The first part of my contentions against Eunomius has with God’s help been sufficiently established in the preceding work, as all who will may see fro
And let no one suppose that it is through pride or desire of human reputation that I go down to this truceless and implacable warfare to engage with t
First of all, however, I think it advisable to run briefly over our own doctrinal views and our opponent’s disagreement with them, so that our review
But to the best of my ability I will raise my voice to rebut our enemies’ argument. They say that God is declared to be without generation, that the G
Now if the term ungenerate did not signify the being without origin, but the idea of simplicity entered into the meaning of such a term, and He were c
But, saith he, He is without both quantity and magnitude. Granted: for the Son also is unlimited by quantity and magnitude, and yet is He the Son. But
But this thing he leaves untold, and only says that ungeneracy should not be predicated of God as a mere conception. For what is so spoken, saith he,
But before we examine what he has written, it may be better to enquire with what purpose it is that he refuses to admit that ungenerate can be predica
For after saying that the Only-begotten God is not the same in essence with the true Father, and after sophistically inferring this from the oppositio
Accordingly, enveloping his former special-pleading in the mazy evolutions of his sophistries, and dealing subtly with the term ungenerate, he steals
Seeing, then, the mischief resulting to the dupes of this fallacious reasoning—that to assent to His not being very God is a departure from our confes
It will presently be time to bring to their own recollection the method of this argument. Suffice it first to say this. There is no faculty in human n
If, then, the lower creation which comes under our organs of sense transcends human knowledge, how can He, Who by His mere will made the worlds, be wi
How pitiable are they for their cleverness! how wretched, how fatal is their over-wise philosophy! Who is there who goes of his own accord to the pit
This, then, was the meaning of his safe guidance on the way to what he sought—that he was not blindly led by any of the means ready to hand for his in
He shows, I think, by the relation of these elements to each other, or rather by their distance, how far the divine nature is above the speculations o
Knowing, then, how widely the Divine nature differs from our own, let us quietly remain within our proper limits. For it is both safer and more revere
And on other accounts also it may be called safe to let alone the Divine essence, as unspeakable, and beyond the scope of human reasoning. For the des
Wherefore Holy Scripture omits all idle inquiry into substance as superfluous and unnecessary. And methinks it was for this that John, the Son of Thun
But, nevertheless, with only such a nature for their base of operations, they open their mouths wide against the unspeakable Power, and encompass by o
I have said, then (for I make my master’s words my own), that reason supplies us with but a dim and imperfect comprehension of the Divine nature neve
But although our great master has thus cleared away all unworthy notions respecting the Divine nature, and has urged and taught all that may be revere
And yet it is plain to every one who has given any attention to the uses of words, that the word incorruption denotes by the privative particle that n
While, however, we strenuously avoid all concurrence with absurd notions in our thoughts of God, we allow ourselves in the use of many diverse appella
And if any one would distinguish such notions by words, he would find it absolutely necessary to call that which admits of no changing to the worse un
I say, then, that men have a right to such word-building, adapting their appellations to their subject, each man according to his judgment and that t
For God is not an expression, neither hath He His essence in voice or utterance. But God is of Himself what also He is believed to be, but He is named
But in applying such appellations to the Divine essence, “which passeth all understanding,” we do not seek to glory in it by the names we employ, but
But let us hear how, “in the way most needed, and the form that preceded” (for with such rhymes he again gives us a taste of the flowers of style), le
If, then, the creation is of later date than its Creator, and man is the latest in the scale of creation, and if speech is a distinctive characteristi
He says that God was what He is, before the creation of man. Nor do we deny it. For whatsoever we conceive of God existed before the creation of the w
