5. A. O leaden dagger! For thou mightest conclude that man is immortal if I had granted thee that this universe can never be without man, and that this universe is eternal. R. You keep a keen look-out. But yet it is no small thing which we have established, namely, that the frame of things cannot be without the soul, unless perchance in the frame of things at some time hereafter there shall be no falsity. A. This consequence indeed I allow to be involved. But now I am of opinion that we ought to consider farther whether former inferences do not bend under pressure. For I see no small step to have been made towards the immortality of the soul. R. Have you sufficiently considered whether you may not have conceded something rashly? A. Sufficiently indeed, but I see no point at which I can accuse myself of rashness. R. It is therefore concluded that the frame of things cannot be without a living soul. A. So far as this, that in turn some souls may be born, and others die. R. What if from the frame of things falsity be taken away? will it not come to pass that all things are true? A. I admit the inference. R. Tell me whence this wall seems to thee to be true. A. Because I am not misled by its aspect. R. That is, because it is as it seems. A. Yes. R. If therefore anything is thereby false because it seems otherwise than it is, and thereby true because it is as it seems; take away him to whom it seems, and there is neither anything false, nor true. But if there is no falsity in the frame of things, all things are true. Nor can anything seem except to a living soul. There remains therefore soul in the frame of things, if falsity cannot be taken away; there remains, if it can. A. I see our former conclusions somewhat strengthened, indeed; but we have made no progress by this amplification. For none the less does that fact remain which chiefly shakes me that souls are born and pass away, and that it comes about that they are not lacking to the world, not through their immortality, but by their succession.

CAPUT IV. Ex falsitatis seu veritatis perpetuitate possitne colligi animae immortalitas.

5. A. O plumbeum pugionem! Posses enim concludere hominem esse immortalem, si tibi concessissem nunquam istum mundum esse posse sine homine, eumque mundum esse sempiternum. R. Bene quidem vigilas. Sed tamen non parum est quod confecimus, rerum naturam sine anima esse non posse, nisi forte in rerum natura falsitas aliquando non erit. A. Istud quidem consequens esse confiteor. Sed jam amplius deliberandum censeo, utrum superius concessa non nutent. Non enim parvum gradum ad animae immortalitatem factum esse video. R. Satisne considerasti, ne quid temere dederis? A. Satis quidem, sed nihil video quo me arguam temeritatis. R. Ergo confectum est rerum naturam sine anima viva esse non posse. A. Confectum hactenus, ut possint vicissim aliae nasci, aliae mori. R. Quid, si de natura rerum falsitas auferatur? nonne fiet ut vera sint omnia? A. Consequi video. R. Responde unde tibi videatur paries iste verus esse. A. Quia ejus non fallor aspectu. R. Ergo quia ita est ut videtur. A. Etiam. R. Si igitur aliquid inde falsum est quod aliter videtur atque est, inde verum quod ita ut est videtur; ablato eo cui videtur, nec falsum quidquam, nec verum est. At si falsitas in rerum natura non sit, vera sunt omnia. Nec videri quidquam nisi viventi animae potest. Manet igitur anima in rerum natura, si auferri falsitas non potest; manet, si potest. A. Video robustius quidem esse factum 0888 quod jam conclusum erat; sed nihil hac adjectione promovimus. Nihilominus enim manet illud quod plurimum me movet, nasci animas et interire, atque ut non desint mundo, non earum immortalitate, sed successione provenire.