Chapter 59: Efficacious Grace

Treating the questions of God's foreknowledge, of predestination and of grace, many Molinists, in order to denote themselves as Thomists, refer to classic Thomism under the name of "Bannesianism." Informed theologians see in this practice an element of pleasantry, even of comedy.

Our purpose here is to insist on a principle admitted by all theologians, a principle wherein Thomists see the deepest foundation of the distinction between grace sufficient and grace efficacious. The Problem

Revelation makes it certain that many graces given by God do not produce the effect (at least the entire effect) toward which they are given, while other graces do produce this effect. Graces of the first kind are called sufficient graces. They give the power to do good, without bringing the good act itself to pass, since man resists their attraction. The existence of such graces is absolutely certain, whatever Jansenists say. Without these graces, God, contrary to His mercy and His justice, would command the impossible. Further, since without these graces sin would be inevitable, sin would no longer be sin, and could not justly be punished. Judas could have really here and now avoided his crime, as could the impenitent robber who died near our Savior.

Graces of the second kind are called efficacious. They not only give us real power to observe the precepts, but carry us on to actual observance, as in the case of the penitent robber. The existence of actual efficacious grace is affirmed, equivalently, in numerous passages of Scripture. Ezechiel [1437] says, for example: I will give you a new heart and put in you a new spirit, I will take away your heart of stone, and give you a heart of flesh. I will put My spirit in you and bring it about that you follow My commands and observe and practice My laws. Again, the Psalmist says: [1438] All that God wills, He does. The word "wills" must here be understood as meaning all that God wills, not conditionally, but absolutely. Thus He wills a man's free conversion, that of Assuerus, e. g.: at the prayer of Esther: [1439] Then God changed the wrath of the King into mildness. God's omnipotence is, in these texts, assigned as reason for the infallible efficacy of God's decree. [1440].

The Second Council of Orange, against the Semi-Pelagians, after citing many of these texts, says of the efficaciousness of grace: [1441] Whenever we do good, God, in us and with us, brings our work to pass. Hence there is a grace which not only gives real power to act right (a power which exists also in him who sins): but which produces the good act, even while, far from excluding our own free cooperation, it arouses rather this cooperation, carries us on to consent.

St. Augustine [1442] thus explains these same texts: God, by His power, most hidden and most efficacious, turns the king's heart from wrath to mildness.

The great majority of older theologians, Augustinians, Thomists, Scotists, hold that the grace called efficacious is efficacious of itself, because God wills it to be so, not because we will it to be so, by an act of consent foreseen by God. God is, not a mere spectator, but the Author of salvation. How is grace self-efficacious? Here these older authors differ. Some recur to the divine motion called premotion, some to what they call "victorious delectation," some to a kind of attraction. But, amid all differences, they agree that grace is of itself efficacious.

Molina, on the contrary, maintains that grace is efficacious extrinsically, by our consent, foreseen by scientia media. This scientia media has always been rejected by Thomists, who say that it implies a passivity in God relative to our free determinations (futuribilia, and future): and that it leads to "determination by circumstances" (since it is by knowledge of these circumstances that God would foresee what man would choose). Thus the very being and goodness of the will and salutary choice would come from man and not from God. Granted equal grace to each, says Molina, [1443] it can come to pass that one is converted, the other not. Even with a smaller aid of grace one can rise, while another with greater grace does not rise, and remains hardened.

Molina's opponents answer thus: Here we have a good, the good of a salutary act, which does not come from God, Source of all good. How then maintain the word of Jesus: [1444] Without Me you can do nothing? Or that of St. Paul: [1445] What hast thou that thou hast not received? If, with equal grace, and amid equal circumstances, one is converted and the other not, then the convert has a good which he has not received.

Molinists object: If, in order to do good, you demand, besides sufficient grace, also self-efficacious grace, does sufficient grace really and truly give you a real power to act?

It does, so Thomists reply, if it is true that real power to act is distinct from the act itself; if it is true [1446] that the architect, before he actually builds, has a real power to build, that he who is seated has a real power to rise; that he who is sleeping is not blind, but has a real power to see. Further, if the sinner would not resist sufficient grace, he would receive the efficacious grace, which is offered in the preceding sufficient grace, as fruit is offered in the blossom. If he resists he merits privation of new aid.

But does St. Thomas explicitly distinguish self-efficacious grace from that grace which gives only the power to act?He does, and often. God's aid, he says, [1447] is twofold. God gives the power, by infusing strength and grace, by which man becomes able and apt to act. But He gives further the good act itself, by interiorly moving and urging us to good... since His power, by His great good will, operates in us to will and to do. Again: [1448] Christ is the propitiation for our sins, for some efficaciously, for all sufficiently, because His blood is sufficient price for the salvation of all, but does not have efficacy except in the elect, because of impediment. Does God remedy this impediment? He does, often, but not always. And here lies the mystery. God, he says, [1449] withholds nothing that is due. And he adds: [1450] God gives to all sufficient aid to keep from sin. Again, speaking of efficacious grace: [1451] If it is given to this sinner, it is by mercy; if it is refused to another, it is by justice.

Thomists add, [1452] in explanation: Every actual grace which is self-efficacious for an imperfect act, say attrition, is sufficient for a more perfect salutary act, say contrition. This is manifestly the doctrine of St. Thomas. [1453] If man resists the grace which gives him the power to do good, he merits privation of the grace which would carry him on to actual good deed. But the saint has not merely distinguished the two graces, he has pointed out the deepest foundation for this distinction. The Divine Will, Antecedent And Consequent

"The will," says St. Thomas, [1454] "is related to things as they are in themselves, with all their particular circumstances. Hence we will a thing simply (simpliciter) when we will it with all its concrete circumstances. This will we call the consequent will. Thus it is clear that everything which God wills simpliciter comes to pass."

If, on the contrary, we will a thing in itself good, but independently of its circumstances, this will is called the antecedent will, or conditional will, since the good in question is not realized here and now. That man should live, says St. Thomas, [1455] is good. But if the man is a murderer, it is good that he be executed. Antecedently, God wills that harvests come to maturity, but He allows for some higher good, that not all harvests do in fact mature. Similarly, He wills antecedently the salvation of all men, though for some higher good, of which He alone is judge, He permits some to sin and perish.

But, since God never commands the impossible, His will and love make the observance of His commandments possible to all men, to each according to his measure. He gives to each, says St. Thomas, [1456] more than strict justice requires. It is thus that St. Thomas harmonizes God's antecedent will, of which St. John Damascene speaks, with God's omnipotence. The Supreme Principles

Nothing comes to pass, either in heaven or on earth, unless God either brings it to pass in mercy, or then in justice permits it. This principle, taught in the universal Church, shows that there is in God a conditional and antecedent will, relative to a good which does not come to pass, the privation of which He permits in view of some higher good.

To this principle we must add another: [1457] God does not command the impossible. From these two revealed principles derives the distinction between God's efficacious consequent will and His antecedent will, which is the source of sufficient grace.

All that God wills, He does. This principle has no exception. All that God wills (purely, simply, unconditionally) comes to pass without our freedom being thereby in any way forced, because God moves that freedom sweetly and strongly, actualizing it, not destroying. He wills efficaciously that we freely consent and we do freely consent. The supreme efficacy of divine causality, says St. Thomas, [1458] extends to the free mode of our acts.

Many repeat these principles, but do not see that they contain the foundation of the distinction between the two kinds of grace, one that is self-efficacious, the other simply sufficient which man may resist, but not without divine permission.

Hence we find that in the ninth century, to terminate the long controversy with Gottschalk, the Council of Thuzey (860): at the instance of the Augustinian bishops, harmonized God's will of universal salvation with the sinner's responsibility. That Council's synodal letter [1459] contains this sentence: Whatever He has willed in heaven or on earth, God has done. For nothing comes to pass in heaven or on earth that He does not in mercy bring to pass or permits to come to pass in justice.

Since God's love is the cause of created goodness, says St. Thomas, [1460] no created thing would be better than another, if God did not give one a great good than He gives to another. This is equivalent to St. Paul's word: [1461] What hast thou that thou hast not received? Consequences. Christian humility rests on two dogmas, that of creation from nothing, and that of the necessity of grace for each and every salutary act. Now this same principle of God's predilection contains virtually the doctrine of gratuitous predestination, because the merits of the elect, since they are the effects of their predestination, cannot be the cause of that predestination. [1462].

Even all there is of being and action in sin must come from God, Source of all being and of all activity. [1463] As the divine will cannot indeed, either directly or indirectly, will the disorder which is in sin, so neither can divine causality produce that disorder. Disorder is outside the adequate object of God's omnipotence, more than sound is outside the object of sight. As we cannot see sound, so God cannot cause the disorder of sin. Nothing is more precise and precisive, if we may use the word, than the formal object of a power. [1464] The good and the true are not really distinct in the object, yet the intellect attains in that object only the truth, and the will only the good. In our organism, it is impossible to confuse the effects of weight with the effects of electricity, say, or of heat. Each cause produces only its own proper effect. And thus God is the cause, not of the moral disorder in sin, but only what there is in sin of being and action. No reality comes to pass, to repeat the principle, unless God has willed it, and nothing of evil unless God has permitted it. How necessary, then, it is that the theologian, after drawing conclusion from principles, should remount from conclusions to principles, thus clarifying his conclusions for those who do not see the bond that binds all consequences to the primal verities.

If, then, one of two sinners is converted, that conversion is the effect of a special mercy. And if a just man never sins mortally after his baptism, this perseverance is the effect of a still greater mercy. These simple remarks are enough to show the gratuity of predestination.

Molina, refusing to admit that grace is intrinsically self-efficacious, maintains that it is efficacious only by our consent, foreseen from eternity by scientia media. Thus we have a good which comes to pass without God having efficaciously willed it, contrary to the principle we have just laid down.

Molina does indeed attempt to defend that principle. God, having seen by scientia media that Peter, placed in such and such circumstances, would with sufficient grace be in fact converted, wills to place him in those favorable circumstances rather than in others where he would be lost. But this explanation surely reduces the absolute principle of predilection to a relative, indirect, and extrinsic principle. Grace is efficacious, not of itself and intrinsically, but only by circumstances which are extrinsic to the salutary act. With equal aid, yea with less aid, says Molina, one rises, the other perseveres in obstinacy. One who thus rises, St. Paul would say, has something he has not received. The Mystery

Who can resist God's will? St. Paul [1465] answers this question with a hymn on the mysterious depths of God's wisdom. Why God draws this man and not that man, says St. Augustine, [1466] judge not unless you would misjudge. Predestination, says St. Thomas, [1467] cannot have the merits of the elect as cause, because these merits are the effects of predestination, which is consequently gratuitous, dependent on the divine good pleasure.

Not infrequently we meet authors who, in explaining this mystery, wish to speak more clearly than St. Paul, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas. Superficially, they may be more clear. But is not this superficial clarity incompatible with the sense of mystery? Willy-nilly, these authors return to Molina. One of them recently wrote as follows: "Here is the mystery of predestination. Since God knew from all eternity that Judas would not profit by the sufficient grace accorded to him, why did God not give to Judas, as He did to the good robber, those graces to which He knew that Judas would correspond? ".

This explanation is Molinistic, since it rests on scientia media, since it implies in God's foreknowledge a passivity, depending on the course man would take, were he put in such and such circumstances, and which he will take if in fact he is placed there. The dilemma remains: Is God's knowledge causal and determining? Or is it rather caused and determined? There is no medium.

If we follow the principle commonly received that all good comes from God's efficacious will and all evil from God's permission, then it is not sufficient to say with the author just quoted: God knew what would happen if, etc. We must rather say: God permitted the final impenitence of Judas. Had God not permitted it, it would not have come to pass and God could not have infallibly foreseen it. And God would not have permitted it, had He willed efficaciously to save Judas. But God did efficaciously will the conversion of the penitent robber, because He willed efficaciously his salvation (gratuitous predestination to glory). [1468].

The free will moved and aroused by God, says the Council of Trent, can dissent if it will. This declaration, which was prepared by Dominic Soto, a Thomist, and by many Augustinians, is not a condemnation of self-efficacious grace. Grace actualizes our liberty, but leaves intact the freedom to resist. [1469] As he who is seated retains real power to rise, so he who chooses a particular road has real power to refuse it freely. Real power to resist is one thing, actual resistance is something else. [1470].

No one, then, can be better than another unless he be loved more by God. Divine predilection is the foundation of predestination. [1471] Bannez says nothing more than does St. Thomas. [1472] Molina, more frank than some of his followers, recognized that his own doctrine is not that of St. Thomas. [1473].

As regards reprobation, it consists precisely, says St. Thomas, [1474] in God's will to permit sin (negative reprobation) and of inflicting punishment of damnation for sin (positive reprobation).

Hence it is wrong to say, as has been recently said, that permission of sin is found in the same way among the elect as it is among the reprobate. Final impenitence is never found among the elect. Conclusion Nothing comes to pass unless God wills it efficaciously, if it is good, or permits it if it is evil. God never commands the impossible. From these two most fundamental principles arises the distinction between efficacious grace, which is the effect of the intrinsically efficacious will of God, and sufficient grace, which is the effect of God's antecedent will, accompanied by permission of sin. The first grace gives the actual doing of salutary acts, the second gives real power for salutary acts. But—we cannot repeat it too often—sufficient grace is a blossom wherein efficacious grace is offered, yet so that, if man resists, he merits privation of the efficacious grace which, without this resistance, he would have received.

A very great mystery, certainly. God cannot be unjust, cries St. Paul. [1475] What creature can claim to have first given anything to God, so as to claim a reward? But this much is manifest in this chiaro oscuro: we are dealing here with the transcendent pre-eminence of the deity, wherein are harmonized infinite justice, infinite mercy, and supreme freedom. Final perseverance comes from infinite mercy. Final impenitence is a just punishment. The infinity of all God's attributes will be manifest only in the immediate vision of God as he is in Himself.

Let us learn, says Bossuet, [1476] to make our intelligence captive, to confess these two graces (sufficient and efficacious): one of which leaves our will without excuse before God, while the other forbids all self-glorification. Resistance to grace is an evil which comes only from ourselves. Non-resistance to grace is a good, which would not come to pass here and now, had not God from all eternity efficaciously willed it so.

Let us notice some common errors, especially in the minds of those who are just being introduced into this doctrine. It is an error to think that some receive only efficacious graces and others only those which are sufficient. All of us receive both kinds of graces. Even those in mortal sin receive from time to time efficacious graces, to make, say, an act of faith, or of hope. But often too they resist the sufficient grace which inclines them to conversion, whereas good servants of God often receive sufficient graces which they do not resist and which are followed by efficacious graces.

We should note too that there are various kinds of sufficient grace. There are first exterior graces, as, e. g.: a sermon, a good example, a proper guidance. Then interior graces, as, e. g.: that of baptism, the infused virtues and graces, which give us the proximate power to act supernaturally. Thirdly, there are actual graces, graces of illumination, which give us good thoughts, graces of attraction which incline us to salutary consent, even though consent does not follow. [1477] A grace which efficaciously produces attrition is, as regards contrition, a sufficient grace. [1478].

Sufficient grace often urges us insistently not to resist God's will, manifested to us by our superior, say, or by our director. For a year, it may be, or two years, or many years, circumstances strengthen what is demanded of us in God's name, and still we remain deceived by our selfishness, though prayers are said for us, and Masses celebrated for our intention. Notwithstanding all light and attraction that comes from these graces, we may still reach a state of hardening in sin. Behold I stand at the gate and knock.

Resistance comes from the soul alone. If resistance ceases, the warmth of grace begins, strongly and sweetly, to penetrate our coldness. The soul begins to realize that resistance is her own work, that non-resistance is itself a good that comes from the Author of all good, that it must pray for this good, as the priest prays just before his Communion at Mass: "Grant, O Lord, that I may ever cling to Thy precepts, and let me never be separated from Thee."

One who keeps the commandments sincerely is certainly better than he who, though fully able, does not keep them. He is therefore bound to special gratitude to God who has made him better. Hence our present distinction, between grace sufficient and grace efficacious, is the foundation of a gratitude intended to be eternal. The elect, as St. Augustine [1479] so often says, will sing forever the mercy of God, and will clearly see how this infinite mercy harmonizes perfectly with infinite justice and supreme freedom. [1480].

The Thomistic synthesis sets all these principles in bold relief, thereby preserving the spirit of theological science which judges all things, not precisely and primarily by their relation to man and man's freedom, but by their relation to God, the proper object of theology, to God, the source and goal of all life, natural and supernatural. Truth concerning God is the sun which illumines our minds and wills on the road that rises to eternal life, to the unmediated vision of the divine reality.