But that we might gain some sort of comprehension of what with reverence may be thought respecting Him, we have stamped our different ideas with certa
They say that God is ungenerate, and in this we agree. But that ungeneracy itself constitutes the Divine essence, here we take exception. For we maint
With such gibes at the term “conception,” he shows, to the best of his ability, that it is useless and unprofitable for the life of man. What, then, w
But why enumerate the greater and more splendid results of this faculty? For every one who is not unfriendly to truth can see for himself that all els
Now that He did not teach us such things by some visible operation, Himself presiding over the work, as we may see in matters of bodily teaching, no o
For that one who proposes to himself to terrify or charm an audience should have plenty of conception to effect such a purpose, and should display to
For it is not the case that, while the intelligence implanted in us by the Giver is fully competent to conjure up non-realities, it is endowed with no
But as far as possible to elucidate the idea, I will endeavour to illustrate it by a still plainer example. Let us suppose the inquiry to be about som
This example being understood, it is time to go on to the thing which it illustrates. This much we comprehend, that the First Cause has His existence
Such are his charges against us not indeed his notions as expressed in his own phraseology, for we have made such alterations as were required to cor
If, then, God gives things their names as our new expositor of the Divine record assures us, naming germ, and grass, and tree, and fruit, He must of n
Such is the nature of this new-fangled Deity, as deducible from the words of our new God-maker. But he takes his stand on the Scriptures, and maintain
But it may be said that the voice of the Father was addressed to the Holy Spirit. But neither does the Holy Spirit require instruction by speech, for
But, says he, the record of Moses does not lie, and from it we learn that God spake. No! nor is great David of the number of those who lie, and he exp
What, then, do we think of this passage? For it may be that, if we understand it, we shall also understand the meaning of Moses. It often happens that
But to return to the matter in question. We assert that the words “He said” do not imply voice and words on the part of God but the writer, in showin
For the case is different from that of men endowed by nature with practical ability, where you may look at capability and execution apart from each ot
But if any one would give a more sensuous interpretation to the words “God said,” as proving that articulate speech was His creation, by a parity of r
And the futility of such assertions may be seen also by this. For as the natures of the elements, which are the work of the Creator, appear alike to a
And if any one cites the confusion of tongues that took place at the building of the tower, as contradicting what I have said, not even there is God s
But some who have carefully studied the Scriptures tell us that the Hebrew tongue is not even ancient like the others, but that along with other mirac
For to suppose that God used the Hebrew tongue, when there was no one to hear and understand such a language, methinks no reasonable being will consen
But this is denied by Eunomius, the author of all this contumely with which we are assailed, and the companion and adviser of this impious band. For,
On these passages it is probable that our opponents will take their stand. And I will agree for them with what is said, and will myself take advantage
But since the nature of most things that are seen in Creation is not simple, so as to allow of all that they connote being comprehended in one word, a
In like manner before him Jacob, having taken hold of his brother’s heel, was called a supplanter , from the attitude in which he came to the birth. F
But I will pass over his other babblings against the truth, possessing as they do no force against our doctrines, for I deem it superfluous to linger
To pass on, then, to what remains. He brings forward once more some of the Master’s words, to this effect: “And it is in precisely the same manner tha
But to return. Such names are used of our Lord, and no one familiar with the inspired Scriptures can deny the fact. What then? Does Eunomius affirm th
But, like a mighty wrestler, he will not relinquish his irresistible hold on us, and affirms in so many words, that “these names are the work of human
“But God,” he says, “gave the weakest of terrestrial things a share in the most honourable names, though not giving them an equal share of dignity, an
This it is that our strong-minded opponent, who accuses us of dishonesty, and charges us with being irrational in judgment,—this it is that he pretend
