Summa Contra Gentiles

 Book 1

 The Function of the Wise Man

 Of the Author's Purpose

 That the Truths which we confess concerning God fall under two Modes or Categories

 That it is an advantage for the Truths of God, known by Natural Reason, to be proposed to men to be believed on faith

 That it is an advantage for things that cannot he searched out by Reason to be proposed as Tenets of Faith

 That there is no lightmindedness in assenting to Truths of Faith, although they are above Reason

 That the Truth of reason is not contrary to the Truth of Christian Faith

 Of the Relation of Human Reason to the first Truth of Faith*

 The Order and Mode of Procedure in this Work

 Of the Opinion of those who say that the Existence of God cannot he proved, being a Self-evident Truth

 Rejection of the aforesaid Opinion, and Solution of the aforesaid Reasons

 Of the Opinion of those who say that the Existence of God is a Tenet of Faith alone and cannot he demonstrated

 Reasons in Proof of the Existence of God

 That in order to a Knowledge of God we must use the Method of Negative Differentiation*

 That God is Eternal

 That in God there is no Passive Potentiality

 That in God there is no Composition

 That God is Incorporeal

 That God is His own Essence*

 That in God Existence and Essence is the same*

 That in God there is no Accident

 That the Existence of God cannot he characterised by the addition of any Substantial Differentia*

 That God is not in any Genus

 That God is Universal Perfection

 How Likeness to God may be found in Creatures

 What Names can be predicated of God

 That the Plurality of divine Names is not inconsistent with the Simplicity of the Divine Being predicated of God and of other Beings

 That nothing is predicated of God and other beings synonymously*

 That it is not at all true that the application of common Predicates to God and to Creatures involves nothing beyond a mere Identity of Name

 That the things that are said God and Creatures are said analogously

 That the several Names predicated of God are not synonymous

 That the Propositions which our Understanding forms of God are not void of meaning

 That God is His own Goodness*

 That in God there can be no Evil

 That God is the Good of all Good

 That God is One

 That God is Infinite

 That God has Understanding

 That in God the Understanding is His very Essence

 That God understands by nothing else than by His own Essence

 That God perfectly understands Himself

 That God primarily and essentially knows Himself alone

 That God knows other things besides Himself

 That God has a particular Knowledge of all things

 Some Discussion of the Question how there is in the Divine Understanding a Multitude of Objects

 Reasons to show how the Multitude of intelligible Ideal Forms has no Existence except in the Divine Understanding

 How there is in God a Multitude of Objects of Understanding

 That the Divine Essence, being One, is the proper Likeness and Type of all things Intelligible*

 That God understands all things at once and together

 That there is no Habitual Knowledge in God

 That the Knowledge of God is not a Reasoned Knowledge

 That God does not understand by Combination and Separation of Ideas

 That the Truth to be found in Propositions is not excluded from God

 That God is Truth

 That God is pure Truth

 That the Truth of God is the First and Sovereign Truth

 The Arguments of those who wish to withdraw from God the Knowledge of Individual Things*

 A list of things to be said concerning the Divine Knowledge

 That God Knows Individual Things

 That God knows things which are not*

 That God knows Individual Contingent Events*

 That God knows the Motions of the Will

 That God knows infinite things*

 That God knows Base and Mean Things*

 That God knows Evil Things

 That God has a Will

 That the Will of God is His Essence

 That the Object of the Will of God in the First Place is God Himself

 That God in willing Himself wills also other things besides Himself*

 That with one and the same Act of the Will God wills Himself and all other Beings

 That the Multitude of the Objects of God's Will is not inconsistent with the Simplicity of His Substance

 That the Divine Will reaches to the good of Individual Existences

 That God wills things even that as yet are not

 That God of necessity wills His own Being and His own Goodness

 That God does not of necessity love other things than Himself

 Arguments against the aforesaid Doctrine and Solutions of the same

 That God wills anything else than Himself with an Hypothetical Necessity*

 That the Will of God is not of things in themselves Impossible

 That the Divine Will does not take away Contingency from things

 That Reason can be assigned for the Divine Will*

 That nothing can be a Cause to the Divine Will

 That there is a Free Will in God

 That there are no Passions in God

 That there is in God Delight and Joy

 That there is Love in God.*

 In what sense Virtues can be posited in God

 That in God there are the Virtues which regulate Action

 That the Contemplative (Intellectual) Virtues are in God

 That God cannot will Evil

 That God hates nothing

 That God is Living

 That God is His own Life

 That the Life of God is everlasting

 Book 2

 Connexion of what follows with what has gone before.