Endnotes 1 Luther even doubted the salvation of the Angelic Doctor

2 See Archivio di filosofia, July, 1933, p. 10, a posthumous article by Laberthonniere

3 See Dictionnaire de theologie catholique, art. "Leibniz" (conclusion).

4 See Ia, q. 1; q. 32. Also Cont. Gent.: I, 35 Cf. Ia, q. 16 Cf. IIa, IIae, q. 2, a. 2, ad. 1

7 Ibid.: q. 188, a. 6

8 The Vatican Council

9 Chap. 31

10 Chaps. 32, 35

11 Ibid.

12 In the Third Part of the Summa.

13 Media vita in morte sumus14 Ibid.: chap. 4815 Ex plenitudine contemplationis16 S. Thomas d'Aquin (French trans.: 1920, p. 58)

17 Giles of Rome, Henry de Bate18 J Cf. Jourdain, Fr. Brentano, G. von Hertling, and others19 In the years 1269-7120 In 1268 or later21 Peri hermenias, I, 1422 Chap. 123 In the second book of the Physica

24 Books three to six of the Physica

25 Books seven and eight

26 Written in the year 1272-73

27 Written 1269-71

28 Written 1272-73

29 Bk. 1, chap. 8 (lect. 17, in St. Thomas)

30 Terra (vel corpus grave) velocius movetur quanto magis descendit

31 S. Thomas d'Aquin, 1920, p. 36

32 The historian of the Copernican system

33 Summa, Ia q. 32, a. 1, ad 2, and De coelo et mundo, Bk. II, lect. 17

34 See also P Duhem, Essai sur la notion De theorie physique De Platon a Galilee, Paris, 1908, pp. 46 ff

35 Written about 1266

36 Written in 1266

37 Written in 1266

38 In the first book

39 Bk. II lect. 1-5

40 Ibid.: lect. 6

41 Ibid.: lect. 13

42 Bk. III, lect. 2

43 Sonatio et auditio sunt in subjecto sentiente, sonatio ut ab agente, auditio ut in patiente

44 Bk. II, lect. 24

45 Fit quodammodo omnia

46 Bk. III, lect. 4, 5, 7

47 Intellectus agens

48 Bk. III, lect. 10

49 Ibid.: lect. 11

50 Ibid.: lect. 8

51 Ibid.: lect. 14

52 Bk. II, chap. 2; Bk. III, chap. 5

53 Bk. I, chap. 4; Bk. III, chaps. 4, 5

54 Bk. 10, chap. 7

55 Bk. IV, lect. 5

56 In, the author's text I find chrinein and chrisis a slip on the part of proofreader or printer's devil

57 Bks VII, VIII

58 Bk. IX

59 Cf. Bk. XII, lect. 7-12

60 Et hoc est quod concludit (Philosophus): quod est unus princeps totius universi, scilicet primum movens et primum intelligibile et primum bonum

61 The saint, in 1266, commented on all ten books

62 The saint, in 1268, commented on Bks. I and II, and of III, chaps. 1-6. He did not explain the Moralia magna, nor the Moralia ad Eudemum

63 Bk. I

64 Bk. II

65 Bk. III

66 Bk. IV

67 Bk. V

68 Bk. VI

69 Bk. VII

70 Bk. IX

71 Bk. X

72 Nous

73 Ibid

74 Cf. A. Mansion, "L'eudemonisme aristotelicien et la morale thomiste" in Xenia thomistica I, 429-49

75 Cf. Msgr. Grabmann, Phil. Jahrbuch, 1915 pp. 373-78

76 IIae, q. 94, a. 5, ad 3; IIa IIae, q. 10, a. 10; q. 104, a. 5

77 see the first chapter of that work

78 see the Summa, Ia IIae, q. 105, a. 1

79 De regimine principum I, 6

80 Si paulatim idem populus depravatus habeat venale suffragium, et regimen flagitiosis, sceleratisque committat, recte adimitur populo talis potestas dandi honores, et ad paucorum bonorum redit arbitrium

81 In 1269

82 In 1257

83 Ad eruditionem incipientium

84 Secundum ordinem disciplinae

85 Ia, q. 1, a. 6

86 Ia, q. 11, prologue

87 IIa IIae, q. 180, a. 6

88 Can. 1366, pars 2: Philosophiae rationalis ac theologiae studia, et alumnorum in his disciplinis institutionem, professores omnino pertractent ad Angelici Doctoris rationem doctrinam et principia, eaque sancte teneant

89 Died 1444

90 Latest edition, Tours, 1900-1908

91 Died 1481

92 Died 1523

93 Written 1507-22

94 On the Ia IIae, Cologne, 1512

95 On the Cont. Gent.: Venice, 1534

96 On the IIa IIae. He died in 1546

97 At Salamanca, 1932-35

98 At Madrid. 1933-35

99 Sess. VI, chap. 6.

100 IIIa, q. 85, a. 5101 Ia IIae, q. 112, a. 4; IIa IIae, q. 24, a. 3.

102 Et liquido nuper in sacris concilii Tridentini decretis apparuit103 Bull. ord. praed.: V, 155104 On the Ia IIae, Salamanca, 1577, and on the IIIa, Salamanca, 1578105 On the la, Salamanca, 1584-88 (recently reprinted, Valencia, 1934) ; on the IIa IIae, Salamanca, 1584-94; and on the IIIa (still in manuscript).

106 Published 1640-42107 Published 1631, 1637, 1641 (new ed.: Paris, 1871).

108 Defensiones (latest edition, Tours, 1900-1908).

109 Bk. III, chap. 51.

110 Ibid.: chap. 94111 Bk IV, chap. 95. Note here some differences between him and Cajetan112 De entia et essentia; De analogia nominum. Noteworthy too are his opuscula on the sacrifice of the Mass.

113 Rome, 1888-1906114 De divinis nominibus, chap. 5, lect. 3. Quodl. XII, a. 3, 4: Commentary on St. John's Gospel (2: 4; 7: 30; 13: 1; 17: 1)

115 Cf. Dict. theol. cath.: s. v. Banez116 Re-edited at Paris, 1883; and recently again, by Beatus Reiser, O. S. B.: Turin, 1930-37

117 Re-edited at Paris, 1883-86. The Benedictines of Solesmes are now again re-editing the work.

118 Fribourg, 1911119 Fribourg, three volumes, 1907120 1908 and 1912121 1910122 Two volumes, 1927123 Primo in conceptione intellectus cadit ens; quia secundum hoc unumquodque cognoscibile est in quantum est actu; unde ens est proprium objectum intellectus et sic est primum intelligibile, sicut sonus est primum audibile. Ia, q. 5, a. 2. Cf. also Ia, q. 85, a3; Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2; Cont. Gent.: II, 83; De veritate, q. 1, a. I.

124 Id cujus actus est esse125 Quod statim ad occursum rei sensatae apprehenditur intellectu. De anima, II, 6, lect. 13 (de sensibili per accidens).

126 Ia, q. 76, a. 5.

127 Per intellectum ens dulce ut ens, et per gustum ut dulce

128 Naturaliter intellectus noster cognoscit ens et ea quae sunt per se entis, in quantum hujusmodi, in qua congnitione fundatur primorum pincipiorum notitia, ut non esse simul affirmare et negare (vel oppositio inter ens et non ens) et alia hujusmodi. Cont. Gent.: II, 83. Cf. Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2.

129 Ia, q. 86, a. 1; De veritate, q. 10, a. 5.

130 See St. Thomas, In Met.: IV, lect. 5-15.

131 Here we see too the distance that separates idea from image. A polygon with 10,000 sides is not easily imaginable, but is easily conceivable, and also realizable

132 In Phys.: II, lect. 10: Hoc quod dico propter quid quaerit de causa; sed ad propter quid non respondetur nisi aliqua dictarum (quattuor) causarum.

133 See also In Met.: V, 2, lect. 2

134 Id quod est.

135 Id quo aliquid est, v. g.: alburn, calidum136 In Met.: V, lect. 10 and 11.

137 Ab aeterno138 Ia, q. 2, a. 2139 Sub ratione finis140 In Phys.: II, 3, lect. 5, 12-14; Ia, q. 44, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 2; Cont. Gent.: III, 2

141 Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2.

142 For more extended treatment of these foundations of Thomistic realism, see our two works: Le sens commun, la philosophie De l'etre et les formules dogmatiques, 1909, 4th ed.: 1936, and Dieu, son existence et sa nature, 1915 (6th ed.: 1936, pp. 108-226). See also J Maritain, Elements De philosophie (6th ed.: 1921): I, 87-94; Sept lecons sur l'etre (s. d. ).

143 Realisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance, 1939, pp. 213-39144 Illud quod primo intellectus concipit, quasi notissimum et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens. De veritate, q. 1, a. 1.

145 Cogito ergo sum146 Cognitio magis communis est prior quam cognitio minus communis. Ia, q. 85, a. 3147 See art. "Acte et puissance, Aristotelisme" in Dict. theol. cath

148 Operari sequitur esse, et modus operandi modum essendi.

149 Phys.: I and II; Met.: I, V (IV): IX (VIII).

150 Phys.: I, 6 and 8; Met.: I, 5; IV (III): per totum; IX (VIII): per totum151 Ex ente non fit ens, quia jam est ens, et ex nihilo nihil fit, ergo ipsum fieri est impossibile

152 Met.: IV (III): from chap. 4 to the end

153 Le Sophiste, 241d, 257a, 259e

154 Phys.: loc. cit. ; Met.: loc. cit.

155 Ex nihilo nihil fit156 Ia, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2157 Ex ente in actu non fit ens

158 Ex nulla presupposita potentia reali

159 Ia, q. 45, a. 1, 2, 5; IIIa, q. 75, a. 8.

160 De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 8.

161 Ia, q. 50, a. 4.

162 From this doctrine Suarez differs. Disp. met.: XXX, sect. 2, no. 18; XXXI, sect. 13, nos. 14 f. De angelis, I, XII, XV

163 Non est quid, nec quale, nec quantum, nec aliquid hujusmodi In Met.: VII (VI) ; lect. 2, 6.

164 Corruptio unius est generatio alterius165 Ia, 15. a. 3, ad 3. Suarez differs from this doctrine; Disp. met.: XIII, sect. 5; XXXIII, sect. I; XV, sect. 6, no. 3 and sect. 9.

166 Cf. St. Thomas, Ia, q. 7, a. 1.

167 Ibid168 Illud quod est maxime formale omnium est ipsum esse (ibid. ).

169 Ia, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3. Ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium; comparatur enim adomnia ut actus; nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi in quantum est; unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum et etiam ipsarum formarum; unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum sed magis sicut receptum ad recipiens, cum enim dico esse hominis vel equi, vel cujuscumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut formale et receptum, non autem ut illud cui competit esse.

170 Ia, q. 7, a. 1.

171 Ibid.: ad 3.

172 Approved, 1914, by the Sacra Congregatio Studiorum173 Disp. met.: XV, sect. 9; XXXI per totum

174 Cf. Disp. met. XXX, sect. 2, no. 18; XXXI, sect. 13, no. 14

175 Deus simul dans esse, producit id quod esse recipit. De potentia, q. 3, a. 1, ad 17.

176 Hoc est contra rationem facti quod essentia rei sit ipsum esse ejus, quia esse subsistens non est esse creatum. Ia, q. 7, a. 2, ad 1.

177 Praeter esse est capacitas realis ad esse et limitans esse178 Ia, q. 13, a. 12179 Dist. met.: XV, sect. 9; XXX and XXXI180 See p. 45 and note 26181 Revue De philosophie, 1938, p. 412; cf. pp. 410 f.: 429

182 Art. cit.: pp. 410 ff

183 De veritate q. 27, a. 1, ad 8.

184 Sententiae Bk. 1, dist. 19, q. 2, a. 2185 De hebdomadibus186 Quodlibet. III, a. 20 (written 1270).

187 Saltem ex esse et quod est

188 Suppositum, id quod est

189 Bk. II, chap. 53: Quod in substantiis intellectualibus creatis est actus et potentia

190 Solus Deus est suum esse, non solum habet esse, sed est suum esse.

191 Ex hoc ipso quod esse Dei est per se subsistens, non receptum in aliquo, prout dicitur infinitum, distinguitur ab omnibus aliis et alia removentur ab eo; sicut si esset albedo subsistens, ex hoc ipso quod non esset in alio differret ab omni albedine existente in subjecto. Ia, q. 7, a. 1, ad 3.

192 De ver. fund. phil. christianae, Fribourg, 1911, pp. 23 ff. Cf. also p. Cornelio Fabro, C. P. S.: "Neotomismo e Suarezismo," Divus Thomas (Placentiae, 1941): fasc. 2-3, 5-6.

193 Cf. F. X. Maquart, Elementa philosophiae, 1938, Vol. IIIb, Ontologia, pp. 54-60194 Ens non est univocum, sed analogum, alioquin diversificari non posset

195 In Metaph.: Bk. 1, chap. 5, lect. 9. See the fourth of the twenty-four Thomistic theses

196 OpusOxon.: Bk. 1, dist 3, q. 2, nos. 5 ff. ;dist. V, q. 1;dist. 8, q. 3; IV Met.: q. 1.

197 Disp. met.: II, sect. 2, no. 34; XV, sect. 9; XXX and XXXI198 Doctrinae D. Thomae tria principia: a) Ens est transcendens et analogum, non univocum. b) Deus est actus purus, solus Deus est suurn esse. c) Absoluta specificantur a se, relativa ab alio

199 Cf. N. del Prado, O. P.: De veritate fundamentali philosophiae christianae, 1911, pp. xliv ff. ; also Dict. theol. cath.: s. v. Essence et existence

200 Ipsum esse subsistens et irreceptum. Ia, q. 7, a. 1

201 Ia, q. 3, a. 6.

202 Ipsum intelligere subsistens. Ia, q. 14, a. 1.

203 1a, q. 19, a. l; q. 20, a. I204 Ia, q. 50, a. 4205 Unum per se, una natura.

206 Ex actu et actu non fit unum per se, sed solum ex propria potentia et proprio actu. Ia, q. 76, a. 4.

207 Id quo aliquid est materiale et id quo aliquod corpus est in tali specie

208 See the ninth of the twenty-four theses

209 Ia, q. 66, a. 1.

210 Id quo forma recepta limitatur et multiplicatur.

211 Ia, q. 15, a, 3, ad. 3212 Ia, q. 85, a. 1213 Ia, q. 14, a. 1; q. 78, a. 3. See the eighteenth of the twenty-four theses.

214 Operari sequitur esse, et modus operandi modum essendi215 Ia, q. 77, a. 3; Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2; IIa IIae, q. 5, a. 3216 Ia, q. 77, a. 1, 2, 3, 4217 Ia, q. 79, a. 7.

218 Omne quod movetur movetur ab alio.

219 Ia, q. a, a. 3220 Multa sunt quae per actum virtualem videntur sese movere et reducere ad actum formalem, ut in appetitu seu voluntate videre licet. Disp. met.: XXIX, I.

221 Ia, q. 105, a. 4, 5222 Quantumcumque natura aliqua corporalis vel spiritualis pnatur perfecta, non potest in suum actum procedere, nisi moveatur a Deo. Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 1

223 Si procedatur in infinitum in causis efficientibus non erit prima causa efficiens, et sic non erit nec effectus ultimus, nec causae efficientes mediae, quod patet esse falsum. Ia, q. 2, a. 3, 2a via

224 See the twenty-second of the twenty-four theses

225 In causis per se subordinatis non repugnat infinitas causas, si sint, simul operari. Disp. met.: XXIX 1, 2; XXI, 2

226 Ibid

227 Concursus simultaneus

228 Partialitate causae, si non effectus

229 Cf. Disp. met.: XX, 2, 3; XXII, 2, no. 51.

230 Quando causae subordinatae sunt inter se, necesse non est, ut superior in eo ordine semper moveat inferiorem, etiamsi essentialiter subordinatae sint inter se et a se mutuo pendeant in producendo aliquo effectu; sed satis est si imrnediate influant in effectum. Concordia, disp. XXVI, in fine

231 Ia, q. 2, a. 3; q. 105, a. 5. Deus in omni operante operatur

232 Cf. St. Thomas, Compend. theol.: 104; IIIa, q. 11, ad I; De verit.: q. 14, a. 2; De potentia, q. 16, ad I, ad 18.

233 De gratia, VI, 5234 Cf. John of St. Thomas, In Iam, q. 12, a. 1, 4 (disp. XIV, a. 2, nos. 17ff. ).

235 Ia, a. 17, a. 1.

236 Potentia dicitur ad actum

237 Cf. Ia, q. 105, a. 4; Ia IIae, q. 10, a. 4.

238 Deus sub ratione deitatis239 On this subject, see Acta secundi congressus thomistici internationalis Rome, 1936, pp. 379-408; Garrigou-Lagrange, De relationibus inter philosophiam et religionem, ac De natura philosophiac christianae

240 l'Evolution homogene du dogme catholique, Paris, 2nd ed.: French trans.: 1924, II, 333.