But what is our author’s meaning, and what is the object of this argument of his? For no one need imagine that, for lack of something to say, in order
He does not, in fact, partake of that dignity which the meaning of those names indicates and whereas wise Daniel, in setting right the Babylonians’ e
But in dwelling on such nonsense I fear that I am secretly gratifying our adversaries. For in setting the truth against their vain and empty words, I
But I fear that all we shall find in the discourse of Eunomius will turn out to be mere tumours and sea lungs, so that what has been said must necessa
Basil, he says, asserts that after we have obtained our first idea of a thing, the more minute and accurate investigation of the thing under considera
And Moses, seeing God in the light, and John calling Him the true Light , and in the same way Paul, when our Lord first appeared to him, and a Light s
I have deluged my discourse with much nonsense of his, but I trust my hearers will pardon me for not leaving unnoticed even the most glaring of his in
Then going farther, as if his object were thus far attained, he takes up other charges against us, more difficult, as he thinks, to deal with than the
But all this is beside our purpose. Would that our charges against him were limited to this, and that he could be thought to err only in his delivery,
But it is time to examine the argument that leads to this profanity, and see how, as regards itself, it is logically connected with his whole discours
But in His very essence, he says, God is indestructible. Well, what other conceivable attribute of God does not attach to the very essence of the Son,
Now that the idea of ungeneracy and the belief in the Divine essence are quite different things may be seen by what he himself has put forward. God, h
But it will be well, I think, to pass over his nauseating observations (for such we must term his senseless attacks on the method of conception), and
But if it were in any way possible by some other means to lay bare the movements of thought, abandoning the formal instrumentality of words, we should
All his argument, then, in opposition to the doctrine of conception I think it best to pass over, though he charge with madness those who think that t
But, like some viscous and sticky clay, the nonsense he has concocted in contravention of our teaching of conception seems to hold us back, and preven
But I will pass over both this and their reading of Epicurus’ nature-system, which he says is equivalent to our conception, maintaining that the doctr
But, says he, since God condescends to commune with His servants, we may consequently suppose that from the very beginning He enacted words appropriat
But our pious opponent will not allow of God’s using our language, because of our proneness to evil, shutting his eyes (good man!) to the fact that fo
But most people, perhaps, will think this too far removed from the scope of our present inquiry. This, however, no one will regard as out of keeping w
Since, then, it is improper to regard God as the inventor of such names, lest the names even of these idol gods should seem to have had their origin f
And if we set forth the opinion of most commentators on these words of the Psalmist, that of Eunomius regarding them will be still more convicted of f
But the names which the Lord gives to such stars we may plainly learn from the prophecy of Esaias, which says, “I have called thee by thy name thou a
I will pass over, then, the abuse with which he has prefaced his discussion of these matters, as when he uses such terms as “alteration of seed,” and
I pass in silence his blasphemy in reducing God the Only-begotten to a level with all created things, and, in a word, allowing to the Son of God no hi
For, proceeding with his discourse, he asks us what we mean by the ages. And yet we ourselves might more reasonably put such questions to him. For it
But I think we must pass over this and all that follows. For it is the mere trifling of children who amuse themselves with beginning to build houses i
Such is our position our adversary’s, with regard to the precise meaning of this term , is such as can derive no help from any reasonings he only sp
He says, “The Life that is the same, and thoroughly single, must have one and the same outward expression for it, even though in mere names, and manne
But why do we linger over these follies, when we ought rather to put Eunomius’ book itself into the hands of the studious, and so, apart from any exam
But if he should still answer with regard to this opposition (of the Divine names), that it is only the term Father, and the term Creator, that are ap
