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Augustine of Hippo, On Nature and Grace
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A Treatise on Nature and Grace, against Pelagius
Chapter 1 [I.]—The Occasion of Publishing This Work What God’s Righteousness is.
Chapter 3 [III.]—Nature Was Created Sound and Whole It Was Afterwards Corrupted by Sin.
Chapter 5 [V.]—It Was a Matter of Justice that All Should Be Condemned.
Chapter 6 [VI.]—The Pelagians Have Very Strong and Active Minds.
Chapter 8.—A Distinction Drawn by Pelagius Between the Possible and Actual.
Chapter 9 [VIII.]—Even They Who Were Not Able to Be Justified are Condemned.
Chapter 11 [X.]—Grace Subtly Acknowledged by Pelagius.
Chapter 13 [XII.]—The Scope and Purpose of the Law’s Threatenings “Perfect Wayfarers.”
Chapter 14 [XIII.]—Refutation of Pelagius.
Chapter 15 [XIV.]—Not Everything [of Doctrinal Truth] is Written in Scripture in So Many Words.
Chapter 16 [XV.]—Pelagius Corrupts a Passage of the Apostle James by Adding a Note of Interrogation.
Chapter 17 [XVI.]—Explanation of This Text Continued.
Chapter 18 [XVII.]—Who May Be Said to Be in the Flesh.
Chapter 19.—Sins of Ignorance To Whom Wisdom is Given by God on Their Requesting It.
Chapter 20 [XVIII.]—What Prayer Pelagius Would Admit to Be Necessary.
Chapter 21 [XIX.]—Pelagius Denies that Human Nature Has Been Depraved or Corrupted by Sin.
Chapter 22 [XX.]—How Our Nature Could Be Vitiated by Sin, Even Though It Be Not a Substance.
Chapter 23 [XXI.]—Adam Delivered by the Mercy of Christ.
Chapter 24 [XXII.]—Sin and the Penalty of Sin the Same.
Chapter 26 [XXIV.]—Christ Died of His Own Power and Choice.
Chapter 27.—Even Evils, Through God’s Mercy, are of Use.
Chapter 30 [XXVII.]—Sin is Removed by Sin.
Chapter 32 [XXVIII.]—God Forsakes Us to Some Extent that We May Not Grow Proud.
Chapter 33 [XXIX.]—Not Every Sin is Pride. How Pride is the Commencement of Every Sin.
Chapter 34 [XXX.]—A Man’s Sin is His Own, But He Needs Grace for His Cure.
Chapter 37 [XXXIII.]—Being Wholly Without Sin Does Not Put Man on an Equality with God.
Chapter 39.—Pelagius Glorifies God as Creator at the Expense of God as Saviour.
Chapter 41.—Whether Holy Men Have Died Without Sin.
Chapter 43 [XXXVII.]—Why Scripture Has Not Mentioned the Sins of All.
Chapter 44.—Pelagius Argues that Abel Was Sinless.
Chapter 46 [XXXIX.]—Shall We Follow Scripture, or Add to Its Declarations?
Chapter 47 [XL.]—For What Pelagius Thought that Christ is Necessary to Us.
Chapter 48 [XLI.]—How the Term “All” Is to Be Understood.
Chapter 50 [XLIII.]—God Commands No Impossibilities.
Chapter 52.—The Whole Discussion is About Grace.
Chapter 53 [XLV.]—Pelagius Distinguishes Between a Power and Its Use.
Chapter 54 [XLVI.]—There is No Incompatibility Between Necessity and Free Will.
Chapter 55 [XLVII.]—The Same Continued.
Chapter 56 [XLVIII.]—The Assistance of Grace in a Perfect Nature.
Chapter 58 [L.]—Even Pious and God-Fearing Men Resist Grace.
Chapter 59 [LI.]—In What Sense Pelagius Attributed to God’s Grace the Capacity of Not Sinning.
Chapter 60 [LII.]—Pelagius Admits “Contrary Flesh” In the Unbaptized.
Chapter 61 [LIII.]—Paul Asserts that the Flesh is Contrary Even in the Baptized.
Chapter 63 [LIV.]—Does God Create Contraries?
Chapter 64.—Pelagius’ Admission as Regards the Unbaptized, Fatal.
Chapter 65 [LV.]—“This Body of Death,” So Called from Its Defect, Not from Its Substance.
Chapter 66.—The Works, Not the Substance, of the “Flesh” Opposed to the “Spirit.”