 That the Philosopher and the Theologian view Creatures from Different Standpoints

 Order of Matters to be Treated

 That it belongs to God to be to other Beings the Principle of Existence

 That there is in God Active Power

 That God's Power is His Substance

 That God's Power is His Action

 In what manner Power is said to be in God

 That something is predicated of God in relation to Creatures

 That the Relations, predicated of God in regard to Creatures, are not really in God*

 How the aforesaid Relations are predicated of God

 That the Predication of many Relations of God is no prejudice to the Simplicity and Singleness of His Being

 That God is to all things the Cause of their being

 That God has brought things into being out of nothing

 That Creation is not a Movement nor a Change

 Solution of Arguments against Creation*

 That Creation is not Successive

 That it belongs to God alone to create

 That God is Almighty

 That God's Action in Creation is not of Physical Necessity, but of Free Choice of Will

 That God acts by His Wisdom*

 In what sense some things are said to be Impossible to the Almighty

 That the Divine Understanding is not limited to certain fixed Effects

 That God has not brought things into being in discharge of any Debt of Justice

 How in the Production of a Creature there may be found a debt of Justice in respect of the necessary Sequence of something posterior upon something pr

 How Absolute Necessity may have place in Creation

 That it is not necessary for Creatures to have existed from Eternity*

 Reasons alleged for the Eternity of the World on the part of God, with Answers to the same

 Reasons alleged for the Eternity of the World on the part Creatures, with answers to the same

 Reasons alleged for the Eternity of the World on the part of the Creative Process itself, with Answers to the same

 Arguments wherewith some try to show that the World is not Eternal, and Solutions of the same

 That the Variety of Creatures does not arise from any Contrariety of Prime Agents*

 That the Variety of Creatures has not arisen from Variety of Merits and Demerits

 The Real Prime Cause of the Variety of Creatures.

 That it was necessary for the Perfection of the Universe that there should be some Intellectual Natures

 That Subsistent Intelligences are Voluntary Agents

 That Subsistent Intelligences have Free Will

 That Subsistent Intelligence is not Corporeal

 That in Created Subsistent Intelligences there is a Difference between Existence and Essence

 That in Created Subsistent Intelligences there is Actuality and Potentiality

 That Subsistent Intelligences are Imperishable

 How a Subsistent Intelligence may be united with a Body, with a Solution of the Arguments alleged to prove that a Subsistent Intelligence cannot be un

 Plato's Theory of the Union of the Intellectual Soul with the Body*

 That Vegetative, Sentient, and Intelligent are not in man Three Souls

 That the Potential Intellect of Man is not a Spirit subsisting apart from Matter*

 That Man is not a Member the Human Species by possession of Passive Intellect, but by possession of Potential Intellect

 That the aforesaid Tenet is contrary to the Mind of Aristotle

 Against the Opinion of Alexander concerning the Potential Intellect*

 That the Soul is not a Harmony*

 That the Soul is not a Body

 Against those who suppose Intellect and Sense to be the same

 Against those who maintain that the Potential Intellect is the Phantasy*

 How a Subsistent Intelligence may be the Form of a Body

 Solution of the Arguments alleged to show that a Subsistent Intelligence cannot be united with a Body as the Form of that Body*

 That the Potential Intellect is not One and the Same in all Men

 Of the Opinion of Avicenna, who supposed Intellectual Forms not to be preserved in the Potential Intellect*

 Confutation of the Arguments which seem to prove the Unity of the Potential Intellect

 That the Active Intellect is not a separately Subsisting Intelligence, But a Faculty of the Soul

 That it is not impossible for the Potential and the Active Intellect to be united in the one Substance of the Soul

 That it was not the opinion of Aristotle that the Active Intellect is a separately Subsistent Intelligence, but rather that it is a part of the Soul*

 That the Human Soul does not Perish with the Body

 Arguments of those who wish to prove that the Human Soul perishes with the Body, with Replies to the same

 That the Souls of Dumb Animals are not Immortal

 Apparent Arguments to show that the Human Soul does not begin with the Body, but has been from Eternity, with Replies to the same

