Chapter XXXVI.—Bearing of the Doctrine of the Resurrection on the Practices of the Christians.

Who, then, that believes in a resurrection, would make himself into a tomb for bodies that will rise again? For it is not the part of the same persons to believe that our bodies will rise again, and to eat them as if they would not; and to think that the earth will give back the bodies held by it, but that those which a man has entombed in himself will not be demanded back. On the contrary, it is reasonable to suppose, that those who think they shall have no account to give of the present life, ill or well spent, and that there is no resurrection, but calculate on the soul perishing with the body, and being as it were quenched in it, will refrain from no deed of daring; but as for those who are persuaded that nothing will escape the scrutiny of God, but that even the body which has ministered to the irrational impulses of the soul, and to its desires, will be punished along with it, it is not likely that they will commit even the smallest sin. But if to any one it appears sheer nonsense that the body which has mouldered away, and been dissolved, and reduced to nothing, should be reconstructed, we certainly cannot with any reason be accused of wickedness with reference to those that believe not, but only of folly; for with the opinions by which we deceive ourselves we injure no one else. But that it is not our belief alone that bodies will rise again, but that many philosophers also hold the same view, it is out of place to show just now, lest we should be thought to introduce topics irrelevant to the matter in hand, either by speaking of the intelligible and the sensible, and the nature of these respectively, or by contending that the incorporeal is older than the corporeal, and that the intelligible precedes the sensible, although we become acquainted with the latter earliest, since the corporeal is formed from the incorporeal, by the combination with it of the intelligible, and that the sensible is formed from the intelligible; for nothing hinders, according to Pythagoras and Plato, that when the dissolution of bodies takes place, they should, from the very same elements of which they were constructed at first, be constructed again.135    [Comp. cap. xxxi., supra, p. 146. The science of their times lent itself to the notions of the Fathers necessarily; but neither Holy Scripture nor theology binds us to any theory of the how, in this great mystery; hence Plato and Pythagoras are only useful, as showing that even they saw nothing impossible in the resurrection of the dead. As to “the same elements,” identity does not consist in the same particles of material, but in the continuity of material, by which every seed reproduces “its own body.” 1 Cor. xv. 38.] But let us defer the discourse concerning the resurrection.136    [It is a fair inference that The Discourse was written after the Embassy. “In it,” says Kaye, “may be found nearly all the arguments which human reason has been able to advance in support of the resurrection.” p. 200.]

Τίς ἂν οὖν ἀνάστασιν πεπιστευκὼς [ἐπὶ] σώμασιν ἀναστη σομένοις ἑαυτὸν παράσχοι τάφον; οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ἀνα στήσεσθαι ἡμῶν πεπεῖσθαι τὰ σώματα καὶ ἐσθίειν αὐτὰ ὡς οὐκ ἀναστησόμενα, καὶ ἀποδώσειν μὲν νομίζειν τὴν γῆν τοὺς ἰδίους νεκρούς, οὓς δέ τις αὐτὸς ἐγκατέθαψεν αὑτῷ, μὴ ἀπαιτήσεσθαι. τοὐναντίον μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς τοὺς μὲν μήτε λόγον ὑφέξειν τοῦ ἐνταῦθα ἢ πονηροῦ ἢ χρηστοῦ βίου μήτε ἀνάστασιν εἶναι οἰομένους, συναπόλλυσθαι δὲ τῷ σώματι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ οἷον ἐναποσβέν νυσθαι λογιζομένους, μηδενὸς ἂν ἀποσχέσθαι τολμήματος· τοὺς δὲ μηδὲν ἀνεξέταστον ἔσεσθαι παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, συγκολασθήσεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸ ὑπουργῆσαν σῶμα ταῖς ἀλόγοις ὁρμαῖς τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις πεπεισμένους, οὐδεὶς λόγος ἔχει οὐδὲ τῶν βραχυτάτων τι ἁμαρτεῖν. εἰ δέ τῳ λῆρος πολὺς δοκεῖ τὸ σαπὲν καὶ διαλυθὲν καὶ ἀφανισθὲν σῶμα συστῆναι πάλιν, κακίας μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως δόξαν ἀποφεροίμεθα διὰ τοὺς οὐ πιστεύοντας, ἀλλ' εὐηθείας· οἷς γὰρ ἀπατῶμεν ἑαυτοὺς λόγοις ἀδικοῦμεν οὐδένα· ὅτι μέντοι οὐ καθ' ἡμᾶς μόνον ἀναστήσεται τὰ σώματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ πολλοὺς τῶν φιλοσόφων, περίεργον ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος δεικνύειν, ἵνα μὴ ἐξαγω νίους τοῖς προκειμένοις ἐπεισάγειν δοκῶμεν λόγους, ἢ περὶ νοητῶν καὶ αἰσθητῶν καὶ τῆς τοιούτων συστάσεως λέγοντες ἢ ὅτι πρεσ βύτερα τὰ ἀσώματα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὰ νοητὰ προάγει τῶν αἰσθητῶν κἂν πρώτοις περιπίπτωμεν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, συνισταμένων ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀσωμάτων κατὰ τὴν ἐπισύνθεσιν τῶν νοητῶν σωμάτων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν νοητῶν [τῶν αἰσθητῶν]· οὐ γὰρ κωλύει κατὰ τὸν Πυθαγόραν καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα γενομένης τῆς διαλύσεως τῶν σωμάτων ἐξ ὧν τὴν ἀρχὴν συνέστη, ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν αὐτὰ καὶ πάλιν συστῆναι. Ἀλλ' ἀνακείσθω μὲν ὁ περὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως λόγος.