Chapter 67 [LVII.]—Who May Be Said to Be Under the Law.
Chapter 68 [LVIII.]—Despite the Devil, Man May, by God’s Help, Be Perfected.
Chapter 69 [LIX.]—Pelagius Puts Nature in the Place of Grace.
Chapter 70 [LX.]—Whether Any Man is Without Sin in This Life.
Chapter 72 [LXI.]—Hilary. The Pure in Heart Blessed. The Doing and Perfecting of Righteousness.
Chapter 73.—He Meets Pelagius with Another Passage from Hilary.
Chapter 75.—Augustin Adduces in Reply Some Other Passages of Ambrose.
Chapter 76 [LXIV.]—John of Constantinople.
Chapter 79 [LXVI.]—A Certain Necessity of Sinning.
Chapter 80 [LXVII.]—Augustin Himself. Two Methods Whereby Sins, Like Diseases, are Guarded Against.
Chapter 81.—Augustin Quotes Himself on Free Will.
Chapter 82 [LXVIII.]—How to Exhort Men to Faith, Repentance, and Advancement.
Chapter 83 [LXIX.]—God Enjoins No Impossibility, Because All Things are Possible and Easy to Love.
Chapter 84 [LXX.]—The Degrees of Love are Also Degrees of Holiness.
Chapter 81.—Augustin Quotes Himself on Free Will.
In order, however, that my meaning on this subject may be clear not merely to him, but also to such persons as have not read those treatises of mine on Free Will, which your author has read, and who have not only not read them, but perchance do read him; I must go on to quote out of my books what he has omitted, but which, if he had perceived and quoted in his book, no controversy would be left between us on this subject. For immediately after those words of mine which he has quoted, I expressly added, and (as fully as I could) worked out, the train of thought which might occur to any one’s mind, to the following effect: “And yet some actions are disapproved of, even when they are done in ignorance, and are judged deserving of chastisement, as we read in the inspired authorities.” After taking some examples out of these, I went on to speak also of infirmity as follows: “Some actions also deserve disapprobation, that are done from necessity; as when a man wishes to act rightly and cannot. For whence arise those utterances: ‘For the good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do’?”217 Rom. vii. 19. Then, after quoting some other passages of the Holy Scriptures to the same effect, I say: “But all these are the sayings of persons who are coming out of that condemnation of death; for if this is not man’s punishment, but his nature, then those are no sins.” Then, again, a little afterwards I add: “It remains, therefore, that this just punishment come of man’s condemnation. Nor ought it to be wondered at, that either by ignorance man has not free determination of will to choose what he will rightly do, or that by the resistance of carnal habit (which by force of mortal transmission has, in a certain sense, become engrafted into his nature), though seeing what ought rightly to be done and wishing to do it, he yet is unable to accomplish it. For this is the most just penalty of sin, that a man should lose what he has been unwilling to make good use of, when he might with ease have done so if he would; which, however, amounts to this, that the man who knowingly does not do what is right loses the ability to do it when he wishes. For, in truth, to every soul that sins there accrue these two penal consequences—ignorance and difficulty. Out of the ignorance springs the error which disgraces; out of the difficulty arises the pain which afflicts. But to approve of falsehoods as if they were true, so as to err involuntarily, and to be unable, owing to the resistance and pain of carnal bondage, to refrain from deeds of lust, is not the nature of man as he was created, but the punishment of man as under condemnation. When, however, we speak of a free will to do what is right, we of course mean that liberty in which man was created.” Some men at once deduce from this what seems to them a just objection from the transfer and transmission of sins of ignorance and difficulty from the first man to his posterity. My answer to such objectors is this: “I tell them, by way of a brief reply, to be silent and to cease from murmuring against God. Perhaps their complaint might have been a proper one, if no one from among men had stood forth a vanquisher of error and of lust; but when there is everywhere present One who calls off from himself, through the creature by so many means, the man who serves the Lord, teaches him when believing, consoles him when hoping, encourages him when loving, helps him when endeavouring, hears him when praying,—it is not reckoned to you as a fault that you are involuntarily ignorant, but that you neglect to search out what you are ignorant of; nor is it imputed to you in censure that you do not bind up the limbs that are wounded, but that you despise him who wishes to heal them.”218 De Libero Arbitrio, iii. 19. In such terms did I exhort them, as well as I could, to live righteously; nor did I make the grace of God of none effect, without which the now obscured and tarnished nature of man can neither be enlightened nor purified. Our whole discussion with them on this subject turns upon this, that we frustrate not the grace of God which is in Jesus Christ our Lord by a perverted assertion of nature. In a passage occurring shortly after the last quoted one, I said in reference to nature: “Of nature itself we speak in one sense, when we properly describe it as that human nature in which man was created faultless after his kind; and in another sense as that nature in which we are born ignorant and carnally minded, owing to the penalty of condemnation, after the manner of the apostle, ‘We ourselves likewise were by nature children of wrath, even as others.’”219 Eph. ii. 3.