 That the Soul is not of the substance of God

 That the Human Soul is not transmitted by Generation*

 That the Human Soul is brought into Being by a Creative Act of God

 Arguments against the Truth of the Conclusion last drawn, with their Solution

 That there are Subsistent Intelligences not united with Bodies*

 That Intelligences subsisting apart are not more than one in the same Species*

 That an Intelligence subsisting apart and a Soul are not of one Species

 That Intelligences subsisting apart do not gather their Knowledge from Objects of Sense

 That the Mind of an Intelligence subsisting apart is ever in the act of understanding

 How one separately subsisting Intelligence knows another

 That Intelligences subsisting apart know Material Things, that is to say, the Species of Things Corporeal

 That Intelligences subsisting apart know Individual Things

 Whether to Separately Subsisting Intelligences all Points of their Natural Knowledge are Simultaneously Present

 Book 3

 Preface to the Book that Follows

 That every Agent acts to some End

 That every Agent acts to some Good

 That Evil in things is beside the Intention of the Agent

 Arguments against the Truth of the Conclusion last drawn, with Solutions of the Same

 That Evil is not a Nature or Essence*

 Arguments against the aforsesaid Conclusion, with Answers to the same

 That the Cause of Evil is good

 That Evil is founded in some Good

 That Evil does not entirely swallow up Good

 That Evil is an Accidental Cause

 That there is not any Sovereign Evil, acting as the Principle of All Evils

 That the End in View of everything is some Good

 That all Things are ordained to one End, which is God

 How God is the End of all Things

 That all Things aim at Likeness to God

 How Things copy the Divine Goodness

 That Things aim at Likeness to God in being Causes of other Things

 That all Things seek good, even Things devoid of Consciousness

 That the End of every Subsistent Intelligence is to understand God

 That Happiness does not consist in any Act of the Will*

 That the Happiness of Man does not consist in Bodily Pleasures

 That Happiness does not consist in Honours nor in Human Glory

 That Man's Happiness does not consist in Riches

 That Happiness does not consist in Worldly Power

 That Happiness does not consist in the Goods of the Body

 That the Final Happiness Man does not consist in Acts of the Moral Virtues

 That the Final Happiness of Man consists in the Contemplation of God

 That Human Happiness does not consist in such Knowledge of God as is common to the majority of Mankind

 That Happiness does not consist in the Knowledge of God which is to be had by Demonstration

 That Happiness does not consist in the Knowledge of God by Faith

 [That we cannot find happiness in this life by sharing an angel's natural knowledge of God]*

 That the Soul in this life does not understand itself by itself

 That we cannot in this life see God as He essentially is*

 That the Final Happiness of Man is not in this Life*

 That the Knowledge which Pure Spirits have of God through knowing their own Essence does not carry with it a Vision of the Essence of God

 That the desire of Pure Intelligences does not rest satisfied in the Natural Knowledge which they have of God

 How God is seen as He essentially is

 That no Created Substance can of its natural power arrive to see God as He essentially is

 That a Created Intelligence needs some influx of Divine Light to see God in His Essence

 Arguments against the aforesaid statements, and their Solutions

 That the Created Intelligence does not comprehend the Divine Substance

 That no Created Intelligence in seeing God sees all things that can be seen in Him

 That every Intelligence of every grade can be partaker of the vision of God

 That one may see God more perfectly than another

 How they who see the Divine Substance see all things

 That they who see God see all things in Him at once

 That by the Sight of God one is Partaker of Life Everlasting

 That they who see God will see Him for ever

 How in that Final Happiness every Desire of Man is fulfilled

 That God governs things by His Providence

 That God preserves things in being

 That nothing gives Being except in as much as it acts in the Power of God

 That God is the Cause of Activity in all Active Agents

 That God is everywhere and in all things

 Of the Opinion of those who withdraw from Natural Things their Proper Actions

 How the Same Effect is from God and from a Natural Agent

 That the Divine Providence is not wholly inconsistent with the presence of Evil in Creation

 That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with an element of Contingency in Creation*

 That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with Freedom of the Will

 That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with Fortune and Chance*

 That the Providence of God is exercised over Individual and Contingent Things

 That the Providence of God watches immediately over all Individual Things

 That the arrangements of Divine Providence are carried into execution by means of Secondary Causes