But let us examine a still more vehement charge of his against us it is this: “If one must proceed to say something harsher still, he does not even k
What, then, does Eunomius say to this? “If He is imperishable only by reason of the unending in His Life, and ungenerate only by reason of the unbegin
What, then, out of all that we have said, has stirred him up to this piece of childish folly, in which he returns to the charge and repeats himself in
Such are the clever discoveries of Eunomius against the truth. For what need is there to go through all his argument with trifling prolixity? For in e
Either, he says, that which is endless is distinct in meaning from that which is imperishable, or else the two must make one. But if he call both one,
But that he himself also may be brought to the knowledge of his own trifling, we will convict him from his own statements. For in the course of his ar
Thus far our argument goes with him. But the riddle with which he accompanies his words we must leave to those trained in the wisdom of Prunicus to in
But let us leave this, and along with it the usual foul deluge of calumny in his words and let us go on to his subsequent quotations (of Basil). But
But who, pray, is so simple as to be harmed by such arguments, and to imagine that if names are once believed to be an outcome of the reasoning facult
But I do not think that we need linger on this, nor minutely examine that which follows. To the more attentive reader, the argument elaborated by our
But now I do not know which it is best to do to pursue step by step this subject, or to put an end here to our contest with such folly. Well, as in t
When, then, he is on the point of introducing this treatment of terms of “privation,” he takes upon himself to show “the incurable absurdity,” as he c
Every term—every term, that is, which is really such—is an utterance expressing some movement of thought. But every operation and movement of sound th
Well, then, if God did not exist formerly, or if there be a time when He will not exist, He cannot be called either unending or without beginning and
Thus much, then, is known to us about the names uttered in any form whatever in reference to the Deity. We have given a simple explanation of them, un
How it is possible, then, to assign one’s gratuities to the non-subsistent, let this man, who claims to be using words and phrases in their natural fo
Well, if the term imperishable or indestructible is not considered by this maker of an empty system to be privative of destruction, then by a stern ne
“But I do not see,” he rejoins, “how God can be above His own works simply by virtue of such things as do not belong to Him .” And on the strength of
He declares that God surpasses mortal beings as immortal, destructible beings as indestructible, generated beings as ungenerate, just in the same degr
Therefore let us again handle this dictum of his: “God is not called immortal by virtue of the absence of death.” How are we to accept this statement,
Still I cannot see what profit there is in deigning to examine such nonsense. For a man like myself, who has lived to gray hairs , and whose eyes are
But it is time now to expose that angry accusation which he brings against us at the close of his treatise, saying that we affirm the Father to be fro
“The evangelist Luke, when giving the genealogy according to the flesh of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ, and stepping up from the last to the first
With what eyes will you now dare to gaze upon your guide? I speak to you, O flock of perishing souls! How can you still turn to listen to this man who
Such, to use your own words, is the “evil,” as one might expect, not indeed “of valuing the character for being clever before one is really such” (for
But since the nature of most things that are seen in Creation is not simple, so as to allow of all that they connote being comprehended in one word, as, for instance, in the case of fire, the element itself is one thing in its nature, while the word which denotes it is another (for fire itself possesses the qualities of shining, of burning, of drying and heating, and consuming whatever fuel it lays hold of, but the name is but a brief word of one syllable), on this account speech, which distinguishes the powers and qualities seen in fire, gives each of them a name of its own, as I have said before. And one cannot say that only a name has been given to fire when it is spoken of as bright, or consuming, or anything else that we observe it to be. For such words denote qualities physically inherent in it. So likewise, in the case of heaven and the firmament, though one nature is signified by each of these words, their