241 Introductio in historiam dogmatum, Paris, 1922, pp. 128, 115-49, 170-73, 185, 192-210.

242 De revelatione, Rome, 1918, I, 18, 20, 189 ff. ; De Deo uno, Paris, 1938, pp. 43-49

243 Essai sur le probleme theologique (Bibliotheque Orientations): Belgium, 1938, pp. 66, 121, 123, 135.

244 Ibid.: pp. 137-41245 See note 3. Cf. Gagnebet, in Rev. thom.: 1939, pp. 108-47

246 This paragraph summarizes the first question in the Summa. See Ia, q. 1, a. 6.

247 Clare visa248 Obscure per fidem cognita249 Ego sum qui sum250 Deus solus est ipsum esse subsistens251 Bk. 1, lect. 4; Scire est cognoscere causam propter quam res est et non potest aliter se habere

252 Cf. R. Gagnebet, O. P.: "La nature de la theologie speculative" in Rev. thom.: 1938, nos. 1 and 2, p. 78; 1939, pp. 108-47

253 Radix ejus est ipsa fides infusa

254 Ia, q. 1, a. 6, 8, 9.

255 Sufficit defendere non esse impossibile quod praedicat fides. Ia, q. 32, a. 1256 IIIa, q. 1, a. 1.

257 Ia, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2258 Haec non possunt nec probari nec improbari, sed cum probabilitate suadentur et sola fide cum certitudine tenentur

259 Matt. 16: 18

260 Doctrina fidei

261 Matt. 26: 39.

262 Fides quaerens intellectum263 Cf. Gagnebet, O. P.: "La nature de la theologie speculative," Rev. thom.: 1938, nos. 1 and 2.

264 Cf. Salmanticenses, Cursus theol.: de tide, disp. 1, dub. 4, no. 127

265 See Salmanticenses (loc. cit.: no. 124): who rightly cite as defenders of their thesisa series of Thomists, Capreolus, Cajetan, Banez, John of St. Thomas, and others, against Vega, Vasquez, Suarez, and Lugo. Cf. Dict. theol. cath.: s. v. Explicite et Implicite and s. v. Dogme

266 Ad aliquam Deo dante mysteriorum intelligentiam, eamque fructuosissimam Denz.: no. 1796

267 Bk. II, lect. 3-17

268 Dieu, son existence et sa nature, 6th ed.: 1933, Part I; De Deo uno, 1st ed.: 1938

269 Ia, q. 2, a. 1

270 Existentiam non solum signatam aut conceptam, sed exercitam in re extra animam

271 Nescimus de Deo quid est

272 Ia, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2; a. 2, ad 2.

273 Ia, q. 104, a. 1.

274 Ia, q. 46, a. 2, ad 7275 Cf. Cont. Gent.: II, 38

276 Cf. Ia, q. 104, a. 1

277 Ia, q. 2, a. 2

278 Ia, q. 104, a. 1.

279 See above, on Concursus simultaneus280 Quae secundum se diversa sunt non conveniunt in aliquod unum nisi per aliquam causam, adunantem ipsa. Ia, q. 3, a. 7281 Quod causam non habet primum et immediatum est. Cont. Gent.: II, 15, § 2.

282 Ens per essentiam et non per participationem283 See note 13284 Causa unionis est unitas285 For more detailed defense of the principle of causality, see Dieu, son existence et sa nature, 6th ed.: 1933, pp. 83 ff.: 98 ff.: 170-81

286 Secumdum viam ascendentem inventionis

287 Secundum viam judicii

288 Ia, q. 44, a. 1.

289 Cf. C. Fabro, "La difesa critica del principio di causa" in Rivista di filosofia neoscholastica, 1936, pp. 102-41; also La nozione metafisica di participazione sec. s. Tommaso, 1939

290 Ia, q. 44, a. 1, ad 1

291 In primo modi dicendi per se

292 In secundo modi dicendi per se. We have here the terminology of Aristotle: Post. Analyt.: 1, 4, lect. 10 of St. Thomas

293 Cf. Ia, q. 2, a. 1: Incorporalia non esse in loco est propositio per se nota apud sapientes tantum

294 See Ia, q. 3, a. 4

295 Via inventionis

296 Via judicii

297 Cf. Ia, q. 79, a. 9.

298 Cf. N. del Prado, De veritate fundamentali philosophiae christianae, 1911

299 Ego sum qui sum. Exod. 3: 14

300 Divina essentia per hoc quod exercitae actualitati ipsius Esse identificatur, seu per hoc quod est ipsum Esse subsistens, in sua veluti metaphysica ratione bene nobis constituta proponitur, et per hoc idem rationem nobis exhibet suae infinitatis in perfectione.

301 See Index of his works in Tabula aurea, s. v. Deus, no. 27302 This proposition must, of course, be irresistibly evident to the created intellect which sees God immediately, and contrasts itself with the self-subsistent existence

303 See Garrigou-Lagrange, "La distinction reelle et la refutation du pantheisme" in Rev. thom.: October, 1938

304 Intelligere subsistens

305 Ipsum esse subsistens

306 Ia, q. 3, a. 1, 2

307 Ia, q. 12.

308 Sub ratione communi et analogica entis309 Deum sub ratione deitatis310 Deum nemo vidit umquam. John 1: 18311 Lucem habitat inaccessibilcm. I Tim. 6: 16.

312 In speculo rerum spiritualium313 In speculo sensibilium

314 Ia, q. 77, a. 3315 Ia, q. 12, a. 4

316 Creaturae sensibiles sunt effectus Dei, virtutem causae non adaequantes. Unde ex sensibilium cognitione non potest tota Dei virtus cognosci, et per conscquens nec ejus essentia videri. Cf. Ia, q. 12, a. 12

317 See also Cont. Gent.: I, 3.

318 Cf. Scotus, In Iam Sent.: dist. III, q. 3, nos. 24, 25319 Prolog. Sent. ; q. 1 and In IV Sent.: dist. XLIX, q. 10320 De gratia, VI, 5321 Ia, q. 12, a. 1322 Cf. Denz.: no. 1021

323 Primum velle

324 Ia IIae, q. 6, a. 6

325 Ia, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1

326 Cf. Salmanticenses, In Iam, q. 12, a. 1, nos. 75, 77.

327 Ad modum ponderis naturae.

328 The Vatican Council condemns the proposition: Mysteria proprie dicta possunt per rationem rite excultam e naturalibus principiis intelligi et demonstrari. Denz.: nos. 1795, 1816.

329 Possibilitas et a fortiori existentia mysteriorum essentialiter supernaturalium non potest naturaliter probari, nec improbari, sed suadetur argumentis convenientiae et sola fide firmiter tenetur. Cf. Salmanticenses, In Iam, Disp. 1, dub. 3. Cf. also GarrigouLagrange, De Deo uno, 1938, pp.: 264-69

330 Ia, q. 12, a. 5

331 Vita nova

332 8 Cf. John of Saint Thomas, In Iam, q. 12, disp. XIV, a. 2, nos. 17, 18, 23

333 De gratia, VI, 5

334 See also the Salmanticenses, In Iam, q. 12, disp. IV, dub. 4,

335 Omnem speciem creatam336 Ia, q. 12, a. 2337 Finito modo338 Ia, q. 12, a. 7.

339 Ia, q. 13. For a thorough study of analogy, see The Bond of Being, an Essay on Analogy and Being, by James F. Anderson. [Tr. ]

340 Op. Oxon.: I, d. III, q. 2, nos. 5 f. ; d. V, q. 1; d. VIII, q. 3.

341 Disp. met.: II, sect. 2, no. 34; XV, sect. 9; XXX and XXXI.

342 Ia, q. 13.

343 Perfectiones simpliciter simplices

344 Substantialiter

345 Perfectiones mixtae

346 In suo significato formali

347 Ia, q. 13, a. 5. Omnis effectus non adaequans virtutem causae recipit similitudinem agentis non secundum eandem rationem, sed deficienter; ita quod id quod divisim et multipliciter est in effectibus, in causa est simpliciter et eodem modo. Omnes rerum perfectiones quae sunt in rebus creatis divisim et multipliciter, praeexistunt in Deo unite et simpliciter. 348 Analoga sunt quorum nomen est commune, ratio vero per nomen significata est simpliciter eadem, et secundum quid diversa

349 Analoga sunt quorum nomen est commune, ratio vero per somen significata est simpliciter quidem diversa in analogatis, et secundum quid eadem, id est similis secundum quandam proportionem, seu proportionaliter eadem

350 Cf. Cajetan, De analogia nomimum, c. 5, 6; also N. del Prado, De veritate fundamentali philosophiae christianae, 1911, pp. 196 ff

351 Ia, q. 13, a. 5. Non secundum eandem rationem hoc nomen sapiens de Deo et de homine dicitur

352 De veritate, q. 2, a. 11

353 Inter creatorem et creaturam non potest tanta simulitudo notari, quin sit semper major dissimilitudo notanda. Denz.: no. 432

354 Cum hoc nomen sapiens de homme dicitur, quodammodo describit et comprehendit rem significatam (distinctam ab essentia hominis, ab ejus esse, ab ejus potentia, etc. ): non autem cum dicitur de Deo; sed relinquit rem significatam ut incomprehensam, excedentem nominis significationem. Ia, q. 13, a. 5.

355 Formaliter eminenter

356 Distinctio formalis actualis ex natura rei

357 In ipsa re, extra animam

358 Council of Florence: In Deo omnia sunt unum et idem, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio. Denz.: no. 703.

359 In Iam, q. 13, a. 5s, no. 7. "Sicut res quae est sapientia, et res quae est justitia in creaturis, elevantur in unam rem superioris ordinis, scilicet Deitatem et ideo sunt una res in Deo: ita ratio formalis sapientiae et ratio formalis justitiae elevantur in unam rationem formalem superioris ordinis, scilicet rationem propriam Deitatis, et sunt una numero ratio formalis, eminenter utramque rationern continens, non tantum virtualiter ut ratio lucis continet rationem coloris, sed formaliter.. Unde subtilissime divinum sancti Thomae ingenium, ex hoc... intulit: Ergo alia est ratio sapientiae in Deo et alia sapientiae in creaturis. "

360 Ibid.: no. 15; De analogia nominum, chap.. 6: Non est una ratio simpliciter, sed proportionaliter una

361 See note 52

362 Hae quidem perfectiones in Deo pracexistunt unite et simpliciter, in creaturis vero recipiuntur divise et multipliciter.. Ita variis et multiplicibus conceptibus intellectus nostri respondet unum omnino simplex, secundum hujusmodi conceptiones imperfecte intellectum. Ia, q. 13, a. 4. Again: Rationes plures horum nominum non sunt cassae et vanae, quia omnibus eis respondet unum quid simplex, per omnia hujusmodi multipliciter et imperfecte repraesentatum. Ibid.: ad 2. It3m, a. 5 in corpore.

363 As mathematical illustration, think of a multitude of radii converging to the center of a circle. Each radius is distinct from all others and still, by its central point of convergence, identified with all other radii. [Tr. ]

364 Blessed Angela de Foligno, for instance365 Secundum se, non quoad nos loquendo, est in Deo unica ratio formalis, non pure absoluta, nec pure respectiva, non pure communicabilis, nec pure incommunicabilis, sed eminentissime ac formaliter continens et quidquid absolutae perfectionis est et quidquid Trinitas respectiva exigit.. Quoniam res divina prior est ente et omnibus differentiis ejus; est enim super ens et super unum, etc. In Iam, q. 39, a. 1, no. 7.

366 Cont. Gent.: I, 3, no. 3367 For more detailed exposition, see Garrigou-Lagrange, De revelatione, 1, chap. 11, pp. 347-54

368 I Tim. 6: 16

369 Ia, q. 14.

370 Ibid.: a. 1.

371 Ibid.: a. 2, 3.

372 Non solum intelligibilis in actu sed intellecta in actu.

373 Ia, q. 14, a. 4374 Ibid.: a. 5.

375 Ibid.: a. 6376 Ibid.: a. 7377 Ibid.: a. 8.

378 Ibid.: a. 10

379 Futuribilia

380 Aeternitas ambit totum tempus

381 Ia, q. 14, a. 13

382 Fortiter et suaviter.

383 Ia, q. 19, a. 1; q. 20, a. 1384 Theod.: chap. 7385 Ia, q. 19, a. 3.

386 Yet Plato and Aristotle are themselves immeasurably above those moderns who trace the world back to a universal radiation which, seemingly, is self-existent. [Tr. ]

387 Agens naturale secundum quod est tale agit, unde quamdiu est tale non facit nisi tale; omne enim agens per naturam habet esse determinatum. Cum igitur esse divinum non sit determinatum (seu limitatum): sed contineat in se totam perfectionem essendi non potest esse quod agat per necessitatem naturae, nisi forte causaret aliquid indeterminatum et infinitum in essendo, quod est impossibile. Non igitur agit per necessitatem naturae, sed effectus determinati ab infinita ipsius perfectione procedunt secundum determinationem voluntatis et intellectus ipsius. Ia, q. 7, a. 2, 4.

388 Vult hoc esse propter hoc, sed non propter hoc vult hoc. Ia, q. 7, a. 5389 Ps. 134: 6: Omnia quaecumque voluit Deus fecit390 Ia, q. 19, a. 6

391 Ibid.: ad 1.

392 Dives in hell knew that the acts which brought him there were his own free choice. Hence his warning to his brothers. [Tr. ]

393 Ia, q. 19, a. 8. This article has special importance on this point. The commentators dwell on it at great length

394 For more extended exposition, see our work, De Deo uno, 1938, pp. 410-34; also Rev. thom.: May, 1937, "Le fondement supreme de la distinction des deux graces, suffisante et efficace. "

395 See Molina, Concordia, Paris, 1876, pp. 51, 230, 356, 459, 565.

396 For an extended exposition of this Thomistic viewpoint, see our article in Dict. de theol. cath.: s. v. Premotion physique, cols. 31-77; also s. v. Predestination, cols. 294058, 2983-89

397 Cf. Molina, Concordia, Paris, 1876, pp. 51, 565

398 Cum amor Dei sit causa bonitatis rerum, non esset aliquid alio melius, si Deus non vellet uni majus bonum quam alteri. Ia, q. 20, a. 1.

399 From Proverbs and St. Paul. See note 19

400 See Origen, in the third book of Peri Archon.

401 Cont. Gent.: I, 89. The saint is commenting on two Scripture texts. Prov. 21: 1: The king's heart is in God's hand. God turns that heart whithersoever He wills. Phil. 2: 13: It is God who works in us by His own good will, both to will and to fulfill. The saint's own words run thus: "Quidam non intelligentes qualiter motum voluntatis Deus in nobis causare possit absque praejudicio libertatis voluntatis, conati sunt has auctoritates male exponere, ut scilicet dicerent quod Deus causat in nobis velle et perficere in quantum dat nobis virtutem volendi, non autem sic quod faciat nos velle hoc vel illud, sicut Origenes exponit in tertio Periarchon. Quibus quidem auctoritatibus sacrae Scripturae resistitur evidenter. Dicitur enim apud Is. 36: 12: 'Omnia opera nostra operatus es in nobis, Domine. ' Unde non solum virtutem volendi a Deo habemus, sed etiam operationem. "

402 Deus movet voluntatem hominis, sicut universalis motor ad universale objectum voluntatis quod est bonum, et sine hac universali motione homo non potest aliquid velle: sed homo per rationem determinat se ad volendum hoc vel illud, quod est vere bonum vel apparens bonum. Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 6, ad 3

403 See preceding note

404 Sed tamen interdum specialiter Deus movet aliquos ad aliquid determinate volendum, quod est bonum, sicut in his quos movet per gratiam ut infra dicetur. Cf. Ia IIae, q. 111, a. 2

405 Quia voluntas est activum principium non determinatum ad unum, sed indifferenter se habens ad multa, sic Deus ipsam movet quod non ex necessitate ad unum determinat, sed remanet ejus motus contingens et non necessarius nisi in his ad quae naturaliter movetur. Ibid.: q. 10, a. 4.

406 Ia IIae, q. 10o, a. 4407 Ibid.: a. 4, ad 3.

408 Si voluntas hominis immobiliter (seu infallibiliter) movetur a Deo sequitur quod homo non habeat liberam electionem suorum actuum. De malo, q. 6, a. l, ad 3.

409 Deus movet quidem voluntatem immutabiliter propter efficaciam virtutis moventis quae deficere non potest; sed propter naturam voluntatis motae, quae indifferenter se habet ad diversa, non inducitur necessitas, sed manet libertas. Ibid.

410 You may note that he does not say: By reason of His divine prevision of our consent411 Si ex intentione Dei moventis est quod homo, cujus cor movet, gratiam (sanctificantem) consequatur, infallibiliter ipsam consequitur. Ia IIae, q. 112, a. 3.

412 John 2: 4413 Intelligitur hora passionis sibi, non ex necessitate, sed secundum divinam providentiam determinata

414 On John 7: 30

415 Cf. also on John 13: 1 and 17: 1

416 Ps. 134: 6

417 Quidquid perfectionis est

418 Motio divina perfecte praescindit a malitia actus mali

419 Nihil est magis praecisivum quam objectum formale alicujus potentiae

420 Ia, q. 20, a. 3, 4; q. 21, a. 4

421 For more extended treatment, see our articles in Dict. de theol. cath.: s. v. Providence, cols. 998-1023; Predestination, cols. 2940-59, 2984-3022.