 That Intelligent Creatures are the Medium through which other Creatures are governed by God

 Of the Subordination of Men one to another

 That other Subsistent Intelligences cannot be direct Causes of our Elections and Volitions*

 That the Motion of the Will is caused by God, and not merely by the Power of the Will

 That Human Choices and Volitions are subject to Divine Providence

 How Human Things are reduced to Higher Causes*

 In what sense one is said to be Fortunate, and how Man is aided by Higher Causes*

 Of Fate, whether there be such a thing, and if so, what it is

 Of the Certainty of Divine Providence*

 That the Immutability of Divine Providence does not bar the Utility of Prayer

 That God does not hear all Prayers

 How the Arrangements of Providence follow a Plan

 God can work beyond the Order laid down for Creatures, and produce Effects without Proximate Causes

 That the things which God does beyond the Order of Nature are not contrary to Nature*

 Of Miracles

 That God alone works Miracles

 How Separately Subsisting Spirits work certain Wonders, which yet are not true Miracles

 That the Works of Magicians are not due solely to the Influence of the Heavenly Spheres*

 Whence the performances of Magicians derive their Efficacy*

 That the Subsistent Intelligence, which lends Efficacy to Magical Performances, is not Good in both Categories of Being*

 That the Subsistent Intelligence, whose aid is employed in Magic, is not Evil by Nature*

 Arguments seeming to prove that Sin is impossible to Spirits, with Solutions of the same

 That in Spirits there may be Sin, and how

 That Rational Creatures are governed by Providence for their own sakes, and other Creatures in reference to them*

 That the acts of the Rational Creature are guided by God, not merely to the realisation of the Specific Type, but also to the realisation of the Indiv

 That it was necessary for a Law to be given to Man by God

 That the main purpose of the Divine Law is to subordinate Man to God

 That the End of the Divine Law is the Love of God

 That by the Divine Law we are directed to the Love of our Neighbour

 That by Divine Law men are obliged to a Right Faith

 That by certain Sensible Rites our mind is directed to God

 That the Worship of Latria is to be paid to God alone

 That the Divine Law directs man to a Rational Use of Corporeal and Sensible Things

 Of the reason for which Simple Fornication is a Sin by Divine Law, and of the Natural Institution of Marriage

 That Marriage ought to be Indissoluble

 That Marriage ought to be between one Man and one Woman

 That Marriage ought not to take place between Kindred

 That not all Sexual is Sin

 That of no Food is the Use Sinful in itself

 How the Law of God relates a man to his Neighbour

 That the things commanded by the Divine Law are Right, not only because the Law enacts them, but also according to Nature

 That the Divine Government of Men is after the manner of Paternal Government

 Of the Counsels that are given in the Divine Law

 Arguments against Voluntary Poverty, with Replies

 Of various Modes of Living adopted by the Votaries of Voluntary Poverty

 In what the Good of Poverty consists

 Arguments against Perpetual Continence, with Replies

 Against those who find fault with Vows

 That neither all Good Works nor all Sins are Equal*

 That a Man's Acts are punished or rewarded by God

 Of the Difference and Order of Punishments

 That not all Punishments nor all Rewards are Equal

 Of the Punishment due to Mortal and Venial Sins respectively in regard to the Last End

 That the Punishment whereby one is deprived of his Last End is Interminable*

 That Sins are punished also by the experience of something Painful

 That it is Lawful for judges to inflict Punishments

 That Man stands in need of Divine Grace for the Gaining of Happiness

 That the Divine Assistance does not compel a Man to Virtue

 That Man cannot Merit beforehand the said Assistance

 That the aforesaid Assistance is called 'Grace,' and what is the meaning of 'Grace constituting a State of Grace'*

 That the Grace which constitutes the State of Grace causes in us the Love of God

 That Divine Grace causes in us Faith

 That Divine Grace causes in us a Hope of future Blessedness

 Of Graces given gratuitously*

 That Man needs the Assistance of Divine Grace to persevere in Good*

 That he who falls from Grace by Sin may be recovered again by Grace

 That Man cannot be delivered from Sin except by Grace

 How Man is delivered from Sin

 That it is reasonably reckoned a Man's own Fault if he be not converted to God, although he cannot be converted without Grace

