praeceptis charitatis tota lex pendet et Prophetae (Matth. XXII, 40), merito fit reus omnium, qui contra illam facit, in qua pendent omnia? Nemo autem peccat, nisi adversus illam faciendo: quia, Non adulterabis, non homicidium facies, non furaberis, non concupisces, et si quod est aliud mandatum, in hoc sermone recapitulatur, in eo quod est, Diliges proximum tuum tanquam teipsum. Dilectio proximi malum non operatur. Plenitudo autem legis, charitas (Rom. XIII, 9, 10). Nemo autem diligit proximum, nisi diligens Deum, et hoc, quantum potest, proximo impendat, quem diligit tanquam semetipsum, ut et ille diligat Deum: quem si ipse non 0740 diligit, nec se, nec proximum diligit. Ac per hoc qui totam legem servaverit, si in uno offenderit, fit omnium reus; quia contra charitatem facit, unde tota lex pendet. Reus itaque fit omnium, faciendo contra eam in qua pendent omnia.

17. Cur ergo non dicantur paria peccata? An forte quia magis facit contra charitatem, qui gravius peccat; minus, qui levius? et hoc ipso quod admittit, fit quidem omnium reus: sed gravius peccans, vel in pluribus peccans, magis reus; levius autem vel in paucioribus peccans, minus reus: tanto majore scilicet reatu, quanto amplius; tanto minore, quanto minus peccaverit: tamen etiamsi in uno offenderit, reus omnium est, quia contra eam facit in qua pendent omnia? Quae si vera sunt, eo modo et illud absolvitur quod ait homo etiam apostolicae gratiae, In multis enim offendimus omnes (Jacobi III, 2). Omnes enim offendimus, sed unus gravius, alius levius, quanto quisque gravius leviusve peccaverit: tanto in peccato committendo major, quanto in diligendo Deo et proximo minor; et rursus, tanto minor in peccati perpetratione, quanto major in Dei et proximi dilectione. Tanto itaque plenior iniquitatis, quanto inanior charitatis. Et tunc perfecti sumus in charitate, quando nihil restat ex infirmitate.

18. Nec sane, quantum arbitror, putandum est leve esse peccatum in personarum acceptione habere fidem Domini nostri Jesu Christi, si illam distantiam sedendi ac standi ad honores ecclesiasticos referamus: quis enim ferat eligi divitem ad sedem honoris Ecclesiae, contempto paupere instructiore atque sanctiore? Si autem de quotidianis consessibus loquitur, quis non hinc peccat? Si tamen peccat, nisi cum apud seipsum intus ita judicat, ut ei tanto melior quanto ditior illo esse videatur: hoc enim videtur significasse, cum dicit, Nonne judicatis apud vosmetipsos, et facti estis judices iniquarum cogitationum?

CAPUT VI.

19. Lex itaque libertatis, lex charitatis est de qua dicit: Si tamen legem perficitis regalem secundum Scripturas, Diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum, bene facilis. Si autem personas accipitis, peccatum operamini, redarguti a lege tanquam transgressores. Et post illam sententiam ad intelligendum difficillimam, de qua satis dixi quod dicendum putavi, eamdem legem libertatis commemorans, Sic loquimini, inquit, et sic facite, sicut per legem libertatis incipientes judicari. Et quoniam quid paulo ante dixerit, novit, quoniam in multis offendimus omnes, suggerit dominicam tanquam quotidianam quotidianis, etsi levioribus, tamen vulneribus medicinam. Judicium enim, inquit, sine misericordia illi qui non facit misericordiam. Hinc enim et Dominus, Dimittite, inquit, et dimittetur vobis; date, et dabitur vobis (Luc. VI, 37, 38). Superexsultat autem misericordia judicio: non dictum est, Vincit misericordia judicium, non enim est adversa judicio; sed, superexsultat, quia plures per misericordiam colliguntur, sed qui misericordiam praestiterunt. Beati 0741 enim misericordes, quia ipsis miserebitur Deus (Matth. V, 7).

20. Et hoc utique justum est, ut dimittatur eis, quia dimiserunt; et detur eis, quia dederunt. Inest quippe Deo et misericordia judicanti, et judicium miseranti. Propter quod ei dicitur, Misericordiam et judicium cantabo tibi, Domine (Psal. C, 1): nam quisquis velut nimium justus judicium sine misericordia quasi securus exspectat, iram justissimam provocat, quam timens ille dixit, Ne intres in judicium cum servo tuo (Psal. CXLII, 2). Unde dicitur populo contumaci, Quid vultis mecum judicio contendere (Jer. II, 29)? Cum enim rex justus sederit in throno, quis gloriabitur castum se habere cor? aut quis gloriabitur mundum se esse a peccato? Quae igitur spes est, nisi superexsultet misericordia judicio? Sed erga illos qui misericordiam fecerunt, veraciter dicendo, Dimitte nobis debita nostra, sicut et nos dimittimus; et sine murmuratione dando; hilarem enim datorem diligit Deus (II Cor. IX, 7). Denique sanctus Jacobus jam ex isto loco de misericordiae operibus loquitur, ut quos vehementer illa sententia terruerat, consoletur; cum admonet quomodo etiam quotidiana peccata, sine quibus hic non vivitur, quotidianis remediis expientur: ne homo, qui cum in uno offenderit fit omnium reus, in multis offendendo (quia in multis offendimus omnes) propter magnum aggerem reatus sui minutatim collectum, ad tribunal tanti judicis perveniat , et eam quam non fecit, misericordiam non inveniat; sed potius dimittendo atque dando mereatur sibi dimitti peccata, reddique promissa.

21. Multa dixi, quibus tibi taedium fortassis inferrem, qui haec, quae tamen approbas, non exspectas discere, quod ea docere consuevisti. Si quid autem est in eis, quantum ad rem ipsam pertinet; nam quali eloquio explicata sint, non nimis curo; si quid ergo in eis est, quod eruditionem offendat tuam, quaeso ut rescribendo admoneas, et me corrigere non graveris. Infelix est enim qui non tantos et tam sanctos tuorum studiorum labores et digne honorat, et de his Domino Deo nostro cujus munere talis es, gratias agit. Unde cum libentius debeam a quolibet discere quod inutiliter ignoro, quam promptius quoslibet docere quod scio; quanto justius abs te hoc charitatis debitum flagito, cujus doctrina, in nomine et adjutorio Domini, tantum in latina lingua ecclesiasticae litterae adjutae sunt, quantum nunquam antea potuerunt! Maxime tamen istam sententiam, Quicumque totam legem servaverit, offendat autem in uno, factus est omnium reus, si quo alio modo exponi melius posse novit tua Dilectio, per Dominum obsecro ut id nobiscum communicare digneris.