On Lying.

 1. There is a great question about Lying, which often arises in the midst of our every day business, and gives us much trouble, that we may not either

 2. Setting aside, therefore, jokes, which have never been accounted lies, seeing they bear with them in the tone of voice, and in the very mood of the

 3. For which purpose we must see what a lie is. For not every one who says a false thing lies, if he believes or opines that to be true which he says.

 4. But it may be a very nice question whether in the absence of all will to deceive, lying is altogether absent. Thus, put the case that a person shal

 5. But whether a lie be at some times useful, is a much greater and more concerning question. Whether, as above, it be a lie, when a person has no wil

 6. On the other hand, those who say that we must never lie, plead much more strongly, using first the Divine authority, because in the very Decalogue

 7. Neither do they confess that they are awed by those citations from the Old Testament which are alleged as examples of lies: for there, every incide

 8. For this reason, from the books of the New Testament, except the figurative pre-significations used by our Lord, if thou consider the life and mann

 9. But if no authority for lying can be alleged, neither from the ancient Books, be it because that is not a lie which is received to have been done o

 10. As concerning purity of body here indeed a very honorable regard seems to come in the way, and to demand a lie in its behalf to wit, that if the

 11. But if any man supposes that the reason why it is right for a person to tell a lie for another is, that he may live the while, or not be offended

 12. Thus has the question been on both sides considered and treated and still it is not easy to pass sentence: but we must further lend diligent hear

 13. In which proposition these points may well deserve to be questioned: whether such consent is to be accounted as a deed: or whether that is to be c

 14. “How,” sayest thou, “is it not his doing as well as theirs, when they would not do this, if he would do that?” Why, at this rate we go housebreaki

 15. The whole stress, then, of this question comes to this whether it be true universally that no sin of another, committed upon thee, is to be imput

 16. Or, are some lies, also, to be excepted, so that it were better to suffer this than to commit those? If so, then not every thing that is done in o

 17. But yet if the option were proposed to the man who chose to burn incense to idols rather than yield his body to abominable lust, that, if he wishe

 18. This being from the very first and most firmly established, touching other lies the question proceeds more securely. But by consequence we must al

 19. These sorts of lies having been without any hesitation condemned, next follows a sort, as it were by steps rising to something better, which is co

 20. But haply some may think that there is an exception to be added that there be some honest lies which not only hurt no man, but profit some man, e

 21. If this be absurd, what shall we say? Is it so, that there is no “false witness,” but when one tells a lie either to invent a crime against some m

 22. What then, if a homicide seek refuge with a Christian, or if he see where the homicide have taken refuge, and be questioned of this matter by him

 23. This did a former Bishop of the Church of Thagasta, Firmus by name, and even more firm in will. For, when he was asked by command of the emperor,

 24. But one sometimes comes to a case of this kind, that we are not interrogated where the person is who is sought, nor forced to betray him, if he is

 25. For first to be eschewed is that capital lie and far to be fled from, which is done in doctrine of religion to which lie a man ought by no consid

 26. Touching which matter, there will be some place open for consideration, if first the divine authorities which forbid a lie be diligently discussed

 27. As, when we read in the Gospel, “Thou hast received a blow in the face, make ready the other cheek.” Now as an example of patience can none be fou

 28. It is also written, “But I say unto you, Swear not at all.” But the Apostle himself has used oaths in his Epistles. And so he shows how that is to

 29. As that, “Take no thought for the morrow,” and, “Take therefore no thought what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink, or what ye shall put on.” No

 30. Moreover, it was said to the Apostles that they should take nothing with them for their journey, but should live by the Gospel. And in a certain p

 31. Thus then what is written, “The mouth that lieth, slayeth the soul ” of what mouth it speaketh, is the question. For in general when the Scripture

 32. Manifestly also in the Gospel we find the mouth of the heart: so that in one place the Lord is found to have mentioned the mouth both of the body

 33. But, like as it is asked of what mouth the Scripture saith, “The mouth that lieth, slayeth the soul,” so it may be asked, of what lie. For it seem

 34. For what is written in another place, “Wish not to use every lie ” they say is not of force for this, that a person is not to use any lie. Therefo

 35. Moreover what is written “Thou wilt destroy all that speak leasing:” one saith that no lie is here excepted, but all condemned. Another saith: Yea

 36. For, concerning false witness, which is set down in the ten commands of the Law, it can indeed in no wise be contended that love of truth may at h

 37. Likewise, touching that which is written, “A son which receiveth the word shall be far from destruction: but receiving, he receiveth it for himsel

 38. Certain it is, albeit all this disputation go from side to side, some asserting that it is never right to lie, and to this effect reciting divine

 39. And all these sins, truly, whether such whereby an injury is done to men in the comforts of this life, or whereby men corrupt themselves and hurt