81. Sed ut non tantum illi, verum etiam iis qui eosdem libros meos, quos iste legit, de Libero Arbitrio non legerunt, atque illis non lectis, hunc forsitan legunt, de hac re sententia mea satis appareat, ex ipsis libris commemorare me oportet, quod iste si sentiret atque in suis litteris poneret, nulla inter nos de hac re controversia remaneret. Continuo quippe post verba mea quae iste commemoravit, quod occurrere poterat ipse subjeci, et quantum potui pertractavi, dicens: Et tamen etiam per ignorantiam facta quaedam improbantur, et corrigenda judicantur, sicut in divinis auctoritatibus legimus. Atque hinc adhibitis exemplis, etiam de infirmitate locutus sum, dicens: Sunt etiam necessitate facta improbanda, ubi vult homo recte facere, et non potest. Nam unde sunt illae voces, «Non enim quod volo facio bonum; sed quod odi malum, hoc ago?» Atque aliis in hanc sententiam commemoratis testimoniis divinorum eloquiorum: «Sed haec,» inquam, «omnia hominum sunt voces ex illa mortis damnatione venientium. Nam si non est ista poena hominis, sed natura, nulla ista peccata sunt.» Deinde paulo post: «Relinquitur ergo,» inquam, «ut haec poena justa de damnatione hominis veniat. Nec mirandum est quod vel ignorando non habet liberum arbitrium voluntatis ad eligendum quid recte faciat: vel resistente carnali consuetudine, quae violentia mortalis successionis quodam modo naturaliter inolevit, videat quid recte faciendum sit, et velit, nec possit implere. Illa est enim peccati poena justissima, ut amittat quisque quo bene uti noluit, cum sine ulla posset difficultate, si vellet: id est autem, ut qui sciens recte non facit, amittat scire quid rectum sit; et qui recte facere cum posset noluit, amittat posse cum velit. Nam sunt revera omni peccanti animae duo ista poenalia, ignorantia et difficultas. Ex ignorantia dehonestat error, ex difficultate cruciatus affligit. Sed approbare falsa pro veris, ut erret invitus, et resistente atque torquente dolore carnalis vinculi non posse a libidinosis operibus temperare, non est natura instituti hominis, sed poena damnati. Cum autem de libera voluntate recte faciendi loquimur, de illa scilicet in qua homo factus est, loquimur.» Hinc jam hominibus de ipsius ignorantiae difficultatisque in prolem 0288 primi hominis trajectis vitiis atque transfusis, velut justam querelam deponentibus ita responsum est. «Quibus breviter,» inquam, «respondetur, ut quiescant, et adversus Deum murmurare desistant. Recte enim fortasse quererentur, si erroris et libidinis nullus hominum victor existeret: cum vero ubique sit praesens, qui multis modis per creaturam sibi Domino servientem, aversum vocet, doceat credentem, consoletur sperantem, diligentem adhortetur, conantem adjuvet, exaudiat deprecantem; non tibi deputatur ad culpam quod invitus ignoras; sed quod negligis quaerere quod ignoras; neque illud quod vulnerata membra non colligis, sed quod volentem sanare contemnis.» Ita et exhortatus sum, quantum potui, ad recte vivendum; et gratiam Dei non evacuavi, sine qua natura humana jam contenebrata atque vitiata illuminari non potest et sanari: de qua re cum istis tota vertitur quaestio, ne gratiam Dei quae est in Christo Jesu Domino nostro, perversa naturae defensione frustremus. De qua natura item paulo post dixi (De Libero Arbitrio, lib. 3; n. 50-54): «Etiam ipsam naturam aliter dicimus, cum proprie loquimur, naturam hominis in qua primum in suo genere inculpabilis factus est: aliter istam, in qua ex illius damnati poena et ignari et carni subditi nascimur; juxta quem modum dicit Apostolus, Fuimus enim et nos naturaliter filii irae, sicut et caeteri (Ephes. II, 3).