difference represents one or other of its peculiar characteristics, in looking at which we learn one thing by the appellation “heaven,” and another by “firmament.” For when speech would define the limit of sensible creation, beyond which it is succeeded by the transmundane void apprehended by the mind alone, in contrast with the intangible and incorporeal and invisible, the beginning and the end of all material subsistences is called the firmament. And when we survey the environment of terrestrial things, we call that which encompasses all material nature, and which forms the boundary of all things visible, by the name of heaven. In the same manner with regard to earth and dry land, since all heavy and downward-tending nature was divided into these two elements, earth and water, the appellation “dry” defines to a certain extent its opposite, for earth is called dry in opposition to moist, since having thrown off, by Divine command, the water that overspread it, it appeared in its own character. But the name “earth” does not continue to express the signification of some one only of its qualities, but, by virtue of its meaning, it embraces all that the word connotes, e.g. hardness, density, weight, resistance, capability of supporting animal and vegetable life. Accordingly, the word “dry” was not changed by speech to the last name put upon it (for its new name did not make it cease to be called so), but while both the appellations remained, a peculiar signification attached itself to each, the one distinguishing it in nature and property from its opposite, the other embracing all its attributes collectively. And so in light and day, and again in night and darkness, we do not find a pronunciation of syllables created to suit them by the Maker of all things, but rather through these appellations we note the substance of the things which they signify. At the entrance of light, by the will of God the darkness that prevailed over the earliest creation is scattered. But the earth lying in the midst, and being upheld on all sides by its surrounding of different elements, as Job saith, “He hangeth the earth upon nothing66 Job xxvi. 7.,” it was necessary when light travelled over one side and the earth obstructed it on the opposite by its own bulk, that a side of darkness should be left by the obscuration, and so, as the perpetual motion of the heavens cannot but carry along with it the darkness resulting from the obscuration, God ordained this revolution for a measure of duration of time. And that measure is day and night. For this reason Moses, according to his wisdom, in his historical elucidation of these matters, named the shadow resulting from the earth’s obstruction, a dividing of the light from the darkness, and the constant and measured alternation of light and darkness over the surface of the earth he called day and night. So that what was called light was not named day, but as “there was light,” and not the bare name of light, so the measure of time also was created and the name followed, not created by God in a sound of words, but because the very nature of the thing assumed this vocal notation. And as, if it had been plainly said by the Lawgiver that nothing that is seen or named is of spontaneous generation or unfashioned, but that it has its subsistence from God, we might have concluded of ourselves that God made the world and all its parts, and the order which is seen in them, and the faculty of distinguishing them, so also by what he says he leads us on to understand and believe that nothing which exists is without beginning. And with this view he describes the successive events of Creation in orderly method, enumerating them one after another. But it was impossible to represent them in language, except by expressing their signification by words that should indicate it. Since, then, it is written that God called the light day, it must be understood that God made the day from light, being something different, by the force of the term. For you cannot apply the same definition to “light” and “day,” but light is what we understand by the opposite of darkness, and day is the extent of the measure of the interval of light. In the same way you may regard night and darkness by the same difference of description, defining darkness as the negation of light, and calling night the extent of the encompassing darkness. Thus in every way our argument is confirmed, though not, perhaps, drawn out in strict logical form—showing that God is the Maker of things, not of empty words. For things have their names not for His sake but for ours. For as we cannot always have all things before our eyes, we take knowledge of some of the things that