422 Ia, q. 2, a. 3423 Ia, q. 22, a. 1.

424 Ibid.: ad 1

425 Matt. 10: 29 ff

426 Ia, q. 22, a. 2

427 Ia, q. 14, a. 11

428 Ia, q. 22, a. 2, ad 2.

429 Ia, q. 19, a. 8;q. 22, a. 4430 Rom. 8: 28431 Extended treatment will be found in Dict. de theol. cath.: s. v. Predestination, cols. 2940-59, 2984-3022

432 John 17: 12

433 John 10: 27-29

434 Matt. 22: 14.

435 I Cor. 4: 7.

436 Phil. 2: 13437 Eph 1: 4-6438 Rom. 8: 28-30439 Cf. Eph. 1: 14; I Cor. 4: 7; Rom. 9: 15 f.

440 Chaps. 9-11441 Rom. 9: 14-16442 Rom. 11: 33-36

443 Praedestinatio est praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur quicumque liberantur. De dono perseverantiae chap. 14

444 De praedestinatione sanctorum, chap. 10

445 Rom. 9: 22 f.

446 John 6: 44447 In Jo.: tr. 26. Quare hunc trahat et illum non trahat, noli velle dijudicare si non vis errare

448 If thou hast received, why glory? I Cor. 4: 7. God worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish. Phil. 2: 13.

449 John 15: 5. Without Me you can do nothing.

450 Ia, q. 23, a. 5. Quidquid est in homine ordinans ipsum in salutem, comprehenditur totum sub effectu praedestinationis, etiam ipsa praeparatio ad gratiam451 Ia, q. 20, a. 3452 Ia, q. 23, a. 4453 Non praecipitur aliquid ordinandum in finem, nisi praeexistente voluntate finis

454 Ia, q. 23, a. 5

455 Ibid.: ad 3

456 Ia, q. 23, a. 5. ad 3

457 In his quae ex gratia dantur, potest aliquis pro libito suo dare cui vult plus vel minus, dummodo nulli subtrahat debitum absque praejudicio justitiae. Et hoc est quod dicit paterfamilias: Tolle quod tuum est, et vade; an non licet mihi quod volo facere?

458 Matt. 20: 14f459 Deus auxilians460 Cf. IIa IIae, q. 18, a. 4461 Ia, q. 25, a. 1.

462 Ia, q. 46, a. 2.

463 Ex nihilo sui et subjecti

464 Ia, q. 46, a. 1, 2, 5.

465 Ibid.: a. 5466 Disp. met.: XX, 1, 2, 3.

467 Cf. Ia, q. 44, a. 2.

468 Met.: V (IV): 2469 Ia, q. 44, a. 5, ad 3470 Cf. the twenty-fourth Thomistic thesis471 Elevations sur les mysteres, IIIe sernaine, le elev.: against Leibnitz, Theod.: §8

472 Cont. Gent.: II, 22-24, 26-30; III, 98 f. ; De potentia, q. 6; Ia, q. 105, a. 6

473 Theod.: §8.

474 Ia, q. 25, a. 5.

475 Dum Deus calculat fit mundus476 Ia, q. 25, a. 6, ad 1477 Qualibet re a se facta potest facere aliam meliorem.

478 Ia, q. 46, a. 2.

479 Cf. Cont. Gent.: II, 34, and especially 38.

480 Ibid.: 31-37481 Novitas divini effectus absque novitate actionius divinae. Cf. ibid.: Bk. II, 35; Ia, q. 46, a. 1, ad 9482 Ia q. 104

483 Cf. N. del Prado, De veritate fundamentali philosophiae christianae, 1911, pp. 404-15.

484 Ia, q. 104, a. 1, ad 4.

485 Ia, q. 8, a. 1486 Isa. 26: 12487 Acts 17: 28.

488 I Cor. 12: 6.

489 Ia, q. 105, a. 5490 Ibid491 Cf. Cont. Gent.: III, 67.

492 Sic ergo Deus est causa actionis cujuslibet in quantum dat virtutem agendi, et in quantum conservat eam, et in quantum applicat actioni, et in quantum ejus virtute omnia alia virtus agit. De potentia, q. 3, a. 7.

493 Ibid.: ad 7: Rei naturali conferri non potuit quod operaretur absque operatione divina.

494 Cf. the twenty-fourth Thomistic thesis495 Concordia, ed. Paris, 1876, p. 152: Duo sunt quae mihi difficultatem pariunt circa doctrinam hanc D. Thomae. Primum est, quod non videam quidnam sit motus ille et applicatio in causis secundis qua Deus illas ad agendum moveat et applicet

496 Ibid.: p. 158: non secus ac cum duo trahunt navim

497 Disp. met.: XXII, sect. 2, no. 51; sect. 3, no. 12; sect. 4.

498 For extended treatment, see our article in Dict. de theol. cath.: s. v. Premotion, cols. 31-77.

499 Cont. Arianos, I, 14, 16, 25, 27; III, 6; II, 24500 St. Athanasius, Epist. ad Serapionem, I, 23 ff. ; III, 1-5.

501 Omnia per ipsum (Verbum) facta sunt. St. John's prologue. Thus similarly in St. Paul's epistles

502 De Trinitate

503 Ibid.: Bks. IX and X

504 Ibid.: V, 5, 16, 17

505 See especially ibid.: XV, 10-16

506 Ibid.: Bks. IX and X; XV, 17-28

507 Ibid.: Bk. V (in toto) and XV, chaps. 4, 5, where he speaks thus: Demonstratur non omne quod de Deo dicitur secundum substantiam dici, sed dici etiam relative, id est, non ad se, sed ad aliquid, quod ipse non est.

508 Ad Filium, ad Patrem. Ad Patrem et Filium. Ibid.: V, 16, 17. Cf. J. Tixeront, Hist. des dogmes, II, 364-66

509 See Denz.: nos. 19, 77, 254, 281, 284, 421, 428

510 De Trin.: VI 2

511 Ia, q. 39, a. 7, 8; q. 46, a. 3; q. 4s, a. 6, ad 2

512 In Deo omnia sunt unum et idem ubi non obviat relationis oppositio. Denz.: no. 703

513 Cf. T. de Regnon, Etudes positive sur le mystere de la Trinite, 1892-98 I, 303 ff.

514 Ia, q. 34, a. 1, ad 3515 Ia, q. 37. a. 1516 Ia, q. 32, a. 1.

517 Ia, q. 26-43518 Secundum emanationem intelligibilem Verbi intelligibilis a dicente. Ia, q. 27, a. 1

519 Ibid.: ad 2.

520 IV, II. Quanto aliqua natura est altior, tanto id quod ex ea emanat est magis intimum521 Deus verus de Deo vero522 Bonum est esssentialiter diffusivum sui.

523 Ia, q. 28, a. 5, ad 2; IIIa, q. 1, a. 1.

524 Ps. 2: 7; Heb. 1: 5

525 Ia, q. 27, a. 2.

526 John 1: 18.

527 Cf. Cont. Gent.: IV; also John of St. Thomas, In Iam, q. 27, a. 2528 Ia, q. 27, a. 3529 Ibid.: a. 4530 Amor meus, pondus meum (Augustine).

531 Ia, q. 27, a. 5.

532 Ia, q. 34, a. 1, ad 3533 Ia, q. 37, a. 1

534 Ia q. 28, a. 1

535 IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 3

536 Esse accidentis est inesse

537 De mysterio SS. Trinitatis III, 5. See N. del Prado, De verit. fund.: phil. christianae, 1911, pp. 537-44

538 In divinis est unum esse tantum

539 Est unum esse in Christo. IIIa, q. 17, a. 2

540 Ia, q. 28, a. 3

541 In Deo omnia sunt idem, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio. Denz.: no. 703

542 Ia, q. 28, a. 3, ad 1

543 De myst. SS. Trin.: IV, 3.

544 IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 3.

545 See N. del Prado, op. oit.: pp. 529-44

546 See also I. Billot, De Trinitate, epilogue; regarding the difference between St. Thomas and Scotus, see Cajetan, In Iam, q. 28, a. 2.

547 Ia, q. 28, a. 4548 St. Thomas analyzes this definition. Ia, q. 29, a. 1

549 Ibid.: a. 2

550 Ibid.: a. 3.

551 Ibid.: a. 4552 De potentia, q. 9, a. 4: Persona nihil aliud est quam distinctum relatione subsistens in essentia divina. Cf. Ia, q. 40, a. 1553 In Iam, q. 39, a. 1, no. 7554 Formaliter eminenter555 Ia, q. 40, a. 4; q. 41

556 Ia, q. 40, a. 4, ad 2; and sed contra

557 Ibid.: corpus in fine

558 Ia, q. 41, a. 1.

559 Ibid.: a. 2560 Ut est in Patre561 Per unicam spirationem562 Ia, q. 41, a. 5; q. 36, a. 4563 Denz.: no. 432: Non est essentia vel natura quae generat, sed Pater per naturam

564 Potentia generandi significat in recto naturam divinam et in obliquo relationem paternitaus. Cf. Ia, q. 41, a. 5

565 John 17: 10

566 John 17: 21

567 Ia, q. 32, a. 1

568 Denz.: no. 1861

569 In necessariis ex reali possibilitate sequitur existentia

570 Aut falsae aut non necessariae. St. Thomas, In Boetium de Trinitate, a. 3

571 Possibilitas et a fortiori existentia mysteriorum supernaturalium non probatur, nec improbatur, sed suadetur et defenditur contra negantes

572 In the prologue of his Gospel

573 Principium non de principio. Ia, q. 33

574 Ia, a. 4s, a. 6, ad 2

575 Ia, q. 34, 35

576 Ia, q. 36, 37, 38.

577 Rom 5: 5578 See Ia, q. 43579 John 14: 23.

580 Cf. John 14: 16, 26; I John 4: 9-16; Rom. 5: 5; I Cor. 3: 16; 6: 19581 See John of St. Thomas, In Iam, q. 43, a. 3, disp. XVII, nos. 8-10; also p. A. Gardeil, La structure de l'ame et l'experience mystique, 1927, II, 7-60582 Ia, q. 43, a. 3

583 Ibid

584 IIa IIae q. 45, a. 2.

585 Rom. 8: 14586 IIa IIae, q. 45, a. 2: Rectum judicium habere de rebus divinis secundum quamdarn connaturalitatem ad ipsas pertinet ad sapientiam, quae est donum spiritus sancti587 Non qualiscumque cognitio sulficit ad rationem missionis (et habitationis) divinae personae, sed solum illa quae accipitur ex aliquo dono appropriato personae, per quod efficetur in nobis conjunctis ad Deum, secundum modum proprium illius personae, scilicet per amorem quando Spiritus Sanctus datur, unde cognitio ista est quasi experimentalis. In I Sent.: dist. XIV, q. 2, a. 2, ad a, ad 3

588 John 14: 26

589 I Cor. 3: 16

590 On this Thomistic doctrine concerning the indwelling of the Trinity, we commend especially John of St. Thomas, Ia, q. 43, a. 3

591 Filiatio adoptiva est quaedam participata similitudo filiationis naturalis; sed fit in nobis appropriate a Patre, qui est principium naturalis filiationis, et per donum Spiritua Sancti, qui est amor Patris et Filii. IIIa, q. 3, a. 5, ad 2

592 Adoptatio licet sit communis toti Trinitati, appropriatur tamen Patre ut auctori, Filio ut exemplari, Spiritui Sancto ut imprimenti in nobis similitudinem hujus exemplaris. IIIa, q. a3, a. 2, ad 3

593 Col. 1: 116; 2: 10; Rom. 8: 38.

594 De civ. Dei, VII, 9: Bonam voluntatem quis fecit in angelis, nisi ille qui eos... creavit, simul in eis condens naturam et largiens gratiam595 Scotus, De rerum principio, q. 7, 8; Opus Oxon.: dist. III, q. 5, 6, 7, etc. Cf. Suarez, De angelis

596 Ia, q. 50, a. 1, 2

597 Ia, q 54, a. 1, 2, 3

598 Ia, q. 50. a. 4.

599 Ipsum esse irreceptum est subsistens et unicum. Ia, q. 7, a1; q. 11, a. 3600 Ia, q. 12, a. 4601 Ia, q. 55, a. 3602 Ia, q. 58, a. 3603 Componendo et dividendo

604 Ia, q. 58, a. 4.

605 Ia, q. 57, a. 3, 4, 5606 Nihil volitum nisi praecognitum ut conveniens, et nihil praevolitum nisi praecognitum ut convenientius hic et nunc607 Ia, q. 60, a. 5.

608 Ia, q. 63, a. 1, ad 3;De malo, q. 16, a. 3609 Ia, q. 62, a. 4, 5; q. 63, a. 5, 6

610 Ia, q. 64, a. 2.

611 De civ. Dei, XII, 9. Cf. Ia, q. 62, a. 3.

612 Ia, q. 64, a. 1, ad 4613 Angelus post primum actum caritatis quo beatitudinem (supernaturalem) meruit, statim beatus fuit. Ia, q. 62, a. 5.

614 This instant is already the one unique instant of eternity615 Ia, q. 63, a. 3616 Cf. De ver..: q. 29, a. 7, ad 5617 IIIa, q. 59, a. 6618 See Cajetan, Banez, John of St. Thomas, the Carmelites of Salamanca, Gonet, and Billuart619 Cf. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et l'Averoisme latin au XIIIe siecle, and ed.: Louvain, 1908-10. Introd. and chap. 6; also Denifle, Chartularium univ. parisien.: I, 543

620 De anima, III, Venice, 1550, p. 165.

621 De unitate intellectus contra averroistas

622 In De anima intellectiva

623 Mandonnet, op. cit.: pp. 112 ff

624 Ia, q. 75.

625 Ibid.: a. 5626 See the saint's commentaries on Aristotle, Met.: 1, lect. 10; III, lect. 7; VI, lect. I; VIII, lect. I; XII, lect. 2.

627 Ia, q. 75, a. 2

628 Ibid.: a. 6

629 Ibid. Intellectus apprehendit esse absolute et secundum omne tempus. Unde omne habens intellectum desiderat esse semper. Naturale autem desiderium non potest esse inane. Omnis igitur intellectualis substantia est incorruptibilis

630 Id quod operatur independenter a materia, paritcr est et fit seu potius producitur independenter a materia. Ia, q. 118, a. 2.

631 Ia, q. 12, a. 4, ad 3632 See Ia, q. 85, a. 7, for proof that the soul of man is specifically distinct from the angels

633 Per se subsistit anima humana quae, cum subjecto sufficienter disposito potest infundi, a Deo creatur, et sua natura incorruptibilis est atque immortalis.

634 Immaterialitatem necessario sequitur intellectualitas, et ita quidem ut secundum gradus elongationis a materia, sint quoque gradus intellectualitatis

635 Disp. met.: V, 5; XXX, 14, 15

636 Ia, q. 76

637 Sequitur quod Socrates non sit unum simpliciter nec ens simpliciter

638 Ia, q. 76, a. 1

639 Ibid

640 Ibid.: ad 5

641 Ibid.: ad 6

642 Ibid.: a. 2

643 Ibid.: a. 2, ad 1, 2

644 Like a company of soldiers. [Tr. ] Ibid.: a. 3, 4

645 Ibid.: a. 4: Forma substantialis dat esse simpliciter

646 Ex actu et actu non fit unum per se in natura

647 Ex potentia essentialiter ordinata ad actum et ex actu potest fieri aliquid per seunum, ut ex materia et forma. Cf. Cajetan, In Iam, q. 76, a. 3

648 Ibid

649 We hear at times the expression: The human soul is only virtually sensitive and vegetative. The expression would be correct if used of God who causes these qualities. But God, since He cannot be the form of our body, cannot be, like the soul, formally vegetative and sensitive

650 Ia, q. 77, a. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6

651 Ia, q. 76, a. 5

652 Eadem anima rationalis ita unitur corpori, ut sit ejusdem forma substantialis unica, et per ipsam habet homo ut sit homo ut anirnal et vivens et corpus et substantia et ens. Tribuit igitur anima homini omnem gradum perfectionis essentialem; insuper cornmuni. cat corpori actum essendi, quo ipsa est

653 Disp. met.: XIII. 13, 14.

654 See especially Cajetan, In Iam, q. 75, 76, where with great penetration he defends the doctrine of St. Thomas against Scotus. All conclusions of St. Thomas follow from the principles of Aristotle655 Ia, q. 77 ff

656 De tribus principiis doctrinae sancti Thomae. The first fundamental truth he formuLates thus: Ens est transcendens seu analogum. The second thus: Deus est actus purus

657 Relativum spccificatur ab absoluto ad quod essentialiter ordinatur.

658 A. Reginald did not get to write this third part of his work659 Ia, q. 54, a. 1, 2, 3; q. 77, A. 1, 2, 3.

660 Disp. met.: XIV, 5661 Ia, q. 77, a. 4, 5; q. 79662 Ia, q. 80, a. 2663 Ia, q 77, A. 5.

664 IA, q. 84-88.

665 Ia, q. 83; Ia IIae, q. 10 a. 1, 2, 3, 4.

666 Concordia, q. 14, a. 13, disp. II, init.: Paris, 1876, p. 10. Illud agens liberum dicitur quod positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum potest agere et non agere667 Op.: cit.: pp. 318, 356, 459, 550, etc.

