A Treatise To Prove That Every Man Who is Virtuous is Also Free.

 I. (1) My former treatise, O Theodotus, was intended to prove that every wicked man was a slave, and that proposition I fully established by many natu

 II. (8) Again, how can it be anything but a most unreasonable assertion, one full of complete shamelessness of insanity, (or I really know not what to

 III. However, we have said enough of these matters. (16) We must now examine with accuracy that which we have taken as the subject of our investigatio

 IV. (23) But we must consider that not only is the man who feels no anxiety to avoid death incapable of being made a slave, but the same privilege bel

 V. (26) I have before now seen among the competitors in the pancratium, at the public games, one man inflicting all kinds of blows both with his hands

 VI. (32) And of the assertion that the being compelled to perform services to others is not of itself an indication of slavery, there is a most clear

 VII. (41) And every one may learn to appreciate the true freedom of which the virtuous man is in the enjoyment from other circumstances.

 VIII. (51) And from the same principle as a starting-point it will also be clearly shown that the foolish man is a slave for as the laws which prevai

 IX. (58) What has now then been said with the view of establishing the truth in the matter inquired into is, in my opinion, sufficient. But since phys

 X. (62) But since some persons, who have paid but very little attention to literary pursuits, not understanding demonstrative arguments, which establi

 XI. (71) Since, then, we have such great assistance towards arriving at virtue, must we not blush to assert that there is any necessary deficiency of

 XII. (75) Moreover Palestine and Syria too are not barren of exemplary wisdom and virtue, which countries no slight portion of that most populous nati

 XIII. (88) Such diligent practisers of virtue does philosophy, unconnected with any superfluous care of examining into Greek names render men, proposi

 XIV. (92) But it is necessary for us (since some persons do not believe that there is any perfect virtue in the multitude, but that whatever in such p

 XV. (98) Moreover, both poets and historians are witnesses to the real freedom of virtuous men, in whose doctrines both Greeks and barbarians are equa

 XVI. (105) But it is not right, some one will say, to bring forward the actions of heroes as proofs of the correctness of an argument, for that they w

 XVII. (110) I know also that combatants in the pancratium very often, out of the excess of their spirit of rivalry, and of their eagerness for victory

 XVIII. (117) Do we then imagine that there can be such a profound love of freedom firmly fixed in women and children, one of which classes is by natur

 XIX. (131) And moreover any one who considers the matter may find even among the brute beasts examples of the freedom which exists among men, as he ma

 XXI. (147) We must take care, therefore, never to catch a beast of that character which, being formidable not only in respect of its strength but also

 XXII. (158) Therefore having put an end to empty opinion, on which the chief multitude of men depends, and being devoted to that most sacred possessio

IX. (58) What has now then been said with the view of establishing the truth in the matter inquired into is, in my opinion, sufficient. But since physicians are accustomed to cure various diseases with still more various remedies, it is necessary that we should bring a series of proofs, keeping close to the subject, in order to establish those propositions which appear paradoxical by reason of their unusual character. For some people, even if they are convicted by ever so close a series of proofs, can hardly be brought to see their error. (59) Therefore, it is not an incorrect assertion that the man who does everything wisely does everything well; and he who does everything well does everything correctly; and he who does everything correctly does everything also in an unerring, and blameless, and irreproachable, and faultless, and beneficial manner: so that he will have free permission to do everything, and to live as he pleases. And he who has this liberty must be free. But the virtuous man does do everything wisely; therefore he alone is free. (60) And indeed the man whom it is not possible either to compel to do anything, or to prevent from doing anything, cannot possibly be a slave; and one cannot compel or prevent the virtuous man. Therefore the virtuous man cannot be a slave; and that he is never under compulsion or under any restraint is quite plain; for that man is under restraint who does not obtain what he desires. But the wise man only desires such things as proceed from virtue, in which it is impossible for him to be disappointed. And again, if he is under compulsion, then it is plain that he does something against his will; but in all cases where there are actions, they are either good ones proceeding from virtue, or evil ones proceeding from wickedness, or else they are of an intermediate and indifferent character. (61) Now the actions which proceed from virtue, the creature man performs, not through compulsion but voluntarily, for everything which he does is the result of his deliberate choice; and the actions which proceed from wickedness, inasmuch as they ought to be avoided, he does not do even in dreams; nor again, is it likely that he would perform those actions which are of an indifferent character, between which the mind, as if in a scale, is equally balanced, not being induced to yield to them, as having any attractive power, nor, on the other hand, to regard them with any particular aversion as worthy of hatred; from all which it is plain, that the virtuous man does nothing against his will, and nothing under compulsion; and if he were a slave he would be acting under compulsion: so that the virtuous man must be free.