are present with us from time to time, and others we register in our memories. But it would be impossible to keep memory unconfused unless we had the notation of words to distinguish the things that are stored up in our minds from one another. But to God all things are present, nor does He need memory, all things being within the range of His penetrating vision. What need, then, in His case, of parts of speech, when His own wisdom and power embraces and holds the nature of all things distinct and unconfused? Wherefore all things that exist substantially are from God; but, for our guidance, all things that exist are provided with names to indicate them. And if any one say that such names were imposed by the arbitrary usage of mankind, he will be guilty of no offence against the scheme of Divine Providence. For we do not say that the nature of things was of human invention, but only their names. The Hebrew calls Heaven by one name, the Canaanite by another, but both of them understand it alike, being in no way led into error by the difference of the sounds that convey the idea of the object. But the over-cautious and timid will-worship of these clever folk, on whose authority he asserts that, if it were granted that words were given to things by men, men would be of higher authority than God, is proved to be unsubstantial even by the example which we find recorded of Moses. For who gave Moses his name? Was it not Pharaoh’s daughter who named him from what had happened67 Exod. ii. 10.? For water is called Moses in the language of the Egyptians. Since, then, in consequence of the tyrant’s order, his parents had placed the babe in an ark and consigned it to the stream (for so some related concerning him), but by the will of God the ark was floated by the current and carried to the bank, and found by the princess, who happened just then to be taking the refreshment of the bath, as the child had been gained “from the water,” she is said to have given him his name as a memorial of the occurrence,—a name by which God Himself did not disdain to address His servant, nor did He deem it beneath Him to allow the name given by the foreign woman to remain the Prophet’s proper appellation.
ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἐν τῇ κτίσει θεωρουμένων οὐχ ἁπλῆν ἔχει τὴν φύσιν, ὡς ἑνὶ ῥήματι δυνατῶς ἔχειν ἐμπεριληφθῆναι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἄλλο μέν ἐστι τῇ φύσει τὸ ὑποκείμενον πρᾶγμα, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ σημαντικὸν τοῦ πράγματος ὄνομα (τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐκλαμπτικὸν καὶ καυστικὸν ξηρόν τε καὶ θερμαντικὸν καὶ ἀναλωτικὸν τῆς ὕλης ἧς ἂν περιδράξηται, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα φωνή τις βραχεῖα διὰ μιᾶς συλλαβῆς ἐκφωνουμένη), τούτου ἕνεκεν ὁ διαιρῶν λόγος τὰς ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θεωρουμένας δυνάμεις τε καὶ ποιότητας ἑκάστην ἰδίως κατονομάζει, καθὼς φθάσαντες εἴπομεν: καὶ οὐκ ἄν τις εἴποι ὄνομα μόνον ἐπιβεβλῆσθαι τῷ πυρί, ὅταν τις ἢ φανὸν ἢ ἀναλωτικὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ θεωρουμένων κατονομάσῃ: τῶν γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ φυσικῶς ἐγκειμένων δυνάμεων σημαντικαί εἰσιν αἱ τοιαῦται φωναί. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ στερεώματος μιᾶς φύσεως ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων σημαινομένης ἴδιόν τι τῶν ἐν τῇ κτίσει ταύτῃ γινωσκομένων ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων παρίστησιν, ὥστε πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντας ἡμᾶς ἄλλο τι μαθεῖν διὰ τῆς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ προσηγορίας, ἕτερον δὲ διὰ τοῦ στερεώματος. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τὸ πέρας τῆς αἰσθητῆς κτίσεως ὑπογράφῃ ὁ λόγος, μεθ' ἣν ἡ νοητή τε καὶ ὑπερκόσμιος διαδέχεται λῆξις, συγκρίσει τῇ πρὸς τὸ ἀναφὲς καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ ἀνείδεον στερέωμα λέγεται ἡ ἀρχή τε καὶ τὸ πέρας πάσης τῆς ὑλικῆς ὑποστάσεως: ὅταν δὲ τὴν τῶν ὑποκειμένων περιοχὴν ἐξετάζωμεν, ᾧ πᾶσα ἡ ὑλικὴ περικρατεῖται φύσις, οὐρανὸν τοῦτον προσαγορεύομεν τὸν τῶν ὁρατῶν πάντων ὅρον γινόμενον. τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῆς ξηρᾶς, ἐπειδὴ πρὸς δύο ταῦτα « τὰ » στοιχεῖα ἡ κατωφερής τε καὶ βαρεῖα φύσις διεμερίσθη, πρός τε τὴν γῆν φημι καὶ τὰ ὕδατα, ἡ μὲν τῆς ξηρᾶς προσηγορία διασταλτική πως τῆς ἀντιστοιχούσης ποιότητος: τῇ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ὑγρὸν ἀντιπαραθέσει ξηρὰ κατωνόμασται, ὅτε ἀποδυσαμένη θείῳ προστάγματι τὸ περικεχυμένον ὕδωρ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἐφάνη ποιότητος: τὸ δὲ τῆς γῆς ὄνομα οὐκέτι μιᾶς τινος τῶν περὶ αὐτὴν ποιοτήτων τὴν σημασίαν