 That a Man already in Mortal Sin cannot avoid more Mortal Sin without Grace*

 That some Men God delivers from Sin, and some He leaves in Sin

 That God is Cause of Sin to no Man

 Of Predestination, Reprobation, and Divine Election

 Book 4

 Preface

 Of Generation, Paternity, and Sonship in God

 The Opinion of Photinus touching the Son of God, and its Rejection*

 Rejection of the Opinion of Sabellius concerning the Son of God*

 Of the Opinion of Arius concerning the Son of God*

 Rejection of Arius's Position

 Explanation of the Texts which Arius used to allege for himself

 How the Son of God is called the Wisdom of God

 That the Holy Ghost is true God

 That the Holy Ghost is a Subsistent Person

 Of the Effects which the Scriptures attribute to the Holy Ghost in respect of the whole Creation

 Of the Effects attributed to the Holy Ghost in Scripture in the way of Gifts bestowed on the Rational Creature

 Of the Effects attributed to the Holy Ghost in the attraction of the Rational Creature to God

 Replies to Arguments alleged against the Divinity of the Holy Ghost

 That the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son*

 That there are only Three Persons in the Godhead, Father and Son and Holy Ghost

 Of the Incarnation of the Word according to the Tradition of Holy Scripture

 Of the Error of Photinus concerning the Incarnation

 Of the Error of the Manicheans concerning the Incarnation

 Of the Error of Arius and Apollinaris concerning the Soul of Christ

 Of the Error of Theodore of Mopsuestia concerning the Union of the Word with Man

 Against the Error of Eutyches

 Of the Error of Macarius of Antioch, who posited one Operation only and one Will only in Christ*

 The Doctrine of Catholic Faith concerning the Incarnation

 Objections against the Faith of the Incarnation, with Replies

 Some further Elucidation of the Incarnation

 That the Human Nature, assumed by the Word, was perfect in Soul and Body in the instant of Conception

 That Christ was born of virgin without prejudice to His true and natural Humanity

 That Christ was conceived by the Holy Ghost

 That Original Sin is transmitted from our First Parent to his Posterity

 Arguments against Original Sin, with Replies

 Of the Incarnation as part of the Fitness of Things

 Points of Reply to Difficulties touching the Economy of the Incarnation

 Of the Need of Sacraments

 Of the Difference between the Sacraments of the Old and of the New Law

 Of the Number of the Sacraments of the New Law

 Of Baptism

 Of Confirmation

 Of the Eucharist

 Of the Conversion of Bread into the Body of Christ

 An Answer to Difficulties raised in respect of Place

 The Difficulty of the Accidents remaining

 What happens when the Sacramental Species pass away

 Answer to the Difficulty raised in respect of the Breaking of the Host

 The Explanation of a Text

 Of the kind of Bread and Wine that ought to be used for the Consecration of this Sacrament

 That it is possible for a man to sin after receiving Sacramental Grace*

 That a man who sins after the Grace of the Sacraments may be converted to Grace*

 Of the need of the Sacrament of Penance, and of the Parts thereof

 Of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction

 Of the Sacrament of Order

 Of the Distinction of Orders

 Of the Episcopal Dignity, and that therein one Bishop is Supreme

 That Sacraments can be administered even by Wicked Ministers

 Of the Sacrament of Matrimony

 That through Christ the Resurrection of our Bodies will take place

 Some Points of Reply to Difficulties on the Resurrection

 That Men shall rise again Immortal

 That in the Resurrection there will be no use of Food or of the Sexes

 That Risen Bodies shall be of the same Nature as before

 That the Bodies of the Risen shall be otherwise organised than before

 Of the Qualities of Glorified Bodies

 Of Sex and Age in the Resurrection

 Of the Quality of Risen Bodies in the Lost

 How Incorporeal Subsistent Spirits suffer from Corporeal Fire, and are befittingly punished with Corporeal Punishments

 That Souls enter upon Punishment or Reward immediately after their Separation from their Bodies

 That the Souls of the Saints after Death have their Will immutably fixed on Good

 That the Souls of the Wicked after Death have their Will immutably fixed on Evil

 Of the General Cause of Immutability in all Souls after their Separation from the Body

 Of the Last judgement

 Of the State of the World after the judgement

Summa Contra Gentiles