668 Si proponatur voluntati aliquod objectum, quod non secundum quamlibet considerationem sit bonum non ex necessitate voluntas fertur in illud. Ia IIae, q. 10, a. 2

669 Libertas est indifferentia dominatrix voluntatis erga objectum a ratione propositum ut non ex omni parte bonum

670 De ver.: q. 22, a. 5

671 Intellectum sequitur, non praecedit, voluntas, quae necessario appetit id quod sibi praesentatur tamquam bonum ex omni parte explens appetitum; sed inter plura bona, quae judicio mutabili appetenda proponuntur, libere eligit. Sequitur proinde electio judicium practicum ultimum at quod sit ultimum voluntas efficit.

672 Disp. met.: XIX. 6673 Qualis unusquisque est talis finis videtur ei conveniens674 Dieu, son existence et sa nature, 6th ed.: pp. 590-657

675 Ia, q. 89

676 Cf. Ia, q. 76, a. 2, ad 2; q. 118, a. 3; Cont. Gent.: II, 75, 80, 81, 83

677 Quod potest compleri et explicari per pauciora principia, non fit per plura

678 Ia, q. 51, a. 1; q. 55, a. 2; q. 76, a. 5

679 Suppl q. 75

680 De potentia, q. 6, a. 7, ad 4

681 Ia, q. 89

682 Ibid.: a. 2

683 Ibid.: a. 8.

684 Cf. Cont. Gent.: IV, 95.

685 Ia, q. 93686 Bk. II, dist. XX, q. 2, a. 3. Alii vero dicunt quod homo in gratia creatus est, et secundum hoc videtur quod donum gratuitae justitiae ipsi humanae naturae collatum sit; unde cum transfusione naturae etiam infusa fuisset gratia

687 In II Sent.: dist. XXIX, q. 1, a. 2.

688 De malo, q. 4, a. 2, ad 17: Originalis justitia includit gratiam gratum facientem, nec credo verum esse quod homo sit creatus in naturalibus puris

689 q. 5, a. 1, ad 13: (Juxta quosdam) gratia gratum faciens non includitur in ratione originalis justitiae, quod tamen credo esse falsum, quia cum originalis justitia primordialiter consistat in subjectione humanae mentis ad Deum, quae firma esse non potest nisi per gratiam, justitia originalis sine gratia esse non potuit

690 Ia, q. 95, a. 1

691 Deus fecit hominem rectum. Eccles. 7: 30

692 Cum radix originalis justitiae, in cujus rectitudine factus est homo, consistat in subjectione supernaturali rationis ad Deum, quod est per gratiam gratum facientem, ut supra dictum est, necesse est dicere, quod si pueri nati fuissent in originali justitia etiam nati fuissent cum gratia. Non tamen fuisset per hoc gratia naturalis, quia non fuisset transfusa per virtutem seminis, sed fuisset collata homini statim cum habuisset animam rationalem. Ia, q. 100, a. 1, ad 2

693 Originalis justitia pertinebat primordialiter ad essentiam animae. Erat enim donum divinitus datum humanae naturae, quod per prius respicit essentiam animae quam potentias. Ia IIae, q. 83, a. 2, ad 2

694 Sanctifying grace is the only infused habit in the soul's essence.

695 See Capreolus, In II Sent.: dist. XXXI, a. 3; Cajetan, In Iam IIae q. 83, a. 2, ad 2; Ferrariensis, In Cont. Gent.: IV, 52; Soto, the Salmanticenses, Gonet, Billuart, etc

696 IIIa, q. 59, q. 1. 2, 3.

697 Mors animae. Denz.: no. 175698 Sess. V, can. 2 (Denz.: no. 789).

699 Cf. Acta Conc. Trid.: ed. Ehses, p. 208. See also the preparatory schema for the Vatican Council: Collectio Lacensis pp. 517, 549. Likewise Dict. de theol. cath.: s. v. Justice originelle

700 Totum genus hurnanum in sua radice et in suo capite (Deus) primitus elevavit ad supernaturalem ordinem gratiae... nunc vero Adae posteri ea privati sunt. Coll. Lac.: p. 549

701 Ia IIae, q. 80, a. 1: Sic igitur inordinatio, quae est in isto homine ex Adam generato, non est voluntaria voluntate ipsius, sed voluntate primi parentis

702 Ut dotes naturae. Cf. Ia IIae, q. 81, a. 3; also Billot, S. J.: De personali et originali peccato, 4th ed.: 1910, pp. 139-81; Hugon, O. P.: Tract. dogm.: I, 795, I, 795; De hom. prod. et elev.: II, 1-42

703 Aliquid unum per se in natura

704 Humana natura traducitur a parente in filium per traductionem carnis cui postmodum anima infunditur; et ex hoc infectionem incurrit quod fit cum carne traducta una natura. Si enim uniretur ci non ad constituendam naturam, sicut angelus unitur corpori assumpto, infectionem non reciperet. De potentia, q. 3, a. 9, ad 3; cf. De malo, q. 4, a. 1, ad 2.

705 Cf. Cont. Gent.: IV, 95706 Nulla creatura est suum esse, sed habet esse707 IIIa, q. 1.

708 Cajetan, In IIIam, q. 1, a. 1709 IIIa, q. 1, a. 3710 Vi praesentis decreti

711 Ubique ratio incarnationis ex peccato primi hominis assignatur

712 For example, Matt. 18: 11; I Tim. 1: 15; John 3: 17.

713 Luke 19: 10.

714 Si homo non periisset, Filius hominis non venisset. Serm. 174, no. 2. Cf. St. Irenaeus, Contr. haer.: V, xiv, 1; St. John Chrysostom, In Ep. ad Hebraeos, hom. 5, no. 1

715 In carne passibili

716 De incarn.: disp. V, sect. 2, no. 13; sect. 4, no. 17

717 Ia, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1

718 See note 8 supra

719 Ordinate volens prius vult finem et propinquiora fini, quam alia

720 Gonet, Godoi, the Salmanticenses, I. Billot, Hugon, etc.

721 In IIIam, q. 1, a. 3.

722 Finis cujus gratia723 Finis cui (proficua est incarnatio).

724 Finis cui725 Causae ad invicem sunt causae, sed in diverso genere

726 Godoi, Gonet, the Salmanticenses. See Capreolus, In IIIam Sent.: dist. T, q. 1, a. 3; Cajetan, In Iam, q. 22, a. 2, no. 7.

727 Nihil prohibet ad aliquid majus humanam naturam perductam esse post peccatum. Deus enim permittit mala fieri ut inde aliquid melius eliciat. Unde dicitur (Rom. 5: 20): Ubi abundavit delictum, superabundavit et gratia. Unde et in benedictione cerei paschalis dicitur: O felix culpa, quac talem ac tantum meruit habere redemptorem. IIIa, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3

728 Deus qui maxime parcendo et miserando omnipotentiam tuam manifestas

729 cf. IIa IIae, q. 30, a. 4.

730 Finis cui731 Finis cujus gratia732 Omnia enim vestra sunt, vos autem Christi, Christus autem Dei. I Cor. 3: 23733 Ia, q. 20, a. 4, ad 1734 See Isa. 9: 5 ff

735 Phil. 2: 8-10

736 Persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia

737 Ia, q. 29, a. 1

738 Sui juris

739 Suppositum, substantia prima

740 Ia, q. 29, a. 1, ad 2.

741 John 14: 6742 John 16: 15.

743 In IIIam Sent.: dist. 1, q. 1, no. 5

744 Disp. met.: disp. XXXIV, sect. 1, 2, 4; De incarn.: disp. XI, sect. 3.

745 In IIIam, q. 4, a. 2, no. 8746 Sylvester de Ferraris, Victoria, Banez, John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, the Complutenses Abbreviati, Goudin, Gonet, Billuart, Zigliara, del Prado, Sanseverino, the three cardinals Mercier, Lorenzelli, and Lepicier; Gardeil, Hugon, Gredt, etc

747 In quo natura singularis fit immediate capax existentiae, seu id quo aliquid est quod est

748 Ut est sub uno esse.

749 De Verbo incarnato, 5th ed.: pp. 75, 84, 137, 140.

750 See note 1751 Post analyt.: II, 12, 13, 14752 Scotus. See note 8753 Natura haec754 See IIIa, q. 2, ad. 2.

755 Sub suo esse756 Cf Cont. Gent.: II, 52757 IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 1: Esse consequitur naturam non sicut habentem esse, sed qua aliquid est; personam autem sequitur tamquam habentem esse

758 Cont. Gent.: II, 52: In omni creatura differt quod est (suppositum, persona) et esse

759 Ut sit immediate capax existendi in se et separatim

760 As Suarez holds

761 Aliquid unum per se ut natura

762 Ad aliquid unum per se ut suppositum

763 Post. analyt.: I, 4; comment.: lect. 10

764 Ia, q. 39, a. 3. ad 4

765 I Sent.: dist. XXIII, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4: Nomen personae imponitur a forma personalitatis quae dicit rationem subsistendi naturae tali. Cf. I Sent.: dist. IV, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4.

766 IIIa, a. 4, a. 2, ad 3: Si natura non esset assumpta a divina persona, natura humana767 See note 22768 Ibid.: ad 3.

769 Esse non est de ratione suppositi (creati): Quodl. II, q. 2, a. 4, ad 2.

770 Principium quod existit et operatur771 Alter ego772 John 8: 58; 10: 30; 16: 15773 IIIa, q. 2. a. 2.

774 Ibid.: a. 6, ad 2775 Ibid.: a. 2, ad 2, 3776 Cf. Ia, q. 29, a. 3.

777 IIIa, q. 2, a. 2, 6778 Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, Le Sauveur, Paris, 1933, pp. 92-129779 In III Sent.: dist. II, q. 2, a. 2; q. 3: Sciendum est quod in unione humanae naturae ad divinarn nihil potest cadere medium unionem causans, cui per prius humana natura conjungatur quam divinae personae; sicut enim inter materiam et formam nihil cadit medium... ita etiam inter naturam et suppositum non potest aliquid dicto modo medium cadere.

780 Ibid.: q. 2, a. 9.

781 See IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, and the commentators

782 Ibid.: Impossibile est quod unius rei not sit unum esse

783 Cf. q. 2. a. 2, ad 2

784 IIIa, q. 17, a. 2.

785 See note 47786 Principium quod787 IIIa, q. 7, a. 1.

788 Denz.: no. 224. IIIa, q. 7, a. 10-12789 See St. John's Gospel: 1: 18; 3: 11, 13; 8: 55; 17: 22

790 IIIa, q. 9, a. 2

791 Gratia capitis

792 Cf. Gonet, Clypeus, De incarn.: disp. XXII, a. 3; Hugon, O. P.: De Verbo incarn.: 5th ed.: 1927, p. 631. See also IIIa, q. 22, a. 2, ad 3; Bossuet, Elevations XIIIe sem.: 1st and 6th elevation

793 Latria: the adoration due to God alone. IIIa, q. 25, a2

794 IIIa, q. 58, a. 3; q. 59, a. 1, 2, 6.

795 Pius XI, Quas primas, December 11, 1925 Cf. Denz.: no. 2194796 IIIa, q. 24797 Ibid.: a. 4; De ver.: q. 29, a. 7, ad 8; in joan.: 17: 24

798 IIIa, q. 48, a. 2: IIIe proprie satisfacit pro offensa, qui exhibet offenso id quod aeque vel magis diligit quam oderit offensam. Christus autem, ex caritate et obedientia patiendo, majus aliquid Deo exhibuit, quam exigeret recompensatio totius offensae humani generis

799 Cf. Salmanticenses, De incarn.: disp. XXVIII, de merito Christi, 2; John of St. Thomas, disp. XVII, a. 2; Gonet, De incarn.: disp. XXI, a. 4; Billuart, etc

800 Gutta Christi sanguinis modica, propter unionem ad Verbum, pro redemptione totius humani generis suffecisset. sic est infinitus thesaurus hominibus... propter infinita Christi merita. Denz. nos. 550ff. ; IIIa, q. 46, a. 5, ad 3

801 IIIa, q. 18, a. 4; John of St. Thomas, De incarn.: XVI, a. 1; the Salmanticenses, Gonet, Billuart, etc.

802 Libertas a necessitate803 Libertas a coactione804 Vol. II, cols. 142 ff.

805 John 10: 17 ff. ; 14: 31; 15: 10.

806 Phil. 2: 8; cf. Rom. 5: 19807 IIIa, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3808 As when He prayed: Father, let this chalice pass from Me. [Tr. ] to that object was free, even while He responded sinlessly, without any deviation

809 IIIa, q 18, a. 4, ad 3: Voluntas Christi, licet sit determinata ad bonum, non tamen est determmata ad hoc vel illud bonum. Et ideo pertinet ad Christum eligere per liberum arbitrium confirmatum in bono, sicut ad beatos

810 For detailed exposition, see our work Le Sauveur et son amour pour nous, 1933, pop. 204-18

811 IIIa, q. 46, a. 6, 7, 8.

812 Cf. Salmanticenses, De incarn.: disp. XVII, dub. 4, no. 47

813 IIIa, q. 46, a. 8 corp. and ad 1

814 Cf. Compend. theol. chap. 232

815 IIIa q. 48

816 Ibid.: a. 1

817 Ibid.: a. 2

818 Sacerdos et hostia

819 IIIa, q. 48, a. 3

820 Empti enim estis pretio magno: I Cor. 6: 20. Ibid.: a. 4

821 Ibid.: a. 5.

822 Ibid.: a. 6, ad 3823 Ibid.: a. 2824 Ibid.: a. 5825 IIIa, q. 27, a. 2, ad 2826 IIIa, q. 46, a. 3, 4; q. 47, a. 2, 3827 John 15: 13828 Phil. 2: 8.

829 IIIa, q. 17, a. 2

830 IIIa q. 27-30; Commentaries of Cajetan, Nazarius, J. M. Voste (1940). Cf. Contenson, Theol. mentis et cordis, Bk. X, diss. 6; N. del Prado, S. Thomas et bulla ineffabilis, 1919; E. Hugon, Tractatus theol.: II, 716-95, sth ed.: 1927; G. Friethoff, De alma socia Christi mediatoris, 1936; B. H. Merkelbach, Mariologia, 1939; Garrigou-Lagrange, La Mere du Sauveur et notrc vie inte'rieure, 1941

831 IIIius Virginis primordia quae uno eodemque decreto cum divinae Sapientiae incarnatione fuerunt praestituta

832 In signo priori

833 Cf. Contenson, Hugon, Merkelbach, loc. cit. 5 Rom. 5: 20

834 Rom. 5: 20

835 IIIa, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3

836 IIIa, q. 2, a. 11, ad 3

837 In III Sent.: d. IV, q. 3, a. 1, ad 6. B. Virgo non muerit incarnationem, sed suppositaincarnatione meruit quod per eam fieret, non quidem merito condigni, sed merito congrui. Cf. Sylvius, BIIIuart, and Contenson, loc. cit

838 Second and Third Councils of Constantinople

839 Ia, q. 25, a. 6, ad 4: Beata Virgo, ex hoc quod est mater Dei habet quamdam dignitatem ex bono infinito quod est Deus; et ex hac parte non potest aliquid fieri melius sicut Lon potest aliquid esse melius Deo

840 IIa IIae, q. 103, a. 4, ad 2.

841 Dulia: the cult due to any saint842 Ripalda and Vega

843 With the Salmanticenses and Contenson

844 See Contenson, loc. cit.: IIa praerogativa; also Hugon and Merkelbach, loc. cit

845 Luke 11: 28

846 IIIa q. 30, a. 1

847 Cf. Hugon, loc. cit.: p. 734; M. J. Nicolas, "Le concept integral de la maternite divine" in Rev. thom.: 1937; Merkelbach, op. cit.: pp. 74-92, 297 ff

848 Suarez, Vasquez, the Salmanticenses, Gonet, Mannens, Pesch, Van Noort, Terrien

849 p. cit.: pp. 736 ff

850 Op. Cit.: pp. 64 ff.

851 Nude spectata852 S, Capponi a Porrecta (died 1614): John of St. Thomas (died 1644): Curs. theol.: Spada, Rouart de Card, Berthier; in our days N. del Prado, Divus Thomas et bulla init. ; De approbatione doctrinae S. Thomae, d. II, a. 2; Noel Alexander; more recently, Ineffabilis Deus, 1919; Th. Pegues, Rev. thom.: 1909, pp. 83-87; E. Hugon, op. cit.: p. 748, p. Lumbreras, Saint Thomas and the Immaculate Conception, 1923; C. Frietoff, "Quomodo caro B. M. V. in peccato originali concepta fuerit" in Angelicum, 1933, pp. 32144; J. M. Voste, Comment. in III p. Summae theol. s. Thomae; De mysteriis vitae Christi, 2nd ed.: 1940, pp. 13-20

853 Perrone, Palmieri, Hurter, Cornoldi

854 Among them we note: Suarez, Chr. Pesch.: I. BIIIot, I. Jannsens, Al. Lepicier, B. H. Merkelbach, op. cit.: pp. 127-30

855 Dict.. de theol. cath.: s. v. Freres Precheurs

856 See note 23.

857 1253-54858 In Iam Sens.: dist. XLIV, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3.

