APPENDICES

 I. There is no existing thing equal in honour to God, but he is the one Ruler, and Governor, and King, to whom alone it is lawful to govern and regula

 II. Where, then, God placed the roots, and what foundation it has upon which it is so firmly fixed like a statue, we must now consider. It is not natu

 III. But the Creator created two different kinds both in the earth, and in the water, and in the air. In the air he placed those animals which fly, an

 IV. But, taking up our discourse again at the beginning for the sake of clearness, let us say that of bodies some have put on habit, and others nature

 V. In such important particulars are animals superior to plants. Let us now therefore see in what man is superior to the other animals. He now has rec

 VI. Having now, therefore, gone through the whole question of the more important plants in the world, let us see in what manner also the all-wise God

 VII. And the way in which Paradise was planted is in strict conformity with what has been here said for we read that God planted a Paradise in Eden,

 VIII. Having now, then, discussed these matters at sufficient length, we must proceed to investigate its imperishableness. Now, there are three opinio

 IX. But we must place those arguments first which make out the world to be uncreated and indestructible, because of our respect for that which is visi

 X. Since, therefore, the arrangement of the world is such as I have endeavoured to describe it, so that there is no part whatever left out, so as for

 XI. Let this be taken as a testimony delivered by Plato to the imperishable nature of the world. Its uncreated character follows from the truth of nat

 XII. Moreover this point is manifest to every one, that every nature is desirous to keep and preserve, and if it were possible to make immortal, every

 XIII. However, this argument also is a most demonstrative one, on which I know that vast numbers of philosophers pride themselves as one most accurate

 XIV. But Boethus adduces the most convincing arguments, which we shall proceed to mention immediately for if, says he, the world was created and is l

 XV. Is it not however worth while to examine this question, in what manner there can be a regeneration of all those things which have been destroyed b

 XVI. However, besides what has been here said, any one may use this argument also in corroboration of his opinion, which will certainly convince all t

 XVII. But some of those persons who have fancied that the world is everlasting, inventing a variety of new arguments, employ also such a system of rea

 XVIII. Theophrastus, moreover, says that those men who attribute a beginning and destructibility to the world are deceived by four particulars of the

 XIX. But it is necessary to encounter such quibbling arguments as these, lest some persons of too little experience should yield to and be led away by

 XX. These things, then, may be said by us with respect to the argument that the inequalities of the surface of the earth are no proof of the world hav

 XXII. And as for the third argument, it is convicted by itself, as being derived only from an unsound system of questioning proceeding from the assert

XIV. But Boethus adduces the most convincing arguments, which we shall proceed to mention immediately; for if, says he, the world was created and is liable to destruction, then something will be made out of nothing, which appears to be most absurd even to the Stoics. Why so? Because it is not possible to discover any cause of destruction either within or without, which will destroy the world. For on the outside there is nothing except perhaps a vacuum, inasmuch as all the elements in their integrity are collected and contained within it, and within there is no imperfection so great as to be the cause of dissolution to so great a thing. Again, if it is destroyed without any cause, then it is plain that from something which has no existence will arise the engendering of destruction, which is an idea quite inadmissible by reason; and, indeed, they say that there are altogether three generic manners of corruption, one which arises from division, another which proceeds from a destruction of the distinctive quality which holds the thing together, and the third from confusion; therefore the things which consist of a union of separate members, such as flocks of goats, herds of oxen, choruses, armies; or, again, bodies which are compounded of limbs joined together, are dissolved by disjunction and separation. But wax, when stamped with a new impression, or softened before being remodelled so as to present a new and different appearance, is corrupted by a destruction of the distinctive quality which previously held it together. Other things are corrupted by confusion, as the medicine which the physicians call tetrapharmacon, for the powers of the drugs brought together and combined were destroyed in such a manner as to produce one perfect medicine of especial virtue. By which, then, of these modes of corruption is it becoming to say that the world is destroyed? By that which is caused by separation? No, for it is not compounded of separate members so that its different parts can be dispersed, nor of portions joined together so that they can be dissolved; nor is it united together in a similar manner to our own bodies, for they have the seeds of decay in themselves, and they are subject to influence of a great variety of things by which they are at times injured; but the power of the world is invincible, since by its great superiority to other things it has dominion over everything. Is it then destroyed by a complete destruction of its distinctive qualities? This again is impossible, for there remains, as the adversaries affirm, a quality of arrangement which by the process of conflagration is only diminished to a lesser substance ... Is it destroyed then by confusion? Away with such an idea, for in that case it would be necessary to confess that the corruption of a body can be reduced to a state of non-existence. Why so? Because if each of the particular elements were destroyed separately, it would be possible for it to become changed into another; but if they are altogether destroyed at one and the same moment by confusion, then it would be necessary to imagine what is absolutely impossible.