 40. Now the things which are to be kept safe for sanctity’s sake are these: pudicity of body, and chastity of soul, and verity of doctrine. Pudicity o

 41. There resulteth then from all these this sentence, that a lie which doth not violate the doctrine of piety, nor piety itself, nor innocence, nor b

 42. It clearly appears then, all being discussed, that those testimonies of Scripture have none other meaning than that we must never at all tell a li

 43. So great blindness, moreover, hath occupied men’s minds, that to them it is too little if we pronounce some lies not to be sins but they must nee

13. In which proposition these points may well deserve to be questioned: whether such consent is to be accounted as a deed: or whether that is to be called consent which hath not approbation: or whether it be approbation, when it is said, “It is expedient to suffer this rather than do that;” and whether the person spoken of did right to burn incense rather than suffer violation of his body; and whether it would be right rather to tell a lie, if that was the alternative proposed, than to burn incense? But if such consent is to be accounted as a deed, then are they murderers who have chosen rather to be put to death than bear false witness, yea, what is worse, they are murderers of themselves. For why, at this rate, should it not be said that they have slain themselves, because they chose that this should be done to them that they might not do what they were urged to do? Or, if it be accounted a worse thing to slay another than himself, what if these terms were offered to a Martyr, that, upon his refusing to bear false witness of Christ and to sacrifice to demons, then, before his eyes, not some other man, but his own father should be put to death; his father entreating him that he would not by his persevering permit that to be done? Is it not manifest, that, upon his remaining steadfast in his purpose of most faithful testimony, they alone would be the murderers who should slay his father, and not he a parricide into the bargain? As therefore, in this case, the man would be no party to this so heinous deed, for choosing, rather than violate his faith by false testimony, that his own father should be put to death by others, (yea, though that father were a sacrilegious person whose soul would be snatched away to punishment;) so the like consent, in the former case, would not make him a party to that so foul disgrace, if he refused to do evil himself, let others do what they might in consequence of his not doing it. For what do such persecutors say, but, “Do evil that we may not?” If the case were so, that our doing evil would make them not to have done it, even then it would not be our duty by doing wickedness ourselves to vote them harmless; but as in fact they are already doing it when they say nothing of the kind,29    Al. when they say such things. why are they to have us to keep them company in wickedness rather than be vile and noisome by themselves? For that is not to be called consent; seeing that we do not approve what they do, always wishing that they would not, and, as much as in us lies, hindering them that they should not do it, and, when it is done, not only not committing it with them, but with all possible detestation condemning the same.

13. In qua propositione ista sunt quae merito quaeri possunt: utrum talis consensio pro facto habenda sit; aut utrum consensio dicenda sit quae non habet approbationem; aut utrum approbatio sit, cum dicitur, Expedit hoc pati potius quam illud facere; et utrum recte ille fecerit thurificare quam stuprum pati; et utrum mentiendum esset potius, si ea conditio daretur, quam thurificandum. Sed si talis consensio pro facto habenda est, homicidae sunt etiam qui occidi maluerunt quam falsum testimonium dicere; et quod est homicidium gravius, in se ipsos. Cur enim hoc pacto non dicatur, quod ipsi se occiderint; quia elegerunt hoc in se fieri, ne facerent quod cogebantur? 0498 Aut si gravius putatur alium occidere quam se ipsum, quid si haec conditio martyri proponeretur, ut si nollet de Christo falsum testimonium dicere atque immolare daemonibus, ante oculos ipsius alius non quilibet homo, sed pater ejus occideretur, rogans etiam filium ne id perseverantia sua fieri permitteret? Nonne manifestum est, illo in testimonii fidelissimi sententia permanente, solos homicidas futuros fuisse, qui patrem ejus occiderent, non illum etiam parricidam? Sicut ergo hujus tanti sceleris particeps iste non esset, cum elegisset patrem suum potius ab aliis interfici, etiam sacrilegum, cujus anima raperetur ad poenas, quam fidem suam falso testimonio violare: sic talis ille consensus non eum faceret tanti flagitii participem, si male facere ipse nollet, quidquid alii propterea fecissent, quia ipse non faceret. Quid enim tales persecutores dicunt, nisi, Fac male, ne nos faciamus? Qui si vere, nobis facientibus, non fecissent, nec sic eis nostro scelere suffragari deberemus. Nunc vero quando jam faciunt, cum ista non dicunt , cur nobiscum potius, quam soli turpes atque nocentes sint? Non enim consensus ille dicendus est; quia non approbamus quod faciunt, semper optantes, et quantum in nobis est prohibentes ne faciant, factumque ipsorum non solum non committentes cum eis, sed etiam quanta possumus detestatione damnantes.