859 Rom. 5: 18860 Debitum culpae861 IIIa, q. 33, a. 2.: ad 3.

862 cito post: Quodl. VI, q. 5, a. 1

863 See note 23.

864 See note 23865 IIIa, q. 27, a. 2, ad 2.

866 In IIIum, dist. III, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2.

867 In particular, Del Prado and Hugon.

868 Op. Cit.: pp. 129 ff869 Quodl. VI q. 5, a. 1.

870 Op. cit.: 2nd ed.: 1940, p. 18871 See note 29.

872 On Ps. 14: 2873 Ps 18: 6.

874 Cant 4: 7.

875 Comp. theol.: chap. 224876 Exposition Salutationis Angelicae, Piacenza, 1931 (a critical edition, by F. Rossi, C. M. )

877 April, 1273878 Cf. C. Frietoff, loc. Cit.: p. 329; Mandonnet in Bulletin thomiste, January-March, Notes and communications, pp. 164-67

879 op. cit.: 2nd ed.: 1940, p. 19.

880 In 1254, twenty years before his death. See note 29881 IIIa, q. 27, a. 5882 Ibid.: ad 2.

883 Cf. Contenson, Monsabre, Hugon, Merkelbach

884 Heb. 10: 25 See the saint's commentary

885 Ex opere operato

886 In jure amicabili

887 Benedict XV (Denz.: no. 3034, no. 4): Filium immolavit, ut dici merito queat, ipsam cum Christo humanum genus redemisse.

888 Denz.: no. 3034: B. Maria Virgo de congruo, ut aiunt, promeruit nobis quae Christus de condigno promeruit, estque princeps largiendarum gratiarum ministra

889 Ia IIae, q 114, a. 6

890 Proprie de congruo

891 Lex orandi, lex credendi

892 Traite de la vraie dcvotion a la sainte Vierge

893 IIIa, q. 62, a. 1-5

894 Ibid.: a. 4.

895 Ibid.: a. 5.

896 Instrumentum conjunctum897 Instrumentum separatum898 In IV Sent.: dist. XXVI, q. 2.

899 IIIa, q. 65, a. 1900 IIIa, q. 75 a. 2.901 Ibid.902 In IV, Dist. X, q. 1; dist. XI, q. 3.

903 Bellarmine, De Lugo, Vasquez.904 Part II, chap. 4, nos. 37-39. This catechism was edited by Dominican theologians.905 Denz.: no. 834. Cf. Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, N. del Prado, Billot, Hugon, etc.

906 In IIIam, q. 75, a. 3, no. 8.907 Ut est ex pane.

908 Primum non esse panis.909 Primum esse corporis Christi sub specibus panis. Ibid.: a. 7.

910 Summa, IIIa, q. 75, a. 4, corp. and ad. 3. Cf. Cajetan.911 Ibid.: a. 8.912 Denz. nos. 877, 884.

913 Non sicut in loco, sed per modum substantiae. q. 76, a. 1, 2, 3, 5.

914 IIIa, q. 77, a. 1, 2, 3.

915 IIIa, q. 83, a. 1.

916 Epist. ad Bonifacium.917 Cf. M. Lepin, L'idee du sacrificc de la messe, 2nd ed.: 1926, pp. 38, 51, 84-87, 103, 152.

918 IV Sent.: dist. VIII, no. 2.

919 Cf. Lepin, op. cit.: pp. 158 ff.: 164 ff.

920 See note 1.921 Ad Simplicianum, Bk. II, q. 3.922 IIIa, q. 79, a. 1.923 IIIa, q. 74, a. 1; q. 76, a. 2, ad. 1.

924 Loc. cit.: a. l, 2nd obj.

925 Eph. 5: 2.

926 Opera, II, 183. Cf. Lepin, op. cit.: p. 248.

927 Sess. XXII, chap. 1.928 IIIa, q. 83, a. 1.929 De missae sacrificio et ritu advcrsus Luthcranos, 1531, chap. 6.930 Cursus theol.: De sacramentis, ed. Paris, 1667, XXXII, 285.

931 Cursus theol. (1679-1712, ed. Paris, 1882): tr. 23, disp. 13, dub. 1, no. 2; XVIII, 759.

932 Meditations sur l'Evangile, La Cene, Part 1, 57th day.933 Card. Billot and his followers, Tanquerey, Pegues, Heris, etc.

934 Gonet, Billuart, Hugon.

935 IIIa, q. 48, a. 3, ad 3: Non fuit sacrificium, sed maleficium.936 In genere signi.937 De civ. Dei, X, 5: Sacrificium visibile invisibilis sacrificii sacramentum. This text is often cited by St. Thomas; IIa IIae, q. 81, a. 7; q. 85, a. 2, c. and ad 2.

938 Christum passum.939 Ia, q. 83, a. 1.940 IIa IIae, q. 85, a. 3, ad 3.

941 Sacrum and facere.942 As he does when he says "Oremus."943 Heb. 7: 25.

944 IIIa, q. 82, a. 1.945 Ibid.: a. 7, ad 3; q. 78, a. 1.

946 IIIa, q. 82, a. 4.

947 IIIa, q. 82, a. 5, 6; q. 83, a. 1, ad 3.

948 With Scotus, Amicus, M. de la Taille.

949 Cf. IIIa, q. 62, a. 5.

950 Denz.: no. 940.951 Heb. 7: 25; Rom. 8: 34. Cf. IIa IIae, q. 83, a. 11. Cf. also the Salmanticenses, Cursus thcol.: De euchar. sacramcnto, disp. XIII, dub. 3, nos. 48, 50.

952 De incarn.: disp. XXII, a. 2.

953 Cf. our work, Lc Sauveur et son amour pour nous, Paris, 1933, pp. 356-85.

954 Cf. the Salmanticenses, De euch.: disp. XIII, dub. 1, no. 107.

955 IIa, q. 85, a. 3, 4; Suppl.: q. 1, a. 1; q. 2, a. l, 2, 3, 4.

956 Sess. XIV, chap. 4.957 Denz.: no. 1207.

958 St. Augustine often sets these two words in mutual opposition.959 Denz.: no. 1305: Attritio, quae gehennae et poenarum metu concipitur, sine benevolentia Dei propter se, non est bonus motus ac supernaturalis.

960 In IIIam, q. 85. See especially his opusculum, De contritione, reprinted in the Leonine edition of the Summa theol.: after Cajetan's cormnentary on the articles of St. Thomas relative to penance.

961 See opusculum, De contritione, q. 1. See also the Salmanticenses, De poenit.: disp. VII, no. 50; Billuart, De poenit.: diss. IV, a. 7; p. J. Perinelle, O. P.: L'attrition d'apres le concile de Trente et d'apres saint Thomas d'Aquin, 1927 (Bibliotheque thomiste, X sect. theol, 1).

962 Attritio pure formidolosa.

963 Ethice bonus.

964 The Council of Trent, Denz.: no. 798. Note also, ibid.: no. 898, that the Council speaks thus in a context which deals explicitly with the difference between attrition and contrition.

965 Loc. cit.: no. 50. See note 7. See also Billuart, De poenit.: diss. IV, a. 7, § 3; also Perinelle, op. cit. This last work is a careful and well constructed study of the acts of the Council of Trent.

966 Sess. VI, chap. 6; Denz.: no. 798.

967 Denz.: no. 898; Sess. XIV, chap. 4. See Perinelle, Op. Cit.

968 See note 12.

969 Sess. XIV, chap. 4.

970 IIIa, q. 85, a. 2, 3; q. 86, a. 3.

971 IIa IIae, q. 23, a. 1.

972 A living together.

973 Semen gloriae.

974 Opusc. De contritione, q. 1.

975 Sess. VI, chap. 6 (see note 12).

976 Sess. VI, can. 16, 26, 32; Denz.: nos. 809, 836, 842.977 Opusc. 5, De meritis mortificatis, disp. II.

978 IIIa, q. 89, a. 5, ad 3.979 Ia IIae q. 52, a. l, 2; q. 66, a. 1.

980 IIIa, q. 89, a. 2.981 Ia IIae, q. 52, a. 1, 2; q. 66, a. 1.982 IIIa, q. 89, a. 5, ad 3.983 De sacramentis, II, 5th ed.: p. 120.984 In IIIam q. 89, a. 1, no. 4.985 De merito disp. V, nos. 5, 6, 8.986 De poenit.: diss. III, a. 5.

987 Thus Cardinal Billot and Father Gardeil, and more recently Ch. Journet, in his work, L'Eglisc du Verbe incarne, Vol. 1, Desclee, De Brouwer (Bruges, 1943).

988 Christus ut caput ecclesiae: IIIa, q. 8.989 Ibid.: a. 3.

990 IIa IIae q. 1, a. 10; q. a, a. 6, ad 3; Quodl. IX, a. 16.

991 Ia IIae q. 60, a. 6, ad 3.992 IIa IIae, q. 10, a10; q. 12, a. 2.

993 Turrecremata, Summa de ecclesia Cf. E. Dublanchy, "Turrecremata, et la pouvoir du pape dans les questions temporelles," in Rev. thom.: 1923, pp. 74-101.

994 Other noteworthy works in this field: Cajetan, De auctoritate papae et concilii; Cano, De locis theologicis. More recently: De Groot, O. P.: Summa de ecclesia, 3rd ed.: Ratisbonne, 1906; Schultes, O. P.: De ecclesia catholica, Paris, 1926; Garrigou-Lagrange, De revelatione per eccl. cath.: proposita, Rome, 3rd ed.: 1935; A. de Poulpiquet, O. P7 L'Eglise catholique, Paris, 1923.

995 Bk. IV, chaps. 91-96. In particular, chap. 95.

996 See, again, in chap. 91: Statim post mortem animae hominum recipiunt pro meritis vel poenam vel praemium.

997 In Iam, q. 64, a. 2, no. 18.

998 In Cont. Gent.: chap. 95.999 De gratia, de merito, disp. 1, dub. IV, 36.1000 John 9: 4. See II Cor. 5: 10.1001 Per primum non esse viae.

1002 Ia IIae, q. 5, a 4.

1003 Ia IIae, q. 1-5.

1004 Cf. A. Gardeil, Dict. theol.: s. v. Beatitude, cols. 510-13.1005 Ia IIae, q. 1.

1006 See our work, Le realisme du principe de finalite, Paris, 1932, pp. 260-85.1007 In Iam IIae, q. 2, a. 7.

1008 Cf. Ia, q. 60, a. 5; IIa IIae, q. 26, a. 4.

1009 Ia IIae, q. 3, a. 4-8.1010 Ibid.: q. 4, a. 1-8. We have treated above the beatific vision (Ia, q. 12, a. 1) and the natural desire, conditioned and inefficacious, to see God without medium.

1011 IIa IIae, q. 6-21; cf. A. Gardeil, Dict. theol. cath.: s. v. Actes humains; Dom Lottin, O. S. B.: "Les elements de la moralite des actes chez saint Thomas" in Rev. neo-scholast.: 1922, 1923.

1012 Ia IIae, q. 8-17.

1013 Primum velle: q. 8, a. 2.

1014 q. 12.1015 q. 11.

1016 q. 15.1017 q. 13.1018 q. 19, a. 3.

1019 q. 19, a. 3.1020 q. 14.1021 q. 13, a. 3; q. 14, a. 6.1022 q. 17.

1023 q. 16, a. 1.

1024 q. 18.

1025 q. 19.1026 q. 20.1027 q. 21.1028 q. 18, a. 2, 3, 4.

1029 Ibid.: a. 8, 9.

1030 Cf. Ia IIae, q. 11I, a. 2.

1031 Ia, q. 79, a. 9, ad 4; IIa IIae, q. 1, a. 4; q. 2, a. 1.

1032 Ia IIae, q. 57, a. 5, ad 3: per conformitatem ad appetitum rectum.1033 In Iam IIae, q. 19, a. 6 (1577).

1034 Dict. de theol. cath.: s. v. Freres Precheurs, col. 919.

1035 Ibid.: s. v. Probabilisme.

1036 Tractatus de conscientia, Paris, ed. by A. Gardeil, O. P.

1037 In dubio standum est pro quo stat praesumptio. Cf. M. Prummer, O. P.: Manuale theol. mor.: Freiburg-in-B.: 1915, I, 198.

1038 As does p. Deman, O. P.: Dict. theol. cath.: s. v. Probabilisme.

1039 Ia IIae q. 57, a. 5, ad 3.

1040 Ibid.: q. 24, a. 3.

1041 Ibid.: q. 26-28.

1042 IIa IIae, q. 184, a. 3.

1043 Ia IIae, q. 49-54.

1044 Objectum quod.

1045 Objectum quo.

1046 For more detailed treatment, see Act. Pont. academiae romanae S. Thomae, 1934, especially our article, "Actus specificantur ab objecto formali," pp. 139-53.

1047 Ia IIae, q. 54, a. 2.

1048 Initium fidei et salutis.

1049 Ia IIae, q. 57.

1050 Recta ratio agibilium.

1051 Recta ratio factibilium.

1052 Ia IIae, q. 58-61.

1053 Ibid.: q. 62.

1054 Ibid.: a. 1.

1055 Ibid.: q. 63, a. 4.

1056 Ibid.

1057 1 Cor. 9:27.1058 Eph. 2:19.1059 In statu virtutis.

1060 Ia IIae, q. 54.

1061 q. 68.1062 Rom. 5:5; q. 68, a. 5.1063 q. 66, a. 2.1064 q. 71-89.1065 q. 79, a 1-4.1066 q. 84.1067 q. 72, a. 1.1068 q. 88, a 1, corp. and ad 1.1069 q. 85-87.1070 q. 89. a. 1.

1071 q. 88. a. 3.1072 q. 87, a. 5.

1073 Cf. the Salmanticenses, Cursus theol.: De peccatis, tr. XIII, disp. XIX, dub. I, nos. 8, 9; De incarn.: in IIIam, q. 15, a. 1, de impeccabilitate Christi.1074 q. 81-82.1075 q. 82, a. 3.

1076 q. 83, a. 2-4. For further detail, see above, where we treated of man and original justice.

1077 q. 90, a. 4.1078 q. 92, a. 2.

1079 q. 93, a. 1.

1080 q. 94, a. 2.1081 q. 106, a. 1.

1082 q. 107.1083 q. 95. a. 3.

1084 q. 96, a. 4.1085 Theod.: II, 176.

1086 See Dict. de theol. cath.: s. v. Gerson.

1087 Ia IIae, q. 109.

1088 Ibid.: a. 1.

1089 Supernaturalis quoad substantiam vel essentiam.1090 Cf. the Salmanticenses, John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Billuart, on Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 1.

1091 IIa IIae, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1.

1092 Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 2.

1093 Ibid.: a. 3.

1094 Cf. Billuart, De gratia, diss. II, a. 3.

1095 q. 109, a. 4.

1096 Ibid.: a. 8.

1097 Ibid.: a. 6; q. 112, a. 3.1098 John 6:44.

1099 Lam. 5:21.

1100 Ia IIae, q. 109, a. 6; q. 112, a. 3.

1101 In Jo.: tr. 26.

1102 q. 109, a. 7.

1103 De dono perseverantiae.1104 II Pet. 1:4.

1105 De amore Dei, q. 20, a. 2.1106 Rom. 5:5.

1107 John 4:14.1108 I John 3:9.1109 Semen gloriae.1110 q. 110, a. 2.1111 Sess. VI, can. 11; chap. 16.

1112 q. 110, a. 1-4; q. 112, a. 1.

1113 Deitas ut sic est super ens et unum, super esse, vivere, intelligere.

1114 See our treatise, "La possibilite de la grace est-elle rigoureusement demontrable? " in Rev. thom.: March, 1936; also our work, Le sens du mystere, Paris, 1937, pp. 224-33.

1115 Ia IIae, q. 113, a. 9, ad 2.

1116 IIa IIae, q. 24, a. 3, ad 2.

1117 Ia IIae, q. 113, a. 3.

1118 Ibid.: a. 4.

1119 Ibid.: q. 111.

1120 Gratiae gratis datae.1121 In I Tim. 2:6.

1122 Ia, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3.

1123 Ia IIae, q. 106, a. 2, ad 2.

1124 Eph. 3:7.

1125 Cf. Ia IIae, q. 109, a. l, 2, 9, 10; q. 113, a. 7, 10.1126 IIa IIae, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1.1127 Ia IIae, q. 79, a 2.1128 Prov. 1:24; cf. Isa. 65:2.

1129 Matt. 23:37.1130 Acts 7:51; cf. II Cor. 6:1.1131 I Tim. 2: 4.1132 Sess. VI, chap. II; Denz.: no. 804.1133 De nat. et gratia, chap. 43, no. 50.1134 Ezech. 36:26-28.1135 Ecclu. 33:13; cf. Esth. 13:9; 14:13.1136 John 10:27.

1137 Phil. 2:13.

1138 Denz.: no. 182.

1139 Ia, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1.

1140 134: 6.1141 Against Gottschalk. Cf. PL, CXXVI, 123.1142 See our work, La predestination des saints et la grace 1936, pp. 257-64, 341-45, 141-69. Cf. "Le fondement supreme de la distinction des deux graces suffisante et efiicace" in Rev. thom.: May-June, 1937; "Le dilemme: Dieu determinant ou determine," Ibid.: 1928, pp. 193-210.

1143 I Cor. 4: 7.

1144 Ia, q. 20, a. 4.1145 Concordia, Paris, 1876, pp. 51, 565, 617ff.

1146 Potentia proxima et expedita.

1147 Cf. Hugon, De gratia, q. 4, no. 9.

1148 De auxiliis, Bk. III, disp. 80. All Thomists, even the most rigorous, agree with him. See Gonet, Clypeus, De vol. Dei, disp. 4, no. 147.1149 Cf N. del Prado, De gratia, 1907, III, 423.

1150 Traite du libre arbitre, chap. 8.

1151 De gratia, diss. V, a. 4.

1152 Cf. Lemos, Panoplia gratiae, Bk. IV, tr. 3, chap. 6, no. 78.1153 Word of St. Prosper, preserved by the Council of Quiersy; Denz.: no. 318.

1154 q. 112, a. 1.

1155 I Kings 7: 3.

1156 q. 112, a. 3.

1157 Ibid.: a. 4.

1158 I Cor. 4:4.

1159 Ia IIae, q. 113.

1160 Ibid.: a. 1.

1161 Ibid.: a. 2.1162 Sess. VI, chap. 7, can 10, 11.1163 Ia Iiae, q. 113, a. 4, 5.1164 Gonet, for example.

1165 Ia IIae, q. 113, a. 8, ad 1, 2.

1166 In diverso genere, causae ad invicem sunt causae. Cf. Arist.: Mct. V, 2; comm. of St. Thomas, lect. 2.

1167 See note 76.1168 Mark 9: 40.1169 Ia IIae, q. 114. Cf. Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, Gotti, Billuart, N. del Prado, Hugon, etc.

1170 Reatus poenae.

1171 q. 114 a. 1-6.

1172 De condigno.

1173 De congruo proprie dictum.

1174 De congruo late dictum.

1175 Ia IIae, q. 114, a. 1.

1176 Ibid.: a. 6.

1177 Ibid.: a. 3.1178 Ia IIae, q. 114.1179 Ibid.: 1-4.

1180 Matt. 5:12.1181 q. 114, a. 1, 3.1182 Ibid.: a. 4.1183 Ibid.: a. 8.1184 Ibid.: a. 5.1185 Ibid.: a. 7.1186 Sess. VI, chap. 13.1187 De dono persev. (chaps. 2, 6, 17). Cf. Rom. 14:4.

1188 q. 114 a. 9.

1189 Council of Trent, Sess. VI, chap. 16, and can. 32.

1190 IIa IIae, q. 1-16.1191 Ibid.: q. 1, a. 1.1192 Veritas prima in dicendo.1193 Veritas prima in intelligendo. See Vatican Council, Sess. III, chap. 3: Auctoritas Dei revelantis.

1194 IIa IIae, q. 1, a. 1.

1195 Ibid.: q. 2, a. 2.

1196 Ibid.: q. 5, a. 1.1197 Ibid.: q. 4, a. 1.

1198 Ibid.: q. 6, a. 1.1199 Ibid.: q. 5, a. 3, ad 1.1200 Ibid.: q. 2, a. 2, ad 3.1201 Credo Deo revelanti.

1202 Credo Deum revelatum.1203 Credo in Deum.1204 IIa IIae, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3.1205 Ibid.: q. 4, a. 8.1206 Pius credulitatis affectus.1207 In I Sent.: dist. III, q. 3, nos. 24f.1208 In III Sent.: dist. XXXI, no. 4.1209 Ibid.: dist. XXIII, q. 1, a. 8.

1210 Biel, In III Sent.: dist. XXIII, q. 2.

1211 Concordia, q. 14, a. 13, disp. XXXVIII, Paris, 1876, p. 213.

1212 De ente supernat.: Bk. III, dist. XLIV, no. 2; dist. XLV, no. 37.

1213 De fide, disp. IX, sect I, nos. 2, 3; disp. 1, sect. I, nos. 77, 100, 104.

1214 De divina traditione, pp. 692, 616.

1215 Etudes sur le concile du Vatican, II, 75 ff.

1216 De gratia, Bk. II, chap. 11; De fide, Part 1, disp. III, sect. 6, 8, 12.

1217 Ultimo resolvitur.

1218 Id quo et quod creditur.

1219 Id quo et quod videtur simul cum coloribus.

1220 In III Sent.: d. 24, q. 1, a. 3.

1221 Credo Deo.1222 Credo Deum.1223 In lllam lIIae, q. 1, a. 1, no. 11.

1224 See Ibid.: q. 2, a. 2.

1225 I John 5:10.1226 In Cont. Gent.: I, 6; III, 40, § 3.

1227 De gratia, disp. XX, a. 1, nos. 7, 9; De fide q. 1, disp. 1, a. 2, nos. 1, 4.

1228 De gratia, disp. 1, a. 2, § 1, nos. 78, 79, 93; De fide, disp. 1, a. 2, no. 55.1229 De gratia, disp. III, dub. 3, nos. 28, 37, 40, 45, 48, 49, 52, 58, 60, 61; De fide, disp. 1, dub. 5, nos. 163, 169.

1230 De gratia, diss. III, a. 2, § 2; De fide, diss. 1, a. l, obj. 3, inst. 1. See also Gardeil, La credibilite et l'apologetique, 2nd ed.: Paris, 1912, pp. 61, 92, 96, and in Dict. de theol. cath.: s. v. Credibilite. See also Scheeben, Dogmatik, 1, § 40, nos. 681, 689; § 44, nos. 779805. And for extended treatment, see our work, De revelatione, Rome, 3rd ed.: 1935, I, 458-511.

1231 In actu exercito.

1232 In actu signato.

1233 IIa IIae, q. 2, a 2, ad 3.

1234 Sess. III, chap. 3.

1235 Cf. IIa IIae, q. s, a. 3, ad 1. See also John of St. Thomas, De gratia, disp. XX, a. 1, nos. 7-9; De fide, q. 1, disp. 1, a2, nos. 1-8; also the Salrnanticenses, De gratia disp. III, dub. 3, nos. 28-37, 40-49, 52-61.

1236 For more extended treatment, see our work, L'amour de dieu et la croix de Paris, 2nd ed.: 1939, 11, 575-97.

1237 IIa IIae, q. 8.

1238 Ibid.: q. 9.1239 Ibid.: q. 17-22.1240 Ibid.: q. 17, a. 1, 2, 4, 5. Deus auxilians.

1241 Ibid.: a. 4.

1242 In IIam IIae, q. 17, a. 5, no. 6.

1243 Nobis et propter nos.

1244 IIa IIae, q. 18, a. 4.

1245 Ibid.: q. 22.

1246 Ibid.: q. 23-47.

1247 Ibid.: q. 23, a. 1, 2, 3, 5; q. 25, a. 1; q 27, a. 3.

1248 I will not now call you servants. But I have called you friends: John 15: 15.

1249 IIa IIae, q. 23, a. 1.

1250 Ibid.: q. 17, a. 3.

1251 Ibid.: q. 27, a. 4.1252 Ibid.: q. 26, a. 2, 3.1253 Ibid.: q. 25, a. 1.1254 Ibid.: q. 26, a. 1, 4-13.1255 Ibid.: q. 23, a. 6.

1256 Ibid.: a. 7, 8. See the Salmanticenses, Billuart, etc.1257 Ibid.: q. 24, a. 4.1258 Ibid.: a. 6, ad 1.1259 Ibid.: q. 44, a. 1, 2.1260 For extended treatment, see our work, L'amour de dieu et la croix de Jesus Paris, 2nd ed.: 1939, II, 597-632.

1261 Recta ratio agibilium.

1262 cf. IIa IIae, q. 47-57.

1263 Ibid.: q. 47, a. 8.

1264 Qualis unusquisque cst, talis finis videtur ei. Cf. Ia IIae, q. 58, a. 5.1265 Verum intellectus pratici est per conformitatem ad appetitum rectum. Ibid.: q. 57, a. 5, ad 3.

1266 Cf. IIa IIae, q. 53.

1267 Ibid.: q. 57-122.1268 Ibid.: q. 61, a. 1, 2.1269 Ibid.: q. s8, a. 6, 7; q. 60, a. 1, ad 4; q. 80, a. 8, ad 1.

1270 Summum jus summa injuria. Ibid.: q. 80, a. 1, ad 3, 5; q. 120, a. 1, 2.

1271 Ibid.: q. 29, a. 3, ad 3.1272 Ibid.: q 66, a. 2.

1273 Cf. Ia IIae, q. 105, a. 2.1274 See Dict. de theol. cath.: s. v. Propriete; see also the notes on IIa IIae, q. 66, in the French translation of the Summa published by the Revue des Jeunes.

1275 IIa IIae, q. 81-119.

1276 Ibid.: q. 123-41.

1277 Ibid.: q. 123, a. 6.

1278 Ibid.: q. 124.1279 Ibid.: q. 139.

1280 Ibid.: q. 141.1281 Ibid.: q. 143.1282 Ibid.: q. 144, a. 1.

1283 Ibid.: q. 152, a. 3.1284 Ibid.: a. 4.

1285 Ibid.: q. 141-43.

1286 Ibid.: q. 141, a. 3.

1287 Ibid.: a. 6, ad 3. St. Thomas here explains the degrees enumerated by St. Anselm.

1288 Ibid.: a. 5.

1289 Ibid.: q. 163.

1290 Ibid.: a. 2.

1291 Ibid.: q. 166.

1292 IIa IIae, q. 184, a. 1.

1293 Ibid.: a. 3.

1294 John 13:35.

1295 Ia, q. 82, a. 3.

1296 IIa IIae, q. 27, a. 4.1297 Ibid.: q. 184, a. 3.1298 I Tim. 1-5.1299 Com. in I Pol.: chap. 3.1300 De perfect. justitiae, chap. 8.1301 Cf. Cajetan, In IIam, q. 184, a. 3; Passerini, Ibid.

1302 De statu perfectionis, chap. 11, nos. 15 f.

1303 Traite de l'amour de Dieu, Bk. III, chap. 1.

1304 Studiorum Ducem, June 29, 1923 (on St. Thomas) ; and Rerum omnium, January 26, 1923 (on St. Francis de Sales).

1305 IIa IIae, q. 179 f.1306 Ibid.: q. 188.1307 Ibid.: q. 180, and 188, a. 6.

1308 In statu perfectionis acquirendae.1309 In statu perfectionis exercendae et communicandae.1310 IIa IIae, q. 185, a. 4.

1311 Gratiae gratis datae: IIa IIae, q. 171-78.

1312 Ibid.: q. 173, a. 2.1313 Ibid.: q. 173 f.1314 Ibid.: q. 174, a. 3.1315 For extended treatment see our work, De revel.: per cccl. cath. proposita, Rome, 1st ed.: 1918; 3rd ed.: 1935. Cf. 1, 153-68; 11, 109-36.

1316 IIa IIae, q. 171-74; De Veritate, q. 12. Father Pesch (De inspir. s. Script.: 1906, p. 159) writes thus: "St. Thomas Aquinas so elaborated the essence of biblical inspiration that the following centuries have hardly added anything of importance." Leo XIII, in Providentissimus Deus, has added the weight of papal authority to the doctrine of Aquinas. Cf. Voste, De diuina inspir. et verit. s. Scripturae, 2nd ed.: Rome, 1932, pp. 46 ff.

1317 IIa IIae, q. 171, a. 5; q. 173, a. 4.

1318 Ibid.: q. 174, a. 2, ad 3; De veritate q. 12, a. 12, ad 10.

1319 Ibid.: q. 171, a. 2; q. 174, a. 3, ad 3; De veritate, q. 13, a. 1.

1320 Cf. Quodl. VII, a. 14.

1321 Cf. Voste, op. cit.: pp. 76-105.1322 Pius XII, in Divino afflante Spiritu, insists on deeper study of each inspired writer's personal character as a presupposition to full understanding of his message. [Tr. ]

1323 For extended bibliography, see Voste, Op. cit.: who gives in particular the works of recent Thomists, Zigliara, Pegues, Hugon, de Groot, M. J. Lagrange, etc.

1324 Ia, q. 1, a. 3.

1325 See Revue de "Universite d'Ottawa, Octoba-December, 1936.

1326 Congreg. Stud. Sacr.: July 24, 1914.

1327 See p. 6, note 2.1328 May-June, 1917. Cf. Guido Mattiussi, S. J.: Le XXIV tesi della filosofia di S. Tommaso d 'Aquino approvata dalla S. Congr. degli studi, Rome, 1917; Hugon, OP.: Les vingtquatre theses Thomistes, Paris; Pegues, O. P.: Autour de saint Thomas, Paris, 1918, where each Thomistic thesis is set contrary to the corresponding counterthesis.

1329 John 8:32.

1330 Wiener Kreis.

1331 Noesis noeseos.

1332 See our work, Dieu, son existence et sa nature, 6th ed.: pp. 604-69.

1333 We need so to view the world as to combine an idea of wonder and an idea of welcome. Chesterton, Orthodoxy. [Tr. ]

1334 Cf. Ia, q. 28, a2; IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, corp. and ad 3.1335 Cf. Acta Apost. Sedis, VI, 383 ff.1336 Proponantur veluti tutae normae directivae.1337 Can. 1366, § 2.

1338 Les vingt-quatre theses thomistcs, Paris, Tequi, 1922.

1339 Ibid.: p. vii.

1340 P. Guido Mattiussi, S. J.: had written already in 1917 a work of first importance on this subject: Le XXIV tesi della filosofia di S. Tommaso d'Aquino approvate dalla SacraCongreg. degli Studi, Roma.1341 Parmenides.

1342 Heraclitus.

1343 Real potency of movement, say, for example, in a billiard ball, is not the mere negation, the mere privation, of movement, nor even the simple possibility of existence; though the latter suffices for an act of creation, which does not presuppose any real subject, any real potency.

1344 Suarez holds that prime matter, since it is not pure potentiality, but involves a certain actuality, can exist without form. This view shows why he likewise maintains that our will is a virtual act, capable, without divine premotion, of passing to second act.

Leibnitz substitutes force for real potency, active or passive. In consequence, passive potency disappears and with it prime matter Movement too can no longer be explained as a function of intelligible being, primordially divided into potency and act. Further, force itself, supposed to explain all else, is a simple object of internal experience, unattached to being, man's first intelligible notion. This dynamism of Leibnitz breaks on the principle that activity presupposes being.

1345 la, q. 2, a. 3.1346 Created person, like created essence, cannot be formally constituted by what belongs to it only as a contingent predicate. Now only as a contingent predicate does existence belong to a created person. Peter of himself is Peter, nothing more. He of himself is not existence, and in this he differs from God, who alone is His own existence. To deny the real distinction in creatures, of person, of suppositum, from existence is to jeopardize also the real distinction between essence and existence. In every created substance, says St. Thomas (Cont. Gent.: II, 52): quod est differs from existence. Quod est is the person, the suppositum. It is not the essence of Peter, it is Peter himself. Existence, says St. Thomas again (IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 1): follows person as that which has existence. Now if existence follows person, it cannot constitute person. Each of the two concepts, created person and created existence, is a distinct and irreducible concept.

1347 la, q. 14, a. 1.

1348 Cf. IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 3.1349 See above the words of Benedict XV (note 2).

1350 "La theologie dogmatique hier et aujourd'hui" in Nouvelle revue theologique, 1929, p. 810.1351 Pascendi and Sacrorum Antistitum.1352 We may seem to repeat commonplaces. But, in fact, these truths are seldom treated in relation to the problem of contradiction.