ἐνδείκνυται, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἐμπεριλαμβάνει διὰ τῆς ἐγκειμένης ἐμφάσεως τὸ ἐν τῷ στοιχείῳ νοούμενον, οἷον τὸ ναστόν, τὸ πυκνόν, τὸ ἐμβριθές, τὸ ἀντίτυπον, τὸ πρὸς πᾶσαν καρπῶν τε καὶ ζῴων ἀνατροφὴν ἐπιτήδειον. οὔκουν οὐ μετωνομάσθη παρὰ τοῦ λόγου ἡ ξηρὰ πρὸς τὸ τελευταῖον αὐτῇ ἐπιβληθὲν ὄνομα (οὐ γὰρ ἀπέθετο διὰ τοῦ δευτέρου ὀνόματος τὸ ξηρὰ καὶ εἶναι καὶ λέγεσθαι), ἀλλὰ μενούσης τῆς κλήσεως καὶ ταύτης κἀκείνης ἑκατέρῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἰδία τις ὕπεστι σημασία, ἡ μὲν ἀντιδιαιρετικὴ τῆς ἑτερογενοῦς φύσεως τε καὶ ἰδιότητος, ἡ δὲ περιεκτικὴ πάσης τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ θεωρουμένης δυνάμεως. Οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τῆς νυκτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σκότους εὑρίσκομεν οὐ συλλαβῶν ἦχον παρὰ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῶν ὅλων ἐπὶ τούτων δημιουργούμενον, ἀλλὰ πραγμάτων ὑπόστασιν διὰ τῶν προσηγοριῶν τούτων ἐπιγινώσκομεν. λύεται κατὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ εἰσόδῳ τοῦ φωτὸς τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν σκότος παρὰ τὴν πρώτην κτίσιν: τῆς δὲ γῆς ἐν τῷ μέσῳ περισχεθείσης καὶ τῇ πανταχόθεν τῶν ἑτεροφυῶν στοιχείων περιβολῇ ἑαυτὴν ἀνεχούσης, καθώς φησιν ὁ Ἰὼβ ὅτι Κρεμάζων γῆν ἐπὶ μηδενός, ἐπάναγκες ἦν καθ' ἓν μέρος τοῦ φωτὸς διοδεύοντος ἀντιφραττούσης κατὰ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ ὄγκῳ τῆς γῆς ὑπολειφθῆναί τινα διὰ τοῦ ἀποσκιάσματος μοῖραν τοῦ σκότους, τῆς δὲ ἀεικινήτου περιφορᾶς τοῦ πόλου συμπεριαγούσης ἑαυτῇ κατ' ἀνάγκην καὶ τὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἀποσκιάσματος ἐπισυμβαίνοντα ζόφον τὴν ἐγκύκλιον ταύτην περίοδον τάξαι τὸν θεὸν εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι μέτρον τῆς χρονικῆς παρατάσεως: τὸ δὲ μέτρον τοῦτο ἡμέρα ἐστὶ καὶ νύξ. διὰ τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σοφίαν ἱστορικώτερον τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν δογμάτων ὁ Μωϋσῆς ἡμῖν σαφηνίζων τὸν ἐξ ἀντιφράξεως τῆς γῆς ἐπεισιόντα ζόφον χωρισμὸν φωτὸς καὶ σκότους ὠνόμασε καὶ τὴν ἀεὶ γινομένην περὶ τὸν περίγειον χῶρον τοῦ φωτὸς πρὸς τὸ σκότος ἔμμετρον διαδοχὴν ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτα προσεῖπεν. ὥστε οὐχὶ ἐπίκλητον τὸ φῶς ἡμέρα προσηγορεύθη, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐγένετο φῶς καὶ οὐχὶ ψιλὴ προσηγορία φωτός, οὕτως καὶ τοῦ χρόνου τὸ μέτρον ἐγένετο, ἐπηκολούθησε δὲ τῷ μέτρῳ τὸ ὄνομα, οὐκ ἐν ῥημάτων ψόφῳ παρὰ τοῦ πεποιηκότος γενόμενον, ἀλλ' αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ πράγματος φύσεως ἐπισπασαμένης τὴν διὰ τῆς φωνῆς σημασίαν. καὶ ὥσπερ εἰ τοῦτο σαφῶς εἴρητο παρὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ φαινόμενον καὶ ὀνομαζόμενον οὐκ αὐτοφυές ἐστιν οὐδὲ ἀποίητον, ἀλλ' ἐκ θεοῦ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει, ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν ἂν συνεθήκαμεν τὸ πάντα τὸν κόσμον καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ μέρη καὶ τὴν ἐνθεωρουμένην τάξιν καὶ τὴν γνωριστικὴν τῶν ὄντων δύναμιν τὸν θεὸν πεποιηκέναι, οὕτως καὶ δι' ὧν εἶπε πρὸς ταύτην ἐνάγει ἡμᾶς τὴν διάνοιαν, εἰς τὸ πιστεύειν τὸ μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων ἄναρχον εἶναι. καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέπων ὁδῷ καὶ τάξει τὰ καθεξῆς διεξέρχεται, τὴν τῶν γεγονότων ἀκολουθίαν ἀπαριθμούμενος. ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἦν ἄλλως παραστήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ, μὴ διὰ τῶν γνωριστικῶν ὀνομάτων τὴν σημασίαν ποιούμενον. ἐπεὶ οὖν γέγραπται ὅτι Ἐκάλεσεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ φῶς ἡμέραν, νοητέον ὅτι ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς ἐκ τοῦ φωτὸς ἡμέραν ἕτερόν τι οὖσαν κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον. οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀποδοίης φωτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας λόγον, ἀλλὰ φῶς μὲν τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πρὸς τὸ σκότος νοούμενον, ἡμέρα δὲ τὸ τοσόνδε τοῦ ἐν τῷ φωτὶ διαστήματος μέτρον. ὡσαύτως καὶ νύκτα καὶ σκότος κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ λόγου διαίρεσιν κατανοήσεις, σκότος μὲν τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίου πρὸς τὸ φῶς νοούμενον ὁριζόμενος, νύκτα δὲ τὴν τοσήνδε τοῦ σκότους περιγραφὴν ὀνομάζων. οὐκοῦν ἔρρωται διὰ πάντων ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν, εἰ καὶ μὴ τεχνικῶς κατὰ τὰ σχήματα τῆς διαλεκτικῆς συνηρώτηται, δεικνὺς ὅτι θεὸς πραγμάτων ἐστὶ δημιουργός, οὐ ῥημάτων ψιλῶν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκείνου χάριν, ἀλλ' ἡμῶν ἕνεκεν ἐπίκειται τοῖς πράγμασι τὰ ὀνόματα.
Διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ πάντοτε δυνατὸν ἡμῖν εἶναι πάντα ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἔχειν τὰ ὄντα τὸ μέν τι τῶν ἀεὶ παρόντων γινώσκομεν, τὸ δὲ τῇ μνήμῃ ἐναπογράφομεν. ἄλλως δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀσύγχυτον φυλαχθῆναι ἡμῖν τὴν μνήμην, μὴ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων σημασίας διαστελλούσης ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐναποκείμενα τῇ διανοίᾳ πράγματα. θεῷ δὲ πάντα πάρεστι καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ μνήμης αὐτῷ, πάντων τῇ διορατικῇ δυνάμει περικρατουμένων τε καὶ θεωρουμένων. τίς οὖν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ χρεία ῥήματος ἢ ὀνόματος, αὐτῆς τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ σοφίας τε καὶ δυνάμεως ἀσύγχυτόν τε καὶ διακεκριμένην τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν περιεχούσης; οὐκοῦν παρὰ θεοῦ μὲν τὰ ὄντα καὶ ὑφεστῶτα πάντα, τῆς δὲ ἡμετέρας ἕνεκεν ὁδηγίας ἔπεστι τοῖς οὖσι τὰ σημειωτικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ὀνόματα. ταῦτα δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἀρέσκον ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων συνηθείαις γίνεσθαί τις εἰπὼν οὐδὲν εἰς τὸν τῆς προνοίας πλημμελήσει λόγον. οὐ γὰρ τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων γίνεσθαι παρ' ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὀνόματα λέγομεν. ἄλλως ὀνομάζει τὸν οὐρανὸν ὁ Ἑβραῖος καὶ ἑτέρως ὁ Χαναναῖος, νοεῖ δὲ ὡσαύτως ἑκάτερος, οὐδὲν τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν φθόγγων περὶ τὴν κατανόησιν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου διαμφιβάλλοντες. ἡ δὲ λίαν εὐλαβὴς τῶν σοφῶν τούτων ἐθελοθρησκεία, δι' ὧν, εἰ δοθείη παρὰ ἀνθρώπων εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασι τὰς φωνάς, τὸ « ἀρχηγικωτέρους » εἶναι τοῦ θεοῦ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους κατασκευάζει, ἐλέγχεται ματαία τις οὖσα καὶ ἀνυπόστατος καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν Μωϋσέα μνημονευθέντος ἡμῖν ὑποδείγματος. αὐτῷ γὰρ τῷ Μωϋσῇ τίς ἔθετο τὴν προσηγορίαν; οὐχ ἡ θυγάτηρ τοῦ Φαραὼ ἐκ τοῦ συμβάντος ἐπονομάσασα; Μωϋσῆς γὰρ τὸ ὕδωρ λέγεται τῇ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων φωνῇ. ἐπεὶ οὖν κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ τυράννου κιβωτῷ τὸ βρέφος ἐνθέντες οἱ γεννησάμενοι τοῖς ῥείθροις ἔδωκαν (οὕτω γάρ τινες τῶν ἱστορικῶν τὰ κατ' αὐτὸν διηγήσαντο), ἡ δὲ κατὰ θεῖον βούλημα ὑπὸ τῆς δίνης τῶν ὑδάτων ἐκκυμανθεῖσα προσηνέχθη τῇ ὄχθῃ καὶ εὕρημα τῆς βασιλίδος κατ' ἐκεῖνο τῷ λουτρῷ τὸ σῶμα φαιδρυνομένης ἐγένετο, ὡς ἐξ ὕδατος αὐτῇ τοῦ παιδὸς κτηθέντος μνημόσυνον τῆς συντυχίας λέγεται τῷ παιδὶ θέσθαι τὸ ὄνομα, ᾧ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς ἐπὶ τοῦ θεράποντος κεχρῆσθαι οὐ παρῃτήσατο, οὐδὲ ἀνάξιον ἔκρινε τὴν τῆς βαρβάρου κλῆσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ προφήτου κυρίαν ἐᾶσαι.