1353 Cf. Denz.. nos. 1659 ff.

1354 Ibid.: no. 570.

1355 Ibid.: nos. 553ff.

1356 Cf. Olgiati, La filosofia di Descartes, 1937, preface and pp. 26, 66, 175 f.: 241, 322 f.

1357 We must add here a remark of Msgr. Noel of Louvain. In his work, Le realisme immediate, 1938 (chap. 12, "La valeur reelle de l'intelligence"): he has kindly quoted us often. We are essentially in accord with his view. But we must note that we are speaking here, not precisely of the real intrinsic possibility, say, of a circle, but of the real impossibility of a contradictory thing, a squared circle, for example. And we say that this impossibility is real and absolute, and that even by miracle it can have no exception. This necessity is not hypothetical as when we say: It is necessary to eat, even though we know that by a miracle a man could live without eating. The necessity we speak of is objective and absolute

1358 Met.: IV, 3.

1359 Msgr. Noel, in the work just cited (see note 6) writes (p. 253): "We must not drink too freely the conquering allurement of certain formulas. True, the essential necessities seen by the intellect dominate all reality. They transcend all the limits of experience, since they rule the metaphysical order. But of themselves they do not in any positive way furnish us any reality."

Msgr. Noel means that the principle of contradiction is not an existential judgment, and we have never affirmed that it is. He who here drinks too freely is the absolute realist after the manner of Parmenides. He was really drunk on being, when he affirmed that the universal exists just as it is conceived, when he confounded God's being with being in general. But, without drunkenness, or even tipsiness, limited realism affirms that he who denies or doubts the objective and absolute validity of the principle of contradiction will find every existential judgment invalid, including "I think." Further, whenever we affirm the objective validity of the principle of contradiction, we have simultaneously within us a spontaneous and indistinct judgment of our own existence and of the existence of the body from which we draw the notion of being. There is a mutual relation between the subject matter of our knowledge (the sense object present) and the form under which the principle of contradiction conceives that matter. So close is this relation that to doubt the principle is to see vanish every existential judgment, just as matter cannot exist without form.

1360 See the illuminating article of Al. Roswadowski, S. J.: "De fundamento metaphysico nostrae cognitionis universalis secundum S. Thomam" (Acta secundi Congressus thomistici internationalis): Rome, 1936, pp. 103-12.

1361 Cf. Ia, q. 44, a. 1, ad 1.

1362 In this formula the contradiction is less flagrant than if we said: Contingency is incompatible with non-contingency. But the most dangerous contradictions are hidden contradictions (which abound in Spinoza). To deny the tenth characteristic of a circle is less evidently contradictory than to deny its definition, but it is still a contradiction.

1363 Cf. Ia, q. 88, a. 3; q. 76, a. 5.

1364 Cf. Ia, q. 44, a. 1, ad I. For the principle of finality, which we do not treat here see our work, Le realisme du principe de finalite, 1932.

1365 See Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie, revised by the members of the Societe francaise de philosophie, 1926.

1366 Methode, 1, 7.

1367 See note I.

1368 Bulletin de le Societe francaise de philosophie, session of May 7, 1908, p. 294.

1369 See Vocabulaire technique...: s. v. Pragmatisme, p. 611.

1370 Dogme et critique, p. 25.

1371 Denz.: no. 2026.1372 De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, 3, 5, 8, 10; la, q. 16, a. 1.

1373 Denz.: no. 2080.

1374 "Point de depart de la recherche philosophique" in Annales de philosophie chretienne, June 15, 1906, p. 235.

1375 J. de Tonquedec, in his book Immanence, 1913, pp. 27-59, shows the limitless consequences, unforeseen by its author, of the new definitions. Here is one sentence from Tonquedec: "It will no longer be possible to demonstrate by argument (independently o action) the existence of God or the reality of the supernatural or the fact of divine intervention" (p. 28).

1376 Denz, no. 2058.1377 This reproach addressed to the philosophy of action was expressed already in 1896 by our teacher, Father Schwalm, O. P.: in Rev. thom.: 1896, pp. 36 ff.: 413; 1897, pp. 62 239, 627, 1898, p. 578. We ourselves expressed the same view (in the same review, 1913, pp. 351-71.

1378 La science et l'hypothese, pp. 112-19.

1379 See our book, Dieu, 5th ed.: p. 7781380 Being is being, non-being is non-being, or, being is not non-being.1381 Everything that exists has its raison d'etre, intrinsic or extrinsic.

1382 Every contingent being depends on an efficient cause.

1383 Every agent, including natural agents not endowed with cognition, acts for an end.

1384 Rom. 8:16.

1385 IIa Ilae, q. 8, a. 1, 2, q. 45, a. 2.

1386 This conception, that theology is nothing but a spirituality which has developed its own regimen of intelligibility, comes in great measure from John Moehler, in particular from his book, Die Einheit in der Kirche, oder das Princip des Katholizismus (Tubingen, 1825). This book would call for a critical and theological study to correct its deviations. It reduces faith to religious experience. Cf. Dict. theol. cath.: s. v. Moehler, cols. 2057ff.

1387 la IIae, q. 57, a. 5, ad 3.

1388 Ethica, VI, 2.

1389 la IIae, q. 19, a. 3, ad 2.

1390 Ethica, VI, 2.

1391 In the corpus he had argued: Goodness in the will, speaking properly, depends onthe object aimed at by the will. Now the will's object is proposed to it by the reason. Hence goodness in the will depends on the reason, just as it depends on its object.

1392 Denz.: no. 2058.1393 See note 10.1394 L'Etre and les etres, 1935, p. 415.1395 Ia IIae, q. 17, a. 6: In truths to which the intellect assents naturally, in first principles, we cannot choose between assent or dissent, but our necessary assent is a work of nature.

1396 Ibid.: ad I, 2.

1397 La science et la religion, 1908, p. 290.1398 Cf. De veritate, q. 1, a. 1.1399 We hold that St. Thomas would see, in this replacement of the traditional definition of truth by the pragmatic definition, an insensate enterprise, an unlimited imprudence, fated to destroy all truth, even that of prudent judgment, which presuppose a higher truth.

We speak thus to young seminarians, who, fearing not to be up to date, prefer the doctrine of Maurice M. Blondel, or even that of Henri Bergson, to the doctrine of St. Thomas. Now it is easy, without being a prophet, to foresee that a hundred years hence Henri Bergson will be forgotten, whereas St. Thomas, like St. Augustine, will live forever.

Bergson, we admit, the author of Matiere et memoire and of Donnees immediates de la conscience, has indeed liberated many minds from materialism and mechanism, but his book, L'evolution creatrice, has drawn many others away from higher certitudes, especially during the epoch of modernism. I seem to hear him still, as, in 1904-1905, at the College de France, he was explaining Book XIl of Aristotle's Metaphysics. His commentary on Aristotle's proofs for God's existence ran thus: "Gentlemen, it is astounding that Aristotle seeks to explain motion by aught else than itself, whereas for us motion explains everything else. "

These words say, equivalently, that what is in process of becoming is more than what is, more even than He who eternally is being itself. To compare Bergson with Aquinas is to compare a pretty villa with a Gothic cathedral. Surely it has been justly said, "Anyone not informed by ancient learning can never read such works without danger. "

1400 Rev. de met. et de mor.: July, 1907, pp. 448 f.

1401 Cf. Dieu, son existence et sa nature, 7th ed.: pp. 133 ff.: 156 ff.: where we examine the theories of Bergson and Le Roy.

1402 These positions return to that of Nicholas d'Outrecourt, who held that all first principles are merely probable. As one example of many who agree with us, see M. J. Maritain, Reflexions sur l'intelligence, 1924, chap. 3, pp. 78-141. See also p. Descoqs, Praelect. theol. naturalis, 1932, 11, 287ff. ; 1, 150. P. Descoqs quotes a long passage from Archambault, one of the most faithful of Blondel's disciples, and compares it with a proposition condemned by the Holy Office in 1924.

1403 Cursus philos.: II, 341.

1404 Philosophers are often better than their philosophy. Hume, to escape from his skepticism, would play billiards. Stuart Mill, to escape empiricism, would assume the viewpoint of religion. Beneath the philosopher, or rather above, is the man, the Christian. But the question remains: Does not his philosophy lead men away from wisdom rather than toward it? The Church thus questioned the philosophy of that holy priest whom we call Antonio Rosmini.

1405 Acta Acad. rom. S. Thomae, p. 51.

1406 Ibid.: pp. 174-78.1407 Conformity of mind with life must replace the abstract and chimerical conformity of intellect with reality (Annales phil. chre't.: 1906, p. 235). Metaphysics has its essence in the acting will. It reaches truth only under this experimental point of view. It is the science of what is to be rather than of what is (L'Action, 1893, p. 297).

Accord of thought with reality must be replaced by immanent conformity of ourselves with ourselves (L'illusion idealiste, 1898, pp. 12, 17).

1408 We quoted his retraction in Acta. Acad.: 1935, p. 54.1409 La pensee, 1, 39, 130, 131, 136, 347, 355.

1410 Ibid.: II, 39, 65, 67, go, 96, 196.

1411 See the condemned propositions of Nicholas d'Outrecourt (Denz.: nos. 553 f.: 558 567, 570). See also the propositions condemned by the Holy Office (December, 1924): in Monitore ecclesiastico, 1925, p. 194, in Documentation catholique, 1925, I, 771 ff.: and in Descoqs, Praelect. theol. nat.: 1932, I, 150, 11, 287 ff.

1412 We have, we may add, always admitted, as valid proof of God's existence, man's desire for happiness (see la IIae, q. 2, a. 8). But this proof presupposes the ontological validity of the principle of finality; every agent, and in a special manner the rational agent, acts for a purpose.

1413 Cf. Ia IIae, q. 19, a. 3, ad 2.

1414 See our review of his work in Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica, January, 1944, pp. 63-67.

1415 In IIIam, q. 4, a. 2.

1416 Op. cit.: p. 158.1417 We treated this question as early as 1909 (Sens commun, la philosophie de l'etre et les formules dogmatiques, 5th ed.: pp. 365-77). A recent defense of Cajetan's view appears in Acta Acad. rom. S. Thomae, 1938, pp. 78-92.

1418 See Tabula aurea, s. v. suppositum, persona, personalitas, modus, assumere, substantia, substantla pnma, subsistentia, quod est, quo est.

1419 In omni creatura differt esse et quod est. Cont. Gent.: II, 52.

1420 Solus Deus est suum esse. Esse irreceptum est unicum.

1421 Distinctio realis inadequata.

1422 Distinctio realis adaequata.

1423 Esse consequitur naturam non sicut habentem esse, sed sicut qua aliquid est, personam autem seu hypostasim consequitur sicut habentem esse. IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad I. Ipsum esse non est de ratione suppositi: Quadl.: q. 2, a. 4, ad 2. In Deo tres personae non habent nisi unum esse: llla, q. 17, a. 2, ad 3.

1424 I Sent.: d. 23, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4.

1425 la, q. 39, a. 3, ad 4.

1426 la, q. 3, a. 5, ad I.

1427 IIIa, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3.1428 De veritate q. 1, a. 1.

1429 De potentia, q. 9, a. 2, ad 6.

1430 As personality corresponds to person, so subsistence corresponds to "suppositum," not to "subsistere." The abstract noun corresponding to the concrete "subsistere" is "existentia substantiae." An error of correlation has here beclouded the question.

1431 In III Sent.: d. V, q. 3, a. 3, § 2.

1432 Here is, in reduced form, the argument of Cajetan: Requiritur aliquid reale et positlvum quo subjectum existens est id quod est (contra Scotum). Atque hoc non potest esse nec natura singularis, quae se habet ut quo, nec existentia quae est praedicatum contingens subjecti creati. Ergo requiritur aliquid aliud positivum, quae est ultirna dispositio naturae singularis ad existentiam.

1433 In IIIam, q. 2, a. 2, no. 8.

1434 Cf. IIIa, q. 16, a. 1, 2.

1435 Objicitur: Ex actu et actu not fit unum per se; sed natura individuata et personalitas sunt duo actus, ergo ex eis non fit unum per se Respondetur: Ex actu et actu non fit unum per se, scil. una natura in I modo dicendi per se, concedo; non fit unum suppositum, per se subsistens, in 3 modo dicendi per se, nego. Ita in Christo est unum suppositum, quamvis sint duae naturae.

Insistitur: Sed anima separata est id quod existit, et tamen non est persona.

Respondetur: Anima separata retinet suam essentiam, suam subsistentiam et suum esse, sic est id quod est; sed non retinet nomen personae, quia non est quod completum, sed pars principalis Petri aut Pauli defuncti.

1436 See especially pp. 41-50, of the work cited above.

1437 Ezech. 36: 271438 Ps. 134:6.1439 Esther 13:9; 14:13, 15:11.1440 See also Prov. 21: I; Ecclu. 33: 13, 24-47; John 10: 27; 17: 2; Phil. 2:13.

1441 Denz.: no. 182.

1442 1 ad Bonif.: chap. 201443 Concordia, ed. Paris, 1876, pp. 51, 565. Cf. also the index, s. v. Auxilium. Cf. also Lessius, De gratia efficaci, chap. 18, no. 7: Not that he who accepts accepts by liberty alone but because from liberty alone arises the distinction between the two, not from diversity previous aid of grace.

1444 John 15: 5.

1445 I Cor. 4: 71446 See Aristotle, Met.: IX 3.

1447 In Ep ad Eph, chap. 3, lect. 2. See also la IIae, q. 109, a. 1, 2, 9, 10; q. 113, a. 7, 10.

1448 In Ep. ad Tim, 2: 6.1449 Ia, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3.

1450 la IIae, q. 1o6, a. 2, ad 2.1451 lla IIae, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1.1452 Alvarez, De auxiliis, Bk. III, disp. 80; Gonet, Clypeus thom., De vol. Dei, disp. 4, no. 147; del Prado, De gratia et libero arbitrio, III, 423.

1453 Cf. Ia IIae, q. 79, a. 3. See also Tabula aurea s. v. Satisfactio, no. 36.

1454 la, q. 19, a. 6, ad I.

1455 Ibid.1456 1a, q. 21, a. 4.1457 See St. Augustine, De natura et gratia, chap. 43, no. 50 (PL., XLIV, 271) ; Council of Trent, Sess. VI, chap. II (Denz, no. 804).

1458 1a, q. 19, a. 6.1459 PL, CXXVI, 123; Denz.: 17th ed.: p. 145 no. 320 note 2.1460 Ia, q. 20, a. 3.1461 1 Cor. 4: 7.

1462 la, q. 23, a. 5.

1463 Ia Ilae, q. 79, a. 2.

1464 Causalitas divina requisita ad actum physicum peccati praescindit omnino a malitia.1465 Rom. 9:14-24.

1466 In Joan., tr. 26.1467 Ia, q. 23, a. 5.1468 Does the phrase "ante praevisa merita" imply a succession in God? This has been recently asserted. But it is clear that Thomists recognize in God only one act, by which God wills efficaciously the merits of the elect in order to save them. Not on account of this does God will that, says St. Thomas (Ia, q. 19, a. 5): but He wills (by one and the same act) this to be on account of that. The principle of predilection (to be better than another, one must be more loved by God) is independent of all temporal succession

1469 See eg.: la IIae, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3.

1470 In his recent treatise Anthropologia supernaturalis, De gratia, (Turin, 1943, p. 199): Msgr. P. Parente confused the Thomistic sensus divisus with that of Calvin. Calvin said: Under efficacious grace the power to the opposite does not remain, it only reappears afterward. Thomists say nothing like that. Parente's position is syncretistic, an attempted medium between Thomism and Molinism. Now there can be no medium between these [two contradictory propositions: God knows futuribilia before His decrees, and God doesnot know futuribilia before His decree. God's knowledge either determines, or it is determined; there is no medium].

1471 Cf. Ia, q. 23, a. 4.

1472 See del Prado, De gratia, 1907, III, 417-67: Utrum Bannezianismus sit vera comeodia Molinistis inventa.

1473 Concordia, Paris, 1876, p. 152.1474 Ia, q. 23, a. 3.

1475 Rom. 9: 14-24; II: 33-36.

1476 OEvres completes, Paris, 1845, p. 664. See also his index, s. v. Grace. See also his La defense de la tradition, XI, 19-27.1477 Thus a grace may be efficacious for an imperfect act and yet only sufficient in relation to the perfect act which ought to follow. See del Prado, De gratia et libero arbitrio, Fribourg, 1907, II, 5-23.

1478 Those Thomists, like Gonzales, Bancel, Guillermin, who extend to the limits the field of sufficient grace, still maintain, as an essential element of Thomism, that no fully salutary act can come to pass unless God's consequent will have so decreed from eternity. Actual and limited effects, says St. Thomas (Ia, q. 19, a. 4): proceed from God's infinite perfection by the determining decree of God's will and intellect. This terminology, it is clear, antecedes Duns Scotus.

1479 See De praedest. sanctorum, passim.

1480 Nothing positive and good can exist outside God without causal dependence on God. If this be denied, all proofs for the existence of God are compromised. God is, without any exception